From Theory to Practice: Neo-Wilsonianism in the White House, 2001–2017

2018 ◽  
pp. 235-275
Author(s):  
Tony Smith

This chapter examines neo-Wilsonianism in the White House, considering the Bush Doctrine—often referred to as the National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002, or NSS-2002. In the annals of American foreign policy there had never been anything even remotely like NSS-2002, its façade of Wilsonianism covering a far more aggressive imperialist claim for American exceptionalism than Woodrow Wilson had ever espoused, which in due course threatened to destroy altogether the credentials of good stewardship for world affairs that American liberal internationalism had enjoyed from the 1940s through the 1980s. One month after NSS-2002 appeared, the Iraq Resolution passed Congress with strong majorities in both chambers. Neo-Wilsonianism, born in theory during the 1990s, entered into practice five months after this historic vote with the invasion of Iraq that started on March 20, 2003. The chapter then looks at neo-Wilsonianism during the Obama presidency.

Author(s):  
Tony Smith

This introductory chapter provides an overview of Wilsonianism, which comprises a set of ideas called American liberal internationalism. More than a century after Woodrow Wilson became president of the United States, his country is still not certain how to understand the important legacy for the country's foreign policy of the tradition that bears his name. Wilsonianism remains a living ideology whose interpretation continues either to motivate, or to serve as a cover for, a broad range of American foreign policy decisions. However, if there is no consensus on what the tradition stands for, or, worse, if there is a consensus but its claims to be part of the tradition are not borne out by the history of Wilsonianism from Wilson's day until the late 1980s, then clearly a debate is in order to provide clarity and purpose to American thinking about world affairs today.


2006 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jules Lobel

In September 2002, as the Bush administration was gearing up for a showdown with Iraq, the White House released its National Security Strategy, which announced a radical shift in American military policy. The United States had previously adhered doctrinally, if not always in practice, to the international rule that a nation may unilaterally launch a military attack against another nation only in strict self-defense, that is, in response to an armed attack or an imminent threat of an armed attack.Any other use of military force requires approval of the United Nations (“U.N.”) Security Council, which must first find that a “threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression” exists, and then must authorize the use of force to remove that threat. The 2002 National Security Strategy maintained that the threat of catastrophic attacks with weapons of mass destruction by rogue states and/or terrorists demands a new, preemptive approach. The new doctrine insisted that unilateral recourse to war is justified not only to forestall imminent attacks, but to preempt non-imminent threats where the threats are large enough. The United States led invasion of Iraq was widely viewed as the first test of this preemptive war doctrine.


Elements ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Scullin

The Bush Doctrine, formally known as the United States National Security Strategy 2002, reorients United States foreign and domestic security policy to reocgnize the increasing threat of terroristic warfare. The doctrine mandates taking any action deemed necessary for American security, maintaining the option for preventative, unilateral war. This paper will explore the doctrine's impact on US foreign policy as well as its shortcomings as a component of international law. It concludes that a shift in foreign policy is necessary to improve the doctrine's effectiveness.


Author(s):  
Benjamin Zyla

Soon after the terrorist attacks on September 11th, the Bush administration announced a new national security strategy. Soon thereafter, this strategic document was denounced in European capitals as ‘cowboyesk’ and isolationist. Particular dislike was announced about the strategy of pre-emption in domestic affairs of other states. Under this plan Washington reserved the right to send U.S. soldiers abroad to intervene in countries before they can pose a threat to the United States. In addition, many officials in Europe rejected Washington’s assertion of withdrawing from its membership in the international criminal court, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Kyoto Protocol; it was perceived as a unilateralist foreign policy that rejects America’s responsibility in the world. However, what some analysts and commentators neglect to see is that the Bush doctrine also shows elements of Wilsonianism, a policy named after former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson who stood for promoting democracy, human rights, freedom and effective in international affairs. The European Union published their first security strategy a year after the U.S. published theirs. Interestingly, Brussels advocated similar strategies and concepts to the US strategy. Similarities can be see in both strategies in their messianic approach to create a better world and promote more international oder. This paper argues that despite the unilateralist tone of the current U.S. national security policy, the European strategy and its American counterpart share the same values of how to conduct and what to achieve in international affairs. Consequently, the two strategies can be seen as complementary to each other, not contradictory. The paper will first address the nature of the U.S. national security strategy before analyzing the European security strategy while making reference, in both cases, to the Wilsonian tradition of international affairs.


Author(s):  
Benjamin Zyla

Soon after the terrorist attacks on September 11th, the Bush administration announced a new national security strategy. Soon thereafter, this strategic document was denounced in European capitals as ‘cowboyesk’ and isolationist. Particular dislike was announced about the strategy of pre-emption in domestic affairs of other states. Under this plan Washington reserved the right to send U.S. soldiers abroad to intervene in countries before they can pose a threat to the United States. In addition, many officials in Europe rejected Washington’s assertion of withdrawing from its membership in the international criminal court, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Kyoto Protocol; it was perceived as a unilateralist foreign policy that rejects America’s responsibility in the world. However, what some analysts and commentators neglect to see is that the Bush doctrine also shows elements of Wilsonianism, a policy named after former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson who stood for promoting democracy, human rights, freedom and effective in international affairs. The European Union published their first security strategy a year after the U.S. published theirs. Interestingly, Brussels advocated similar strategies and concepts to the US strategy. Similarities can be see in both strategies in their messianic approach to create a better world and promote more international oder. This paper argues that despite the unilateralist tone of the current U.S. national security policy, the European strategy and its American counterpart share the same values of how to conduct and what to achieve in international affairs. Consequently, the two strategies can be seen as complementary to each other, not contradictory. The paper will first address the nature of the U.S. national security strategy before analyzing the European security strategy while making reference, in both cases, to the Wilsonian tradition of international affairs. Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v2i2.168


Author(s):  
Marc C. Vielledent

The United States has long enjoyed an essentially unopposed ability to project power and sustain its security forces dispersed throughout the world. However, the uncertainty facing the global security environment, including tenuous alliances, fiscal constraints, and a decline in overseas basing, has increased tensions in emerging areas of potential conflict. These factors are driving change regarding the United States’ defense posture and access agreements abroad. While the preponderance of overseas capability outweighs the preponderance of U.S. forces, deterrence continues to underpin the overarching national security strategy. However, deterrence options impacted by the lack of resilience and investment in distributed logistics and sustainment are generating an additional range of variables and conditions for operators on the ground to consider in shared and contested domains.


2018 ◽  
pp. 276-290
Author(s):  
Tony Smith

This concluding chapter argues that from early 2002 until today, American foreign policy has been premised on convictions that are both utopian and imperialist in a fashion quite foreign to the liberal internationalist tradition as it existed prior to 1990s. With its confidence in the ease of a transition from authoritarian to democratic order, its insistence on a “just war” doctrine that overthrew the Westphalian system of states by legitimizing the armed intervention of democracies against autocratic states, and its redefinition of American exceptionalism from a defense of the democratic world to a world-order project that knew no limits, neo-Wilsonianism sabotaged the very tradition from which it had emerged. The question, then, is whether the liberal internationalist tradition can be resuscitated in such a way that it contributes positively to world affairs.


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