Computation, levels of abstraction, and the intrinsic character of experience

1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 970-971
Author(s):  
Jürgen Schröder
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Levels Of Abstraction ◽  
Strong Ai ◽  
Supervenience Base ◽  
Causal Theories ◽  
Intrinsic Character ◽  
Sufficiency Thesis

Palmer's color room argument is first contrasted with a different argument by Tim Maudlin against the sufficiency thesis of strong AI. This thesis turns out to be false and hence we need to determine the relevant supervenience base of phenomenal consciousness. That could be done by causal theories and intraindividual experiments. Finally, even if we cannot explain the intrinsic character of conscious states, we may be able to know what the experience of another person is like.

Scale-free architectures support representational diversity

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Fields ◽  
James F. Glazebrook
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Levels Of Abstraction ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Abstract Representations ◽  
Computational Architecture ◽  
Architectural Models ◽  
Cognition Scale

Abstract Gilead et al. propose an ontology of abstract representations based on folk-psychological conceptions of cognitive architecture. There is, however, no evidence that the experience of cognition reveals the architecture of cognition. Scale-free architectural models propose that cognition has the same computational architecture from sub-cellular to whole-organism scales. This scale-free architecture supports representations with diverse functions and levels of abstraction.

Learning at Multiple Levels of Abstraction: The Case of Verb Argument Constructions

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy Perfors ◽  
Charles Kemp ◽  
Elizabeth Wonnacott ◽  
Joshua B. Tenenbaum
Keyword(s):  
Levels Of Abstraction ◽  
Multiple Levels

Cartesian Fingerprints in Beckett's Imagination Dead Imagine

2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-243
Author(s):  
Irit Degani-Raz
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Levels Of Abstraction ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Limiting Case

The idea that Beckett investigates in his works the limits of the media he uses has been widely discussed. In this article I examine the fiction Imagination Dead Imagine as a limiting case in Beckett's exploration of limits at large and the limits of the media he uses in particular. Imagination Dead Imagine is shown to be the self-reflexive act of an artist who imaginatively explores the limits of that ultimate medium – the artist's imagination itself. My central aim is to show that various types of structural homologies (at several levels of abstraction) can be discerned between this poetic exploration of the limits of imagination and Cartesian thought. The homologies indicated here transcend what might be termed as ‘Cartesian typical topics’ (such as the mind-body dualism, the cogito, rationalism versus empiricism, etc.). The most important homologies that are indicated here are those existing between the role of imagination in Descartes' thought - an issue that until only a few decades ago was quite neglected, even by Cartesian scholars - and Beckett's perception of imagination. I suggest the use of these homologies as a tool for tracing possible sources of inspiration for Beckett's Imagination Dead Imagine.

The Central Role of Cognitive Computations in Human-Information Interaction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wai-Tat Fu ◽  
Jessie Chin ◽  
Q. Vera Liao
Keyword(s):  
Information Systems ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Intelligent Systems ◽  
Intelligent System ◽  
Levels Of Abstraction ◽  
Intelligent Information Systems ◽  
Emergent Behaviour ◽  
Information Interaction ◽  
Intelligent Information

Cognitive science is a science of intelligent systems. This chapter proposes that cognitive science can provide useful perspectives for research on technology-mediated human-information interaction (HII) when HII is cast as emergent behaviour of a coupled intelligent system. It starts with a review of a few foundational concepts related to cognitive computations and how they can be applied to understand the nature of HII. It discusses several important properties of a coupled cognitive system and their implication to designs of information systems. Finally, it covers how levels of abstraction have been useful for cognitive science, and how these levels can inform design of intelligent information systems that are more compatible with human cognitive computations.

Phenomenal Experience

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Levine
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Phenomenal Experience ◽  
Making Sense

This paper presents a sketch of a theory of phenomenal consciousness, one that builds on the notion of a “way of appearing,” and draws out various consequences and problems for the view. I unabashedly endorse a version of the Cartesian Theater, while assessing the prospects for making such a view work. As I treat phenomenal consciousness as a relation between a subject and what it is she is conscious of, I face a difficulty in making sense of hallucination, since the object of awareness is missing. I distinguish my position from direct realists who endorse disjunctivism, and end on a somewhat speculative note.

Language as a phenomenon of the third kind

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-229
Author(s):  
Ewa Dąbrowska
Keyword(s):  
Language Change ◽  
Invisible Hand ◽  
Social Phenomenon ◽  
Speech Community ◽  
Communicative Interaction ◽  
Levels Of Abstraction ◽  
Long Distance ◽  
The Third ◽  
Dual Perspective ◽  
Micro Level

AbstractWhile many linguists view language as either a cognitive or a social phenomenon, it is clearly both: a language can live only in individual minds, but it is learned from examples of utterances produced by speakers engaged in communicative interaction. In other words, language is what (Keller 1994. On language change: The invisible hand in language. London: Taylor & Francis) calls a “phenomenon of the third kind”, emerging from the interaction of a micro-level and a macro-level. Such a dual perspective helps us understand some otherwise puzzling phenomena, including “non-psychological” generalizations, or situations where a pattern which is arguably present in a language is not explicitly represented in most speakers’ minds. This paper discusses two very different examples of such generalizations, genitive marking on masculine nouns in Polish and some restrictions on questions with long-distance dependencies in English. It is argued that such situations are possible because speakers may represent “the same” knowledge at different levels of abstraction: while a few may have extracted an abstract generalization, others approximate their behaviour by relying on memorised exemplars or lexically specific patterns. Thus, a cognitively realistic usage-based construction grammar needs to distinguish between patterns in the usage of a particular speech community (a social phenomenon) and patterns in speakers’ minds (a cognitive phenomenon).

Perceptual awareness or phenomenal consciousness?A dilemma

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher F. Masciari ◽  
Peter Carruthers
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Perceptual Awareness
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