Moral Choices in Foreign Affairs

Worldview ◽  
1958 ◽  
Vol 1 (9) ◽  
pp. 4-7
Author(s):  
Kenneth W. Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
The United States ◽  
George Washington ◽  
Woodrow Wilson ◽  
American President ◽  
Moral Choices

Three contemporary problems in American foreign policy illustrate in graphic terms the moral dilemmas that confront any state in the conduct of foreign relations. Every American President since George Washington has proclaimed the Republic's devotion to democracy both here and abroad. One of our greatest Presidents, Woodrow Wilson, led the country in a crusade to “make the world safe for democracy.” The Eisenhower administration in 1952 rededicated itself to the liberation of subject peoples in eastern Europe from tyranny and oppression. By April 29, 1958, however, Vice President Nixon in replying to a question why the United States supported dictatorships in Latin America observed: “If we openly discriminate between one government and another in Latin America, what would we be charged with? We would be charged with interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and with trying to impose our system of government on them.”

Know Thyself: What Is “Wilsonianism”?

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Tony Smith
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Decisions ◽  
Woodrow Wilson ◽  
Liberal Internationalism ◽  
History Of

This introductory chapter provides an overview of Wilsonianism, which comprises a set of ideas called American liberal internationalism. More than a century after Woodrow Wilson became president of the United States, his country is still not certain how to understand the important legacy for the country's foreign policy of the tradition that bears his name. Wilsonianism remains a living ideology whose interpretation continues either to motivate, or to serve as a cover for, a broad range of American foreign policy decisions. However, if there is no consensus on what the tradition stands for, or, worse, if there is a consensus but its claims to be part of the tradition are not borne out by the history of Wilsonianism from Wilson's day until the late 1980s, then clearly a debate is in order to provide clarity and purpose to American thinking about world affairs today.

The Reagan Presidency and US Foreign Relations

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Miles
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Reagan Administration ◽  
Financial Burden ◽  
Vice President ◽  
The United States ◽  
White House ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy legacy remains hotly contested, and as new archival sources come to light, those debates are more likely to intensify than to recede into the background. In dealings with the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration set the superpowers on a course for the (largely) peaceful end of the Cold War. Reagan began his outreach to Soviet leaders almost immediately after taking office and enjoyed some success, even if the dominant theme of the period remains fears of Reagan as a “button-pusher” in the public’s perception. Mikhail Gorbachev’s election to the post of General Secretary proved the turning point. Reagan, now confident in US strength, and Gorbachev, keen to reduce the financial burden of the arms race, ushered in a new, cooperative phase of the Cold War. Elsewhere, in particular Latin America, the administration’s focus on fighting communism led it to support human rights–abusing regimes at the same time as it lambasted Moscow’s transgressions in that regard. But even so, over the course of the 1980s, the United States began pushing for democratization around the world, even where Reagan and his advisors had initially resisted it, fearing a communist takeover. In part, this was a result of public pressure, but the White House recognized and came to support the rising tide of democratization. When Reagan left office, a great many countries that had been authoritarian were no longer, often at least in part because of US policy. US–Soviet relations had improved to such an extent that Reagan’s successor, Vice President George H. W. Bush, worried that they had gone too far in working with Gorbachev and been hoodwinked.

From Theory to Practice: Neo-Wilsonianism in the White House, 2001–2017

2018 ◽  
pp. 235-275
Author(s):  
Tony Smith
Keyword(s):  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
American Exceptionalism ◽  
The United States ◽  
Security Strategy ◽  
Woodrow Wilson ◽  
White House ◽  
Liberal Internationalism ◽  
Bush Doctrine ◽  
Theory To Practice ◽  
National Security Strategy

This chapter examines neo-Wilsonianism in the White House, considering the Bush Doctrine—often referred to as the National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002, or NSS-2002. In the annals of American foreign policy there had never been anything even remotely like NSS-2002, its façade of Wilsonianism covering a far more aggressive imperialist claim for American exceptionalism than Woodrow Wilson had ever espoused, which in due course threatened to destroy altogether the credentials of good stewardship for world affairs that American liberal internationalism had enjoyed from the 1940s through the 1980s. One month after NSS-2002 appeared, the Iraq Resolution passed Congress with strong majorities in both chambers. Neo-Wilsonianism, born in theory during the 1990s, entered into practice five months after this historic vote with the invasion of Iraq that started on March 20, 2003. The chapter then looks at neo-Wilsonianism during the Obama presidency.

An Illusion of Security

2018 ◽  
pp. 65-95
Author(s):  
Laurence R. Jurdem
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Policy Issue ◽  
Vice President ◽  
The United States ◽  
Jimmy Carter ◽  
National Review ◽  
Public Policy Issue ◽  
The Soviet Union

Nixon’s policy of détente eventually led the United States and the Soviet Union to sign an arms agreement in Moscow in 1972 at what became known as the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). While symbolically the negotiations were considered significant, they did not do a great deal to limit the arms race. Nixon’s resignation in 1974 left the future of SALT in the hands of Vice President Gerald Ford. The treaty was scheduled to expire that year, and the longtime congressman from Michigan was determined to make progress with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. However, due to difficulties during the SALT II negotiations and Ford’s abbreviated presidency, Jimmy Carter inherited the unfinished arms control negotiations when he took the oath of office in early 1977. As American and Soviet negotiators focused on finalizing the SALT II arms agreement, Commentary, National Review, and Human Events expressed their concern over the ongoing debate between the two superpowers about nuclear and chemical weapons. That contentious public policy issue was not simply about arms control but was symbolic of the state of American foreign policy itself.

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