Property Causation

If one set of properties supervenes upon another, then the former have causal powers if: first, the supervenience base properties minimally metaphysically necessitate the supervening properties; second, part of the minimal supervenience base causes the target effect; third, instances of the supervening properties would all cause certain target effects in the right kind of circumstances, as a result of this. When these conditions are met, the causal relationship holds not only in virtue of the supervenience base properties but also the supervening ones. Two further explanatory virtues that citing property causes may display are: when a property has a distinctive causal profile (when it makes a causal contribution that no other property would) and when an instance of the property supplies the precise contribution required for a certain effect. Pragmatic appeal to the second explanatory virtue explains away our tendency to hear certain explicitly contrastive statements mistakenly as true.

EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM AND TESTIMONIAL JUSTIFICATION

ABSTRACTAccording to epistemic internalists, facts about justification supervene upon one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny this. More specifically, externalists think that the supervenience base of justification isn't exhausted by one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. In the last decade, the internalism–externalism debate has made its mark on the epistemology of testimony. The proponent of internalism about the epistemology of testimony claims that a hearer's testimonial justification for believing that p supervenes upon his internal reasons for thinking that the speaker's testimony that p is true. Recently, however, several objections have been raised against this view. In this paper, I present an argument providing intuitive support for internalism about the epistemology of testimony. Moreover, I also defend the argument against three recent objections offered by Stephen Wright in a couple of recent papers. The upshot of my discussion is that external conditions do make an epistemic difference when it comes to our testimonial beliefs, but that they cannot make any difference with respect to their justificatory status – i.e., they are justificationally irrelevant.

The Emergence of Sin

This book aims to solve an age-old problem in New Testament scholarship: namely, how to understand the relationship between “sins” as human misdeeds, and “Sin/Hamartia, ” the cosmic tyrant, in Romans. It appropriates the critical framework of emergence in philosophy of science to describe the emergence of cognition and agency at the individual, social, and mythological levels. The cosmic tyrant Sin is described as a real person, emergent from a complex system of human transgressions. The work argues that this emergence is analogous to the emergence of mind from the complex neurological system that is the brain. The dominion of Sin is described as downward causation exercised on Sin’s supervenience base (individual sinners), in dialog with liberationist accounts of social sin. This interdisciplinary engagement sets the table for placing Paul’s discourse of the “Body of Sin” within the context of various ancient discourses regarding the social body. The Roma cult in the Roman Republic and early Roman Empire serves as an instance of an ancient collective “person” emergent from a complex social system to compare with Paul’s description of Sin/Hamartia. This comparison allows for a discussion of Sin/Hamartia in Paul in terms of ancient political and gender ideology.

Computation, levels of abstraction, and the intrinsic character of experience

Palmer's color room argument is first contrasted with a different argument by Tim Maudlin against the sufficiency thesis of strong AI. This thesis turns out to be false and hence we need to determine the relevant supervenience base of phenomenal consciousness. That could be done by causal theories and intraindividual experiments. Finally, even if we cannot explain the intrinsic character of conscious states, we may be able to know what the experience of another person is like.