Discerning the patterns of world order: Noam Chomsky and international theory after the Cold War

2003 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-604 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Laffey

In this article I argue that Chomsky's political writings, widely ignored in the discipline, are a significant resource for thinking about contemporary world politics, how we should analyse it, and to what ends. This claim is defended through an analysis of recent efforts by IR scholars to interpret the post-Cold War order. When viewed through the analytic perspective articulated by Chomsky, disciplinary accounts of the post-Cold War world as liberal and peaceful are shown to be insufficiently attentive to the empirical record. Chomsky's political writings are also shown to be compatible with standard accounts of critical social science.

1995 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-583
Author(s):  
John Horvath

With the cold war officially “over,” political scientists are busy settingthe stage for the next pattern of conflict. Cold war ideology, best describedas “a perpetual war for perpetual peace,” has left an unexpected vacuumin world politics. With the post-cold war world order more unstable anddangerous than at any time since the end of the Second World War, manyin the West find themselves struggling with an identity crisis. The goldenage that was to arise from the defeat of communism has not come-oneither side of the Iron Curtain-and prospects for world peace are moreunlikely now than at any time during the cold war. In order to come toterms with this bankruptcy of present-day foreign policy, western societyhas begun to search for pariahs. As Kunstler observes, “it seems that theAmerican public perennially needs identifiable villains to stimulate itsgastric juices.” Consequently, Islam and Muslims have become the latesttarget.Unlike previous enemies and opponents, which were based onnation-states and stimulated through nationalism and calls for patriotism,today’s “evil empire” is based on civilizations and fueled byracism. According to Huntington, “the fault lines between civilizationswill be the battle lines of the future.” Hence Islam is seen as a distinctthreat. The cultural fault lines between Islamic civilization and other civilizationsaround the world, from the Balkans and the bulge of Africa toCentral Asia, are considered the most violent and unstable areas onearth. In Huntington’s words, “Islam has bloody borders.”’ Such a viewof Islam and Islamic civilization as something cancerous to global stabilityis a perfect replacement for the former enemy and its ideology: theex-Soviet Union and communism. Once again, the American (and westem)military-industrial complex can justify the continued need to producearms while “defense” budgets continue to divert monies fromsocial expenditures.In Europe, as elsewhere, there is a basic misunderstanding of whatIslam is and represents. Stereotypes of “Muslim terrorists” have permeatedsociety. Anyone with a beard and/or a dark complexion is often treated assuspect. Muslims are generally seen as fanatics, worshipping the likes ofAyatollah Khomeini and Saddam Hussein and wanting nothing more in lifethan to kill Salman Rushdie. While many Westerners consider Muslims tobe fundamentalists, Muslims can view Westerners as being just as ...


Race & Class ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 030639682110548
Author(s):  
Blake Stewart

This essay seeks to build on the concept of exterminism developed by E. P. Thompson in his 1980 New Left Review essay ‘Notes on exterminism, the last state of civilization’. Thompson’s polemical focus on weapons systems in his analysis was the product of a particular moment in history; one where the most precipitous threat to human security was the Cold War. The concept of exhaustionism developed in this piece describes the governance ideologies and frameworks found within advanced capitalist state/societal complexes in response to the present ‘organic crisis’ of post-Cold War global capitalism; one accelerated by the 2008 financial crisis and Covid-19 pandemic. The exhaustionism of political leadership within the contemporary world order has contributed to widely held assumptions that the collapse of civilisation and the planet is either occurring or imminent. Moreover, it is also implied that it is too late for a novel or fundamental transformation in governing ideology, global governance and political economy to reverse the current predicament. This exhaustionism in many ways mirrors the absurdity and cynicism of the Cold War military technicians and nuclear regimes described by Thompson’s concept of exterminism, but with notable differences related to the host of actors involved, temporal horizon, and emphasis on class, imperialism and supremacism.


Author(s):  
Beate Jahn

Since the end of the Cold War, peacebuilding operations have become an integral part of world politics—despite their continuing failures. This chapter provides an account of peacebuilding operations in practice and identifies cycles of failure and reform, namely the successful integration of peacebuilding into the fabric of the world order despite its continuing failures. It traces these dynamics back to the internal contradictions of liberalism and argues that the main function of peacebuilding operations lies in managing the tensions and contradictions inherent in a liberal world order. Peacebuilding—in one form or another—is therefore likely to persist for the duration of a liberal world order.


Author(s):  
Deborah Welch Larson ◽  
T.V. Paul ◽  
Harold A. Trinkunas ◽  
Anders Wivel ◽  
Ralf Emmers

This concluding chapter offers a summary and evaluation of the key ideas contained in the chapters of this Handbook. The chapter discusses peaceful change in terms of conceptual clarity; historical evolution of scholarship in the area, especially the interwar, Cold War, and post–Cold War era efforts at analyzing the concepts; and the policy innovations in this realm. This is followed by an evaluation of the key umbrella theories of international relations—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—and how they approach peaceful change. Some important sources and mechanisms of change are analyzed. This is followed by discussion of the policy contributions of selected great and rising powers toward peaceful change. The chapter then offers a summary of contributions and progress that various regions have made in the area of peaceful change. It concludes with some ideas for future research while highlighting the significance of the subject matter for international relations and the world order.


1995 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven K. Holloway ◽  
Rodney Tomlinson

AbstractThe demise of the Cold War and greater cooperation among the Security Council's permanent members have created a situation frequently characterized as a New World Order at the United Nations. This study examines whether that characterization can also be applied to the politics of the UN General Assembly. Using descriptive analysis of roll-call votes, the authors find that recent sessions, and in particular the 46th session, witnessed the end of a fairly stable decade of voting blocs in the General Assembly. An indicator of vote changing is developed which documents the rapid movement of the former Warsaw Pact members and Baltic states towards more western European positions. Hierarchical cluster and multidimensional scaling analyses are employed to identify the emerging voting alliances. The results suggest that the accommodation has not been as widespread in the General Assembly and that our longstanding conceptualizations of east/west/north/south polarizations are in need of revision.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Buchan

AbstractThis paper will suggest that since the end of the Cold War liberal states have instituted a new regime of international relations and of international peace and security in particular. Historically, legitimate statehood could be situated virtually exclusively within international society; in their international relations all states subscribed to a common normative standard which regarded all states qua states as legitimate sovereign equals irrespective of the political constitution that they endorsed. With the end of the Cold War, however, an international community of liberal states has formed within international society which considers only those states that respect the liberal values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law as legitimate. Non-liberal states are not only denigrated as illegitimate but more significantly they are stripped of their previously held sovereign status where international community, motivated by the theory that international peace and security can only be achieved in a world composed of exclusively liberal states, campaigns for their liberal transformation. Finally, it will be suggested that despite the disagreement between liberal states over the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 international community survives, and thus its (antagonistic) relationship with non-liberal states continues to provide a useful method for theorising international peace and security in the contemporary world order.


2001 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 191-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. John Ikenberry

The United States is today a global superpower without historical precedent. It stands at the centre of an expanding democratic-capitalist world order that is itself, fifty years after its creation, the dominant reality in world politics. Despite expectations that American hegemony would disappear and trigger the emergence of a new and unstable multipolar post-Cold War order, the opposite has in fact happened. American power has grown even greater in the decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although American power is not uniformly welcome around the world, serious ideological challengers or geopolitical balancers are not to be found. Scholars who a decade ago were debating the prospect of co-operation and conflict in a post-hegemonic world are now debating the character and future of world politics within an American unipolar order.


1995 ◽  
pp. 445-482
Author(s):  
Brigitte Schulz

With the end of the Cold War, much attention has been paid to the nature of the emerging new world order. By what criteria will power and influence be measured in this new era? Who will be the winners and losers? What types of allegiances will develop? Or is Francis Fukuyama's argument correct that, with the collapse of communism, we have reached the "...endpoint of man's ideological evolution" and thus "the end of history". Unlike Marx, who saw socialism at the end of humanity's arduous journey, Fukuyama tells us that the search is off because we have already arrived at our evolutionary destination: liberal capitalism...Other analysts envision less optimistic scenarios...One of the most popular scenarios over the past few years has been to anticipate growing tensions between the three main core powers: the US, Germany, and Japan... The first task of this paper, then, is to look at Germany within the context of the radically altered post-Cold War period... We argue that Germany, based on a multitude of factors which will be outlined below, is not now, nor will it ever become in the foreseeable future, a global hegemon... Indeed, as will be asserted in the second part of this paper, Germany will enter into a close alliance with the United States to form a reinvigorated trans-Atlantic marriage in which the common bonds of "culture and civilization" will replace a virulent anti-communism as the common vow.


Author(s):  
Robyn Eckersley

This chapter examines how US foreign policy on environmental issues has evolved over a period of nearly five decades, from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama. It first considers the United States’ environmental multilateralism as well as environmental initiatives under Nixon, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Obama, and Donald Trump before discussing key trends and puzzles in US foreign environmental policy. It shows the United States as an environmental leader during the Cold War, but an environmental laggard in the post–Cold War period, with the Obama administration’s re-engagement in climate diplomacy as a significant exception. The chapter also explains how the larger trend of waning environmental leadership from the United States has occurred at the same time as international environmental problems, especially climate change, have increasingly moved from the periphery towards the centre of world politics.


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