Liberal Internationalism

Author(s):  
Beate Jahn

Since the end of the Cold War, peacebuilding operations have become an integral part of world politics—despite their continuing failures. This chapter provides an account of peacebuilding operations in practice and identifies cycles of failure and reform, namely the successful integration of peacebuilding into the fabric of the world order despite its continuing failures. It traces these dynamics back to the internal contradictions of liberalism and argues that the main function of peacebuilding operations lies in managing the tensions and contradictions inherent in a liberal world order. Peacebuilding—in one form or another—is therefore likely to persist for the duration of a liberal world order.

2021 ◽  

As the Cold War came to a close in 1991, US President George H. W. Bush famously saw its shocking demise as the dawn of a 'new world order' that would prize peace and expand liberal democratic capitalism. Thirty years later, with China on the rise, Russia resurgent, and populism roiling the Western world, it is clear that Bush's declaration remains elusive. In this book, leading scholars of international affairs offer fresh insight into why the hopes of the early post-Cold War period have been dashed and the challenges ahead. As the world marks the thirtieth anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union, this book brings together historians and political scientists to examine the changes and continuities in world politics that emerged at the end of the Cold War and shaped the world we inhabit today.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 52-79
Author(s):  
V. T. Yungblud

The Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations, established by culmination of World War II, was created to maintain the security and cooperation of states in the post-war world. Leaders of the Big Three, who ensured the Victory over the fascist-militarist bloc in 1945, made decisive contribution to its creation. This system cemented the world order during the Cold War years until the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the destruction of the bipolar structure of the organization of international relations. Post-Cold War changes stimulated the search for new structures of the international order. Article purpose is to characterize circumstances of foundations formation of postwar world and to show how the historical decisions made by the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition powers in 1945 are projected onto modern political processes. Study focuses on interrelated questions: what was the post-war world order and how integral it was? How did the political decisions of 1945 affect the origins of the Cold War? Does the American-centrist international order, that prevailed at the end of the 20th century, genetically linked to the Atlantic Charter and the goals of the anti- Hitler coalition in the war, have a future?Many elements of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations in the 1990s survived and proved their viability. The end of the Cold War and globalization created conditions for widespread democracy in the world. The liberal system of international relations, which expanded in the late XX - early XXI century, is currently experiencing a crisis. It will be necessary to strengthen existing international institutions that ensure stability and security, primarily to create barriers to the spread of national egoism, radicalism and international terrorism, for have a chance to continue the liberal principles based world order (not necessarily within a unipolar system). Prerequisite for promoting idea of a liberal system of international relations is the adjustment of liberalism as such, refusal to unilaterally impose its principles on peoples with a different set of values. This will also require that all main participants in modern in-ternational life be able to develop a unilateral agenda for common problems and interstate relations, interact in a dialogue mode, delving into the arguments of opponents and taking into account their vital interests.


Author(s):  
Celso Amorim

In the last years of the twentieth century, after the end of the Cold War, the world has evolved into a mixed structure, which preserves the characteristics of unipolarity at the same time that approaches to a multipolar world in some ways. In an international reality marked by its fluid nature, the emergence of new actors and the so-called "asymmetric threats" has not eliminated the former agents in the world order. And the conflict between the States has not disappeared from the horizon. In this context, diplomacy must have the permanent support of defense policy. Therefore, in the Brazilian case, the paper presents that the country should adopt a grand strategy that combines foreign policy and defense policy, in which soft power will be enhanced by hard power.


1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 145-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY HAWTHORN

Many expected that after the Cold War, there would be peace, order, increasing prosperity in expanding markets and the extension and eventual consolidation of civil and political rights. There would be a new world order, and it would in these ways be liberal. In international politics, the United States would be supreme. It would through security treaties command the peace in western Europe and east Asia; through its economic power command it in eastern Europe and Russia; through clients and its own domination command it in the Middle East; through tacit understanding command it in Latin America; and, in so far as any state could, command it in Africa also. It could choose whether to cooperate in the United Nations, and if it did not wish to do so, be confident that it would not be disablingly opposed by illiberal states. In the international markets, it would be able to maintain holdings of its bonds. In the international financial institutions, it would continue to be decisive in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; it would be an important influence in the regional development banks; and it would be powerful in what it was to insist in 1994 should be called the World (rather than Multinational) Trade Organisation. Other transactions in the markets, it is true, would be beyond the control of any state. But they would not be likely to conflict with the interests of the United States (and western Europe) in finance, investment and trade, and would discipline other governments.


1994 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-97
Author(s):  
David Robie

Review of Whose Story? Reporting the Developing World After the Cold War, edited by Jill Spelliscy and Gerald B. Sperling, Calgary, Canada: Detselig Enterprises, 1993. 242 pp. 'I get terribly angry', remarks Daniel Nelson, editor of Gemini News Service, 'when journalists take the phrase, which is completly manufactured, "New World Order"—it's absolutely meaningless. Personally I don't think there is a New World Order. I think we have the same world order, but without the Soviet Union which was never a major part of the world economy. And if you live in Katmandu or Kampala, there is no change.'


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-266
Author(s):  
Öner Buçukcu

The United Nations is grounded on the Westphalian state system. Throughout the de-colonizationperiod, the Organization ceased to be peculiar to the West only, and soon became the prevalent model in theentire globe. The Cold War also solidified and institutionalized the Westphalian State as the fundamentalprinciple in international relations. The end of the Cold War, however, along with the collapse of theEastern bloc, the challenges of peace and security in Africa, and the failure of the states in coping withhumanitarian crises increasingly made the three fundamental principles of Westphalian state, namely the“non-interventionism”, “sovereign-equality” and “territoriality” disputable among political scientists. Newapproaches and arguments on the end of the Classical Westphalian state and the emergence of a so-called“New Medieval Age” have widely been circulated. This paper alternatively suggests that, since the end of thecold war, the world politics has gradually and decisively been evolving into a system of states that could becalled Neo-Westphalian.


1992 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-53
Author(s):  
Mark P. Gibney

The Berlin Wall is down; the Cold War is finally over. With the stunning victory by the United Nations forces in the Persian Gulf, President George Bush has proclaimed a “new world order.” Bush provides this description of the old world: “Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided—a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict and cold war.


1997 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 526-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael N. Barnett

The end of the cold war and the attendant security vacuum unleashed aflurryof intellectual activity and international commissions that reflected on the world that was being left behind and the world that should be created in its place. The reports under review are among the best and most influential of the lot. This article focuses on three issues raised by these reports. First, the portrait of the new international order offered by these reports is a liberal international order. Second, the concept of legitimacy appears in various guises, and the UN is considered the site for the legitimation of a particular order. Few international orders are ever founded or sustained by force alone, something well understood by the policymakers who drafted these reports and wisely heeded by international relations theorists who attempt to understand their actions and the international orders that they construct and sustain. Third, these reports envision the UN as an agent of normative integration. As such, it contributes to the development and maintenance of a liberal international order by increasing the number of actors who identify with and uphold its values.


SEEU Review ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-109
Author(s):  
Gurakuç Kuçi

Abstract The end of the Cold War changed the world order. This change created opportunities for a short time to have an international hegemony to switch to international polycentrism. Huntington had anticipated and explained a confrontation and remake of the international order. This author explains that Islam as a civilization does not have a core state like other civilizations. Turkey today is one of these countries which is trying to take this role of the core state for Islamic civilization. The creation of the core state for Islamic civilization, and the making of all world civilizations with core states, pushed the world into the “civil-centrism” international detachment. However, Turkey as a core for Islam civilization, to the nuclearisation of Turkey can be done with the blessing and assistance of the “West”. Creating these civil-centrist centres also makes it possible to achieve peace and agreements in the global interest more easily.


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