What neuron doctrines might never explain

1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 837-838
Author(s):  
Keith Gunderson

My focus is on the inability of neuron doctrines to provide an explanatory context for aspects of consciousness that give rise to the mind–body and other minds problem(s). Neuroscience and related psychological sciences may be viewed as richly contributing to our taxonomic understanding of the mind and conditions underlying consciousness, without illuminating mind–body and other minds perplexities.

SATS ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ståle Gundersen

AbstractRussellian monism is any view that proposes that we cannot solve the mind-body problem because natural science cannot tell us about the aspects of physical reality that are necessary to know to explain consciousness. I argue that Russellian monism should be combined with the Heil-Martin theory about dispositions. However, this combination becomes a theory with some profound epistemic pessimistic consequences, namely that we cannot bridge the explanatory gap between physical and conscious states and that we cannot solve the other minds problem. However, this epistemic pessimism does not constitute an unacceptable kind of “mystery-mongering” because we can also find analogous results in the well-established sciences. This may make it easier to accept Russellian monism’s epistemic pessimism.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-116
Author(s):  
Kailashkanta Naik ◽  

When philosophy of mind goes into every detail in explaining about consciousness and its every aspect, the problem of other minds being its part is not spared. In such context going against the traditional way of giving justification Wittgenstein novel approach to other minds is remarkable and is close to the phenomenological understanding. The analysis of the sensation of pain as one of its important factors in solving the other minds problem is unique and it is this that proves how Wittgenstein dissolves the problem rather than giving a solution. This article focuses Wittgenstein’s two important factors: Private Language Argument and the concept of the sensation of pain in dissolving the issue. And in this I have made an attempt to show how his novelty in approaching this problem gains importance even today.


2015 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN HARRIS ◽  
DAVID R. LAWRENCE

Abstract:The idea—the possibility—of reading the mind, from the outside or indeed even from the inside, has exercised humanity from the earliest times. If we could read other minds both prospectively, to discern intentions and plans, and retrospectively, to discover what had been “on” those minds when various events had occurred, the implications for morality and for law and social policy would be immense. Recent advances in neuroscience have offered some, probably remote, prospects of improved access to the mind, but a different branch of technology seems to offer the most promising and the most daunting prospect for both mind reading and mind misreading. You can’t have the possibility of the one without the possibility of the other. This article tells some of this story.


Author(s):  
Hannah Burrows

This chapter examines the Old Norse myth of the mead of poetry in light of the distributed cognition hypothesis. It explains how Norse skaldic poetry scaffolds various cognitive processes, and then argues that the myth of the poetic mead, which sees poetry as an alcoholic substance, is exploited by Old Norse poets to understand and describe poetry’s effect on the mind. Examples are given that suggest poets saw poetry as ‘mind altering’ in ways that resonate with certain aspects of the distributed cognition hypothesis: in particular, that poetry is cognition-enabling through feedback-loop processes; that the mind can be extended into the world and over time in poetry; that cognition can be shared and/or furthered by engaging with other minds; that the body plays a non-trivial role; and that poetry performs mental and affective work in the world.


2018 ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Arthur S. Reber

The long-standing philosophical argument generally known as “hardware independent functionalism” is presented. This position maintains that consciousness is at its heart computational and any artifact that carried out all the causal functions of a mind would become conscious. This position is critiqued and shown to be hopelessly flawed. There is a long discussion on the “other minds” problem (i.e., “How do we know whether another entity, organism, person is in fact conscious?”). Included is an equally long review of Tom Nagel’s famous question (“What’s it like to be a bat?”) applied to robots and this is followed up with a review of John Searle’s “Chinese Room”—a thought experiment, now over 35 years old, which lays bare the futility of the functionalist’s position. It is acknowledged that there is a firm, almost compelling tendency to endow artifacts like human-appearing robots with sentience, and the reasons for this are discussed. The chapter ends with a summary.


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