Tracking terrorist networks: problems of intelligence sharing within the UK intelligence community

2009 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 997-1009 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTONY FIELD

AbstractThe 7/7 terrorist attacks demonstrated that there were some clear deficiencies with the organisation of the United Kingdom's counter-terrorism intelligence community. In the aftermath of the attacks, there were moves to develop a more robust ‘counter-terrorism network’ in the United Kingdom that would facilitate better communication and intelligence sharing. While recent developments are to be welcomed, the reforms have not addressed some of the fundamental cultural, institutional and technological issues at the heart of the problem. The creation of an effective counter-terrorism network demands that information flows more freely through the intelligence community and that institutional boundaries are broken down. Until these obstacles have been overcome, the new counter-terrorism network will continue to be hampered by the same old problems of intelligence sharing.

2009 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toby Archer

British Muslims are citizens of the United Kingdom and also part of a worldwide community, the Umma, the Muslim community of the faithful. British Muslims have both national and transnational allegiances and on the part of the British state this has necessitated new ways of governing its Muslim citizens. Concerns over both terrorist violence and societal security questions regarding Muslims in the UK are both internal and external to the state. The government has had difficulties in finding transnational policy responses that go beyond the old division of internal and external security. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, security was the main reason why the British state sought to engage Muslims, but this has been transformed into the wider agenda of ‘community cohesion’. In tracing the Muslim groups that the government has engaged with since 2001, I show how the issue of governing Muslims has gone beyond concerns just about terrorism and violence to a wider agenda that accepts British Muslims as citizens, yet at the same time still reflects the fears of Muslim ‘otherness’. I consider how this otherness is seen as a threat to societal security, and how the government’s attempt to create policies to deal with such threats is best understood as the ‘politics of unease’.


2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Ragazzi

While social and security policies have always overlapped in complex ways, recent developments in counter-terrorism policy suggest that Western European states, and the United Kingdom more specifically, are accelerating what can be termed the ‘securitisation of social policy’1 – namely, the increased submission of social policy actors and their practices to the logics of security and social control. With the PREVENT programme remaining highly controversial, what are the effects of these state practices? Has David Cameron’s project of ‘muscular liberalism’, aimed at integration and community cohesion, been enforced through counter-radicalisation policies? This themed issue examines preventative counter-terrorism policies in the UK and the politics of religion, ethnicity and race they enact. The relation between social policy and critical security studies is explored by an interdisciplinary group of scholars.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-56
Author(s):  
W. Elliot Bulmer

Abstract This paper discusses recent developments in Scottish nationalist constitutional thought during the period of 2002 to 2014, showing how the Scottish constitutional conversation has diverged from, but continues to be influenced by, the UK-wide constitutional conversation at Westminster. It presents Scottish nationalist constitutional thought as a ‘very British radicalism’, which is characterised by certain constitutional forms and ideas that are radical in a British context (such as popular sovereignty, proportional representation, a written constitution, and a commitment to covenantal socio-economic and environmental provisions) while at the same time retaining a persistent ‘Britishness’ in terms of specific institutional proposals and ambivalence towards the principles of constitutional government. Finally, I will discuss possible designs of a future constitutional settlement in Scotland and the United Kingdom. Notably, I will explore how far the Scottish constitutional tradition might impact on the constitutional shape of the United Kingdom.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 585-602 ◽  
Author(s):  
Imran Awan ◽  
Irene Zempi

Existing research on Islamophobic hate crime has examined in detail the verbal, physical and emotional attacks against Muslims. However, the experiences of non-Muslim men who suffer Islamophobic hate crime because they look Muslim remain ‘invisible’ in both official statistics and empirical research. Drawing on data from qualitative interviews with 20 non-Muslim men based in the United Kingdom, we examined their lived experiences of Islamophobic hate crime. Interviews were transcribed and analysed using thematic analysis. A deductive approach to thematic analysis was adopted to analyse participants’ narratives, and six overarching themes were developed: (1) nature of Islamophobic hate crime; (2) triggers of Islamophobic hate crime; (3) impact of Islamophobic hate crime; (4) reporting incidents, responses and barriers to Islamophobic hate; (5) victims’ coping strategies; and (6) recommendations on tackling the problem. Our findings show that participants experienced Islamophobic hate crime because of ‘trigger’ events, namely the Brexit vote, Donald Trump’s presidency and ISIS-inspired terrorist attacks in European countries such as France, Germany, Sweden and the UK. Participants described being verbally and physically attacked, threatened and harassed as well as their property being damaged. The impacts upon victims included physical, emotional, psychological and economic damage. These experiences were also damaging to community cohesion and led to polarization between different communities in the UK.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Bernadette Sangmeister

<p>Inspired by the recently concluded litigation seeking to deport the radical Islamic preacher Abu Qatada from the UK to Jordan, this paper aims at examining the 2012 judgment of the ECtHR by focusing on the question under which circumstances a deportation with diplomatic assurances (DWA) may be permissible under the European Convention on Human Rights. Relevant background information will be provided concerning the interplay of the use of the DWA policy and the European Convention on Human Rights as well as concerning the particular circumstances that led to the ECtHR’s ruling in Abu Qatada. In the following analysis of the judgment, the focus will be on the interplay of the DWA policy and the European Convention on Human Rights with special regard to art 3 and art 6 of the Convention. Finally, the impact of this judgment on the future jurisprudence and the DWA policy will be shown. In the light of this judgment, it will be argued that the counter terrorism means of deporting a non-national terrorist suspect with diplomatic assurances seems to be compatible with the Convention if the diplomatic assurances given guarantee a sufficient protection of the human rights of the transferee, which due to the uncertain effects of the DWA policy, still has to be decided on a case-by-case basis.</p>


Subject Future UK-US relations. Significance During his state visit to the United Kingdom, US President Trump took a conciliatory line towards his hosts. There was little substantive progress on bilateral issues, but neither was there open disagreement. Trump appeared to walk back a threat to cut off intelligence-sharing with the United Kingdom over London’s stance towards China, and he also attempted to minimise the damage he caused by suggesting the National Health Service (NHS) should be part of a future US-UK trade deal. Impacts Trump remains unpopular among large sections of the UK public, which makes it risky for Conservative politicians to appear close to him. Trump suggested that Nigel Farage should become the UK’s chief Brexit negotiator, indicating he still holds hard-line views on Brexit. A hard border in Northern Ireland after Brexit would complicate the already-difficult politics of a US-UK trade deal in the US Congress.


Author(s):  
Christian Leuprecht

The United Kingdom’s intelligence accountability system reviews and oversees the Five Eyes’ oldest intelligence and security community. Her Majesty’s intelligence community illustrates the challenge of managing the tension between state security with human security: a cycle of reform driven in an attempt to (re)gain the trust of a sceptical UK public and in response to technological progression. Over the course of the last century, the UK and its intelligence and security agencies (ISAs) assisted other Five Eyes members in establishing their own ISAs, while its cycle of reform has had equally important ramifications for driving innovation in intelligence accountability across the Five Eyes community. Controversies have undermined the prospect for public trust on which the legitimacy of the UK’s intelligence community ultimately depends. Changes from the initial focus on general administrative and executive review and oversight were driven by domestic and transnational legal challenges. The European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights have had a notable impact on security and intelligence in the United Kingdom. The chapter reviews the member organizations of the UK’s intelligence community, the strategic environment that has informed intelligence and accountability in the UK, national security threats from the vantage point of the UK, and the UK’s intelligence accountability architecture: the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and Judicial Commissioners Office, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the Intelligence and Security Committee composed of members of both Houses of Parliament, and the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 18-28
Author(s):  
David McKendrick ◽  
Jo Finch

INTRODUCTION: The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015) passed in the United Kingdom (UK) made it mandatory for social workers, as well as a wide range of caring professionals, to work within the PREVENT policy, originally introduced in 2002, as one strand of the UK’s overall counter-terrorism policy.METHOD: The paper offers a theoretical account of how complex issues, like terrorism, that understandably impact on the safety and security of countries, are reduced to a series of assertions, claims and panics that centre on the notion of common sense.IMPLICATIONS: We theorise the concept of common sense and argue that such rhetorical devices have become part of the narrative that surrounds the PREVENT agenda in the UK, which co-opts social workers (and other public servants) into an increasingly securitised environment within the state. In other words, the appeal to common sense stifles critical debate, makes it hard to raise concerns and positions debates in a binary manner. We use the example of how there has been a decisive linking of traditional safeguarding social work practice with counter-terrorism activity.CONCLUSIONS: We posit that linkages such as this serve to advance a more closed society, resulting in a “chilling” of free speech, an increase in surveillance and the unchecked advancement of a neoliberal political agenda which promotes economic considerations over issues of social justice. This we argue, has implications for not only the UK, but for other countries where social workers are increasingly being tasked with counter-terrorism activities.


2005 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Pendleton

This article questions the extent to which UK corporate governance fits the stereotypical market model. It is argued that the UK system displays features that sit uneasily with an emphasis on markets as the primary form of governance. A web of social relationships between investors and managers complements and to some extent substitutes for market-based discipline. Thus the United Kingdom possesses characteristics of relationship or network systems as well as those of market systems. Furthermore, it is argued that, contrary to the usual inferences from an apparently dispersed structure of ownership in the United Kingdom, investors are able to exert strong control of managers. This arises from a similarity of interests between investors, and involves some explicit forms of investor co-ordination. The article concludes with some observations on the utility of the two-systems model.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Bernadette Sangmeister

<p>Inspired by the recently concluded litigation seeking to deport the radical Islamic preacher Abu Qatada from the UK to Jordan, this paper aims at examining the 2012 judgment of the ECtHR by focusing on the question under which circumstances a deportation with diplomatic assurances (DWA) may be permissible under the European Convention on Human Rights. Relevant background information will be provided concerning the interplay of the use of the DWA policy and the European Convention on Human Rights as well as concerning the particular circumstances that led to the ECtHR’s ruling in Abu Qatada. In the following analysis of the judgment, the focus will be on the interplay of the DWA policy and the European Convention on Human Rights with special regard to art 3 and art 6 of the Convention. Finally, the impact of this judgment on the future jurisprudence and the DWA policy will be shown. In the light of this judgment, it will be argued that the counter terrorism means of deporting a non-national terrorist suspect with diplomatic assurances seems to be compatible with the Convention if the diplomatic assurances given guarantee a sufficient protection of the human rights of the transferee, which due to the uncertain effects of the DWA policy, still has to be decided on a case-by-case basis.</p>


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