The Constitution and the New Deal

1983 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 23-23
Author(s):  
William E. Leuchtenburg

The year 1937 marks a great division in the history of the Supreme Court. In a period of 18 months in 1935 and 1936, the Court struck down more important social and economic legislation of the national government and of state government than at any time in its history, including such landmarks of the New Deal as the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act. In the nearly half-century since then, the Court has not invalidated even one piece of significant social legislation. The seminar will explore how this “Constitutional Revolution of 1937” came about. It will examine the changes wrought by the New Deal, the character of the Court in the era of “the nine old men,” controversial rulings such as those in the Schecter and Butler cases, the origins and nature of FDR's “court packing“ plan, and the long term consequences of the Constitutional Revolution.

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (02) ◽  
pp. 201-213
Author(s):  
Eric Rauchway

During the 1932 campaign, Franklin Roosevelt explicitly committed himself to nearly all of what would become the important programs of the New Deal. In the months before his March 4, 1933, inauguration, he made his proposed policies even clearer. Yet many Americans have forgotten this clarity of purpose, led in large measure by histories of the New Deal and biographies of Roosevelt that echo old misconceptions of this critical election. Such texts are far more likely to describe Roosevelt's campaign as so devoid of substance and full only of “sunny generalities” that at the time he took the oath of office his “plans remained largely unknown to the public.” He had “no larger philosophy or grand design.” He stood only for “action, any action, with little or no thought given to the long-term consequences.” One historian recently declared, “The notion that when Franklin Roosevelt became president he had a plan in his head called the New Deal is a myth that no serious scholar has ever believed.”


Author(s):  
Anna Siomopoulos

This chapter analyses how Hollywood focused on recognizable and venerable architectural representations of federal institutions to symbolise the new relationship that had developed between the citizenry and the national government under the aegis of the New Deal. Through case studies of three films respectively featuring the executive, legislative and judicial edifices of the national state – Gabriel over the White House (1933), Mr Smith Goes to Washington (1939), and The Talk of the Town (1942) – become sites of masculine transformations, as the three male protagonists each experience private revelations that help them take on new roles as president, senator and Supreme Court Justice respectively. Though each contains a romantic sub-plot, none of the movies ends with the expected scene of romantic coupling whose trajectory was established in the early scenes. Accordingly the male leads become defined less by private heterosexuality than by public involvement in the Roosveltian state.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Tamir

In the two decades since Israel’s constitutional revolution, the Basic Laws have come to enjoy normative supremacy and demonstrate efficacy by enabling judicial review of the legislative and the executive branches. Yet, they have not assumed an integrative role in the Israeli society. In terms of their substance, the Basic Laws are incomplete in scope. In terms of the procedure leading up to their enactment, they lack public legitimacy. This can be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that the Supreme Court was the key political actor responsible for retroactively upgrading the Basic Laws from regular laws to constitutional norms. This paper argues that the only document in the history of Israel possessing the potential to fulfill an integrative role was the Declaration of Independence. Due to its intrinsic ‘transitional’ characteristics and the unique socio-political circumstances surrounding its drafting, this founding document could and should have been perceived as a transitional constitution. This transitional constitution established Israel’s basic values and opened the way for an incremental constitutional process that continued with the enactment of the Basic Laws, and that will culminate only with the drafting of a full constitution. However, owing in part to the narrow conception of transitional justice, the Declaration was never interpreted as such. This historical error could have been corrected in 1994 as the identical principle clause of Israel’s two Human Rights Basic Laws—which constitute Israel’s (partial) Bill of Rights—declared that the human rights regime in Israel should be “respected in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence”. Yet, this opportunity was once again not seized. This failure carries unfortunate consequences for the Israeli constitutional regime since unlike the Basic Laws, which enjoy formal normative supremacy yet nonetheless suffer from legitimacy deficiencies, the Declaration bears the potential to fulfill an integrative constitutional function.


1935 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 585
Author(s):  
Harold U. Faulkner ◽  
Louis M. Hacker ◽  
Guy S. Claire

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