An Analysis of Market Structure and Pricing in the Florida Celery Industry

AbstractThe pricing behavior of the Florida celery industry under the current federal marketing order was examined by analyzing the implied market structure of the industry using a model proposed by Appelbaum. Point estimates of the oligopoly power index suggest that some degree of price enhancement above that which would be characterized by a perfectly competitive market may have occurred. However, the bulk of statistical evidence suggests that the departure from marginal cost pricing implied by the industry's pricing behavior is not statistically significant.

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Market Structure and Pricing Behavior in the Korean Transportation Fuel Market

Environmental and Resource Economics Review ◽

10.15266/kerea.2015.24.2.311 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 24 (2) ◽

pp. 311-342

Author(s):

Choon-Geol Moon

Keyword(s):

Market Structure ◽

Transportation Fuel ◽

Pricing Behavior ◽

Market Structure And Pricing

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Contract institutions in the Russian economy: The sphere of state, municipal, and regulated procurement

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2017-11-93-110 ◽

2017 ◽

pp. 93-110 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

O. Anchishkina

Keyword(s):

Economic Growth ◽

Theoretical Model ◽

Market Structure ◽

Market Equilibrium ◽

Statistical Evidence ◽

Market Model ◽

Market Behavior ◽

Database Analysis ◽

Russian Economy ◽

Contracting Model

The article synthesizes information on database analysis of state, municipal, and regulated procurement through which Russian contract institutions and the market model are investigated. The inherent uncertainty of quantity indicators on contracting activities and process is identified and explained. The article provides statistical evidence for heterogeneous market structure in state and municipal procurement, and big player’s dominance. A theoretical model for market behavior, noncooperative competition and collusion is proposed, through which the major trends are explained. The intrinsic flaws and failure of the current contracting model are revealed and described. This ineffectiveness is regarded to be not a limitation, but a challenge to be met. If responded to, drivers for economic growth and market equilibrium will be switched on.

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Efficient Collective Decision-Making, Marginal Cost Pricing, And Quadratic Voting

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.2836610 ◽

2016 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

T. Nicolaus Tideman ◽

Florenz Plassmann

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Marginal Cost ◽

Collective Decision ◽

Collective Decision Making ◽

Marginal Cost Pricing

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Pricing of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles in Mixed-Traffic Networks

Transportation Research Record Journal of the Transportation Research Board ◽

10.1177/0361198120985850 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 036119812098585

Author(s):

Paolo Delle Site

Keyword(s):

Autonomous Vehicles ◽

Marginal Cost ◽

User Behavior ◽

Social Planner ◽

Traffic Networks ◽

Mixed Traffic ◽

The Third ◽

First Case ◽

Marginal Cost Pricing ◽

The Social

For networks with human-driven vehicles (HDVs) only, pricing with arc-specific tolls has been proposed to achieve minimization of travel times in a decentralized way. However, the policy is hardly feasible from a technical viewpoint without connectivity. Therefore, for networks with mixed traffic of HDVs and connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs), this paper considers pricing in a scenario where only CAVs are charged. In contrast to HDVs, CAVs can be managed as individual vehicles or as a fleet. In the latter case, CAVs can be routed to minimize the travel time of the fleet of CAVs or that of the entire fleet of HDVs and CAVs. We have a selfish user behavior in the first case, a private monopolist behavior in the second, a social planner behavior in the third. Pricing achieves in a decentralized way the social planner optimum. Tolls are not unique and can take both positive and negative values. Marginal cost pricing is one solution. The valid toll set is provided, and tolls are then computed according to two schemes: one with positive tolls only and minimum toll expenditure, and one with both tolls and subsidies and zero net expenditure. Convergent algorithms are used for the mixed-behavior equilibrium (simplicial decomposition algorithm) and toll determination (cutting plane algorithm). The computational experience with three networks: a two-arc network representative of the classic town bypass case, the Nguyen-Dupuis network, and the Anaheim network, provides useful policy insight.

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