Global-workspace theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 96-115
Author(s):  
Peter Carruthers

The present chapter outlines and defends the empirical case supporting global-workspace theory as the best account of the functional/neural correlates of consciousness, at least. The chapter explains the theoretical background to global-workspace theory and the evidence that supports it. It shows how the theory is well-supported by raft of findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, as well as by recent experiments tracking conscious contents in the brain. The chapter also replies to a variety of critiques and alleged forms of counter-evidence. It concludes by considering whether the fact that much of this evidence has been collected in work with nonhuman animals begs the consciousness-question that forms our topic (arguing that it does not).

Author(s):  
Ali Motavalli ◽  
◽  
Javad Mahmoudi ◽  
Alireza Majdi ◽  
Saeed Sadigh-Eteghad ◽  
...  

Although there are numerous views about the concept of consciousness, no consensus exists regarding the meaning. However, with the aid of the latest neuroscientific developments, the misleading obstacles related to consciousness have been removed. Over the last few decades, neuroscientific efforts in determining the function of the brain and merging these findings with philosophical theories, have brought a more comprehensive perception of the notion of consciousness. In addition to metaphysical/ontological views of consciousness e.g., higher-order theories, reflexive theories, and representationalist theories, there are some brain directed topics in this matter which include but not are limited to neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), brain loop connectivity, and lateralization. This narrative review sheds light on cultural and historical aspects of consciousness in old and middle ages and introduces some of the prominent philosophical discussions related to mind and body. Also, it illustrates the correlation of brain function with states of consciousness with a focus on the roles of function and connectivity.


2019 ◽  
pp. 140-164
Author(s):  
Peter Carruthers

This chapter argues that if a global workspace theory of phenomenal consciousness is correct, and is fully reductive in nature, then we should stop asking questions about consciousness in nonhuman animals. But this is not because those questions are too hard to answer, but because there are no substantive facts to discover. The argument in support of this conclusion turns on the idea that while global broadcasting is all-or-nothing in the human mind, it is framed in terms that imply gradations across species. Yet our concept of phenomenal consciousness doesn’t permit mental states to be to some degree conscious. Moreover, the first-person concepts that give rise to the problem of consciousness cannot intelligibly be projected into minds significantly different from our own.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Nani ◽  
Jordi Manuello ◽  
Lorenzo Mancuso ◽  
Donato Liloia ◽  
Tommaso Costa ◽  
...  

1998 ◽  
Vol 353 (1377) ◽  
pp. 1889-1901 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
M. E. Raichle

This paper presents a functional brain–imaging strategy designed to isolate neural correlates of consciousness in humans. This strategy is based on skill learning. In the example presented (rapidly generating verbs for visually presented nouns), a cognitive skill is examined before and after practice. As shown, there are marked qualitative differences in the neural circuitry supporting performance of this task in the naive and practised state that include, importantly, both increases and decreases from the baseline activity of the brain.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moti Salti ◽  
Asaf Harel ◽  
Sébastien Marti

Understanding the neural mechanisms underlying conscious perception has become a central endeavor in cognitive neuroscience. In theories of conscious perception, a stimulus gaining conscious access is usually considered as a discrete neuronal event to be characterized in time or space, sometimes referred to as a conscious “episode.” Surprisingly, the alternative hypothesis according to which conscious perception is a dynamic process has rarely been considered. Here, we discuss this hypothesis and its implications. We show how it can reconcile inconsistent empirical findings on the timing of the neural correlates of consciousness and make testable predictions. According to this hypothesis, a stimulus is consciously perceived for as long as it is recoded to fit an ongoing stream composed of all other perceived stimuli. We suggest that this “updating” process is governed by at least three factors (1) context, (2) stimulus saliency, and (3) observers' goals. Finally, this framework forces us to reconsider the typical distinction between conscious and unconscious information processing.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik Johan Wiersma

The human brain processes a wide variety of inputs and does so either consciously or subconsciously. According to the Global Workspace theory, conscious processing involves broadcasting of information to several regions of the brain and subconscious processing involves more localized processing. This theoretical paper aims to expand on some of the aspects of the Global Workspace theory: how the properties of incoming information result in it being processed subconsciously or consciously; why processing can be either be sustained or short-lived; how the Global Workspace theory may apply both to real-time sensory input as well as to internally retained information. This paper proposes that: familiar input which does not elicit intense emotions becomes processed subconsciously and such processing can be continuous and sustained; input that elicits relatively intense emotions is subjected to highly sustainable conscious processing; input can also undergo meta-conscious processing. Such processing is not very sustainable but can exert control over other cognitive processes. This paper also discusses possible benefits of regulating cognitive processes this way.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document