A biocognitive approach to the conscious core of immediate memory

2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard J. Baars

The limited capacity of immediate memory “rides” on the even more limited capacity of consciousness, which reflects the dynamic activity of the thalamocortical core of the brain. Recent views of the conscious narrow-capacity component of the brain are explored with reference to global workspace theory (Baars 1988; 1993; 1998). The radical limits of immediate memory must be explained in terms of biocognitive brain architecture.

2019 ◽  
pp. 96-115
Author(s):  
Peter Carruthers

The present chapter outlines and defends the empirical case supporting global-workspace theory as the best account of the functional/neural correlates of consciousness, at least. The chapter explains the theoretical background to global-workspace theory and the evidence that supports it. It shows how the theory is well-supported by raft of findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, as well as by recent experiments tracking conscious contents in the brain. The chapter also replies to a variety of critiques and alleged forms of counter-evidence. It concludes by considering whether the fact that much of this evidence has been collected in work with nonhuman animals begs the consciousness-question that forms our topic (arguing that it does not).


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Johan Wiersma

The human brain processes a wide variety of inputs and does so either consciously or subconsciously. According to the Global Workspace theory, conscious processing involves broadcasting of information to several regions of the brain and subconscious processing involves more localized processing. This theoretical paper aims to expand on some of the aspects of the Global Workspace theory: how the properties of incoming information result in it being processed subconsciously or consciously; why processing can be either be sustained or short-lived; how the Global Workspace theory may apply both to real-time sensory input as well as to internally retained information. This paper proposes that: familiar input which does not elicit intense emotions becomes processed subconsciously and such processing can be continuous and sustained; input that elicits relatively intense emotions is subjected to highly sustainable conscious processing; input can also undergo meta-conscious processing. Such processing is not very sustainable but can exert control over other cognitive processes. This paper also discusses possible benefits of regulating cognitive processes this way.


Primates ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rie Asano

AbstractA central property of human language is its hierarchical structure. Humans can flexibly combine elements to build a hierarchical structure expressing rich semantics. A hierarchical structure is also considered as playing a key role in many other human cognitive domains. In music, auditory-motor events are combined into hierarchical pitch and/or rhythm structure expressing affect. How did such a hierarchical structure building capacity evolve? This paper investigates this question from a bottom-up perspective based on a set of action-related components as a shared basis underlying cognitive capacities of nonhuman primates and humans. Especially, I argue that the evolution of hierarchical structure building capacity for language and music is tractable for comparative evolutionary study once we focus on the gradual elaboration of shared brain architecture: the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuits for hierarchical control of goal-directed action and the dorsal pathways for hierarchical internal models. I suggest that this gradual elaboration of the action-related brain architecture in the context of vocal control and tool-making went hand in hand with amplification of working memory, and made the brain ready for hierarchical structure building in language and music.


1971 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 399-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. A. Boakes ◽  
B. Lodwick

A series of experiments was performed on the interaction between the short-term retention of sentences and of digits. In Experiment I a digit span method was used whereby subjects were presented with a sentence followed by a sequence of digits and were required either (a) to recall the sentence first and then the digits or (b) to recall the digits followed by the sentence. Under condition (a) prior recall of the sentence reduced the percentage of digit sequences correctly recalled, while under condition (b) retention of the sentence appeared to have no effect on digit recall. This last finding was confirmed in Experiment II, where the sentences varied both in grammatical complexity and length. In Experiment III the effect of prior recall of a sentence on the recall of digits was found to depend on the type of sentence used. A correlation was observed between the size of this effect and the time taken to recall a sentence. The rate of forgetting suggested by this observation was comparable to that obtained in Experiment IV, where subjects performed an intervening task that did not involve immediate memory for sentences in the interval between the presentation and recall of a six-digit sequence. It was concluded from these results that the short-term retention of sentences and of lists of items cannot be explained in terms of some general store of limited capacity.


2012 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 32-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stan Franklin ◽  
Steve Strain ◽  
Javier Snaider ◽  
Ryan McCall ◽  
Usef Faghihi

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