An Illusion of Security

2018 ◽  
pp. 65-95
Author(s):  
Laurence R. Jurdem
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Policy Issue ◽  
Vice President ◽  
The United States ◽  
Jimmy Carter ◽  
National Review ◽  
Public Policy Issue ◽  
The Soviet Union

Nixon’s policy of détente eventually led the United States and the Soviet Union to sign an arms agreement in Moscow in 1972 at what became known as the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). While symbolically the negotiations were considered significant, they did not do a great deal to limit the arms race. Nixon’s resignation in 1974 left the future of SALT in the hands of Vice President Gerald Ford. The treaty was scheduled to expire that year, and the longtime congressman from Michigan was determined to make progress with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. However, due to difficulties during the SALT II negotiations and Ford’s abbreviated presidency, Jimmy Carter inherited the unfinished arms control negotiations when he took the oath of office in early 1977. As American and Soviet negotiators focused on finalizing the SALT II arms agreement, Commentary, National Review, and Human Events expressed their concern over the ongoing debate between the two superpowers about nuclear and chemical weapons. That contentious public policy issue was not simply about arms control but was symbolic of the state of American foreign policy itself.

Trust, but Verify

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
East West

This book uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The chapters in this volume look at how the “emotional” side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.

scholarly journals Why Arms Control?

Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-115
Author(s):  
Jon Brook Wolfsthal
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Nuclear Age ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

America survived the nuclear age through a complex combination of diplomatic and military decisions, and a good deal of luck. One of the tools that proved its value in both reducing the risks of nuclear use and setting rules for the ongoing nuclear competition were negotiated, legally binding, and verified arms control agreements. Such pacts between the United States and the Soviet Union arguably prevented the nuclear arms racing from getting worse and helped both sides climb off the Cold War nuclear precipice. Several important agreements remain in place between the United States and Russia, to the benefit of both states. Arms control is under threat, however, from domestic forces in the United States and from Russian actions that range from treaty violations to the broader weaponization of risk. But arms control can and should play a useful role in reducing the risk of nuclear war and forging a new agreement between Moscow and Washington on the new rules of the nuclear road.

The Helsinki Accord: A Growth Industry

1990 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 53-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Korey
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Ronald Reagan ◽  
The United States ◽  
Jimmy Carter ◽  
Mikhail Gorbachev ◽  
Negotiation Strategies ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Growth Industry

Despite conservative opposition, in the late 1970s, Jimmy Carter turned the tide in favor of the Helsinki Accord by taking a strong stand in fostering U.S. participation in it. Korey focuses on the U.S. delegation to the Commission on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe and credits the success of the Helsinki Accord to U.S. adroit negotiation strategies, beginning with the Carter administration. By 1980, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev came to embrace the “humanitarianism” of the treaty. The Vienna review conference's (1986–89) effort peaked when a milestone was reached in the human rights process, linking it directly to security issues equally pertinent to the East and the West. The author contends that the United States' ardent participation in the monitoring of compliance was particularly effective in putting pressure on the Soviet Union to uphold the agreement within its territory, yielding enormous progress in human rights

5. Soviet–American Relations: Avoiding Hot War and the Search for Stability

2020 ◽  
pp. 145-158
Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
German Question ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter examines US–Soviet relations during the Cold War as well as the question of the genuineness of efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve disarmament and resolve troublesome disputes. It begins with a discussion of the German question, noting that Germany’s future position was vital to the future of Europe and a particular concern of the Soviets. It then considers the progress of arms control and peace efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union, before concluding with an analysis of the relationship of arms control to the use of armaments in hot war and to some aspects of fighting the Cold War.

14. US foreign policy in Russia

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Rutland
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Former Soviet Union ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Bill Clinton ◽  
Us Foreign Policy ◽  
The North ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Vladimir Putin

This chapter examines US foreign policy in Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 raised a number of questions that have profound implications for American foreign policy; for example, whether the Russian Federation, which inherited half the population and 70 per cent of the territory of the former Soviet Union, would become a friend and partner of the United States, a full and equal member of the community of democratic nations, or whether it would return to a hostile, expansionary communist or nationalist power. The chapter considers US–Russia relations at various times under Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, George W. Bush, Vladimir Putin, Barack Obama, Dmitry Medvedev, and Donald Trump. It also discusses a host of issues affecting the US–Russia relations, including the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the crisis in Kosovo and Ukraine, and the civil war in Syria.

scholarly journals What History Can Teach

Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-132
Author(s):  
James Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
International System ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
First Century ◽  
Comprehensive Strategy ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

Most analyses of arms control during the Cold War focus on its role in maintaining strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, history shows that the superpowers' search for strategic stability is insufficient to explain the roots and course of negotiations. This essay argues that arms control was used as one tool in a broader strategy of war prevention, designed to contain a series of challenges to U.S. and Soviet dominance of the international system that both sides worried could upset bipolarity and increase the chances of conflict between them. At the same time, U.S. policy-makers balanced this joint superpower interest with Washington's extended deterrent commitment to its allies, which ultimately upheld the integrity of the system as a whole. The essay concludes that today's leaders should integrate arms control into a more comprehensive strategy of political accommodation fit for twenty-first-century conditions.

The Reagan Presidency and US Foreign Relations

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Miles
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Reagan Administration ◽  
Financial Burden ◽  
Vice President ◽  
The United States ◽  
White House ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy legacy remains hotly contested, and as new archival sources come to light, those debates are more likely to intensify than to recede into the background. In dealings with the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration set the superpowers on a course for the (largely) peaceful end of the Cold War. Reagan began his outreach to Soviet leaders almost immediately after taking office and enjoyed some success, even if the dominant theme of the period remains fears of Reagan as a “button-pusher” in the public’s perception. Mikhail Gorbachev’s election to the post of General Secretary proved the turning point. Reagan, now confident in US strength, and Gorbachev, keen to reduce the financial burden of the arms race, ushered in a new, cooperative phase of the Cold War. Elsewhere, in particular Latin America, the administration’s focus on fighting communism led it to support human rights–abusing regimes at the same time as it lambasted Moscow’s transgressions in that regard. But even so, over the course of the 1980s, the United States began pushing for democratization around the world, even where Reagan and his advisors had initially resisted it, fearing a communist takeover. In part, this was a result of public pressure, but the White House recognized and came to support the rising tide of democratization. When Reagan left office, a great many countries that had been authoritarian were no longer, often at least in part because of US policy. US–Soviet relations had improved to such an extent that Reagan’s successor, Vice President George H. W. Bush, worried that they had gone too far in working with Gorbachev and been hoodwinked.

Remarks by Herbert Scoville

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (5) ◽  
pp. 115-117
Author(s):  
Herbert Scoville
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Nuclear Force ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Attack ◽  
The Status ◽  
Near Future

In speaking about arms control negotiations in a multipolar world, it is necessary to bear in mind that we are not really in a multipolar world right now. But perhaps we are starting toward one, at least as far as nuclear power is concerned. Britain, France, and China possess only relatively small nuclear forces at present but they will grow in time and eventually will have to be taken into consideration at least in arms control negotiations involving nuclear weapons. France and Britain at the present do have a nuclear deterrent force which would deter an attack as far as the Soviets are concerned. The status of the Chinese nuclear force is very much more uncertain. It is possible that they now possess a very limited deterrent to an attack by the Soviet Union. Certainly there is no question that at the present time they do not have any means by which they can threaten, even in retaliation, a nuclear attack against the United States. As a consequence, the Chinese do not provide any direct threat to us and we can go ahead and negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union without any real consideration of Chinese participation. One need not conclude from the growing Chinese nuclear power that they must necessarily be brought into the SALT negotiations in the near future.

scholarly journals Traders as Diplomats: Trade and Sino-American Rapprochement, 1971-78

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (10) ◽  
pp. 52
Author(s):  
Mao Lin
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Turning Point ◽  
American Foreign Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Chinese Market ◽  
Trade Relations ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Common Enemy ◽  
Strategic Transformation

During the 1970s, U.S.-China relations went through a major strategic transformation. To oppose their common enemy, the Soviet Union, the two countries ended hostilities which lasted for more than two decades and became Cold War allies. Many scholars have discussed this major historic turning point, however, most scholars have focused exclusively on the strategic relations between the two countries, while ignoring bilateral economic and trade relations. This paper argues that trade relations actually constituted an important aspect of American foreign policy towards China. And the development of trade relations in the 1970s was mainly promoted by American businessmen. These American businessmen not only hoped to open the Chinese market, but also consciously regarded themselves as “unofficial ambassadors”, because they believed that trade will contribute to the improvement of the relations between the two countries. By developing trade with China, the United States expected to transform China into a market-oriented economy, and eventually change the political nature of the Chinese regime.

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