Two Influential Concepts: Socialist Legality and Constitutional Identity and Their Impact on the Independence of the Judiciary

In this Article, I suggest considering linkages of a theoretical, and continuities of a sociological nature between on the one hand, the concept and the practical use of socialist legality in Socialist Hungary—with particular regard to the period following the judicial reform of 1954—and on the other hand, the concept of constitutional identity as it has developed in the Fundamental Law in Hungary, with particular regard to the period since the 2011 judicial reform. The Article highlights surprising similarities in the politically determined legislative intention in these two periods to form embracing, quasi legal concepts, which in themselves seem to differ fundamentally, although the similarities in their nature and in the specific constitutional practice are attention-grabbing. The interpretation of the role of state institutions, and especially the judicial role, lead one to think that despite the explicit rejection of the Socialist era in Article U) of the Fundamental Law in Hungary, the new constitutional regime has familiar attitudes to the understanding of the rule of law and the role of the judiciary in promoting the enforcement of the new, supra legal concepts of a transformative nature, which, however, are filled in with the ruling political ideology, whether it be socialist legality or national constitutional identity.

Local Alignments and Global Politics: Military Bureaucratic Axis, Subaltern Protests and Political Reversals in PostColonial Pakistan

In the Cold War environment of the 1950s, Pakistan army sought an alliance with the United States and the United Kingdom while they searched for allies in the Middle East and South Asia. At the same time, the military-bureaucratic establishment of Pakistan denied a democratic constitutional regime in the country and slowly transformed East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, into an internal colony. In East Pakistan, the pro-democracy movement was headed by Awami League (AL), a board coalition of constitutional autonomist and radical socialists and communist. Within the AL, Maulana Bhashani, a radical cleric, and his left wigs followers read into the global politics of Cold War alignment between the Pakistan and the USA to be a critical hindrance toward the democratization of politely, but constitutional autonomists within AL remained committed toward the Cold War military alliance. This lead to a split in the AL Consequently, In the wake of Suez War, global politics impinged upon local political alignment as much as local political alignment informed and influenced global politics in Pakistan.

Europe United in Diversity—An Analogical Hermeneutics Perspective

At a moment when a new crisis threatens Europe—a crisis including, among other factors, COVID-19, a faltering economy, immigration and Brexit—the European Union (EU) motto of ‘Europe united in diversity’ would appear progressively less attainable. This paper submits that the European ideal is still both desirable and possible through fostering of political unity at the constitutional (regime) level by using the notions of analogical state and analogical culture, and at the community level by enabling public sphere secularity and relational interculturalism. These concepts envisage the EU in a more flexible manner, in favour of policies enabling further European integration.

13. Free Movement of Goods I

This chapter analyses the constitutional regime of ‘negative integration’ in the context of the free movement of goods. The free movement of goods has traditionally been the most progressive fundamental freedom within the internal market. The negative integration regime for goods is split over two sites within Part III of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). And with regard to goods, the EU Treaties further distinguish between fiscal restrictions and regulatory restrictions. The fiscal restrictions include pecuniary charges that are imposed on imports or exports (customs duties and discriminatory taxation), while the regulatory restrictions include non-tariff measures that limit market access by ‘regulatory’ means. The chapter then looks at possible justifications for such regulatory restrictions.

8. External Powers

This chapter explores the external competences and procedures of the European Union. Sadly, the Union here suffers from a ‘split personality’ because it has a split constitutional regime for foreign affairs. It has a general competence for its ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) within the TEU; and it enjoys various specific external powers within the TFEU. The chapter analyses each of these competences and their respective nature. It then looks at the procedural dimension of the external relations of the Union. How will the Union act, and which institutions need to cooperate for it to act? This depends on which of the two constitutional regimes applies. While the CFSP is still characterized by an ‘executive’ dominance, the procedures within the Union’s special external powers are closer to the ‘legislative’ branch. Finally, the chapter considers two constitutional safeguards regulating the exercise of shared external competences: mixed agreements and the duty of loyal cooperation.

8. External Powers

This chapter explores the external competences and procedures of the European Union. Sadly, the Union here suffers from a ‘split personality’ because it has a split constitutional regime for foreign affairs. It has a general competence for its ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) within the TEU; and it enjoys various specific external powers within the TFEU. The chapter analyses each of these competences and their respective nature. It then looks at the procedural dimension of the external relations of the Union. How will the Union act, and which institutions need to cooperate for it to act? This depends on which of the two constitutional regimes applies. While the CFSP is still characterized by an ‘executive’ dominance, the procedures within the Union's special external powers are closer to the ‘legislative’ branch. Finally, the chapter considers two constitutional safeguards regulating the exercise of shared external competences: mixed agreements and the duty of loyal cooperation.

The Explanatory Model of Closure

This chapter provides a comprehensive explanatory model of party system closure. The model includes the variables analysed in the previous chapters (i.e. age and birth period of democracy, party institutionalization, parliamentary fragmentation, and polarization), with the addition of the degree of economic development, the type of electoral system (i.e. majoritarian or proportional), and the nature of the constitutional regime (i.e. presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary). Then we ask the question: what would be the explanatory model of party system institutionalization had we operationalized it in terms of volatility rather than closure? We show that the determinants of closure are not identical with those of volatility. The latter is more a function of the behaviour of the citizens, the former is more a product of elite decisions. At the end of the chapter we place the factors responsible for closure into a causal chain.