War and moral stupidity

2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimberly Hutchings

AbstractThis article uses the example of Wittgenstein’s decision to go to war in 1914 to frame a contrast between two different ways of thinking about moral stupidity and moral intelligence in relation to war, those of Jeff McMahan and Jane Addams. The article clarifies how pathways for thinking about the morality of war are blocked and enabled not only by different accounts of justice but also by different understandings of war. It is argued that if we want to be morally intelligent in our judgments about the ethics of war we should follow the pathway marked out by Addams and think less about justice and more about war.

Author(s):  
Seth Lazar

This chapter introduces the two main ways to think about the ethics of war. The first is to start by thinking about war. The second is to think about the ethics of killing outside of war, then apply those principles to the case of war. In contemporary just war theory, the first approach has most commonly been associated with those who broadly aim to vindicate international law, such as Michael Walzer and his contemporary defenders. The second approach is more frequently linked to the work of Jeff McMahan, and Walzer’s other revisionist critics. I show that this conflation is mere accident. Indeed, perhaps the richest terrain to be ploughed is in the combinations that have been relatively neglected—vindications of international law that start from cases based outside of war; critiques of international law based on the distinctive nature of war.


Daedalus ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 146 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Lazar

Modern analytical just war theory starts with Michael Walzer's defense of key tenets of the laws of war in his Just and Unjust Wars. Walzer advocates noncombatant immunity, proportionality, and combatant equality: combatants in war must target only combatants; unintentional harms that they inflict on noncombatants must be proportionate to the military objective secured; and combatants who abide by these principles fight permissibly, regardless of their aims. In recent years, the revisionist school of just war theory, led by Jeff McMahan, has radically undermined Walzer's defense of these principles. This essay situates Walzer's and the revisionists’ arguments, before illustrating the disturbing vision of the morality of war that results from revisionist premises. It concludes by showing how broadly Walzerian conclusions can be defended using more reliable foundations.


2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Pattison

Recent discussions in Just War Theory have been framed by a polarising debate between “traditionalist” and “revisionist” approaches. This debate has largely overlooked the importance of an applied account of Just War Theory. The main aim of this essay is to defend the importance of this applied account and, in particular, a nonideal account of the ethics of war. I argue that the applied, nonideal morality of war is vital for a plausible and comprehensive account of Just War Theory. A subsidiary aim of the essay is to show that once we appreciate the importance of the applied, nonideal account, it becomes clear that the positions proposed by revisionists and traditionalists are, in fact, much closer than often presumed.


Author(s):  
Victor Tadros

To Do, To Die, To Reason Why is concerned with a wide range of issues about the ethics of war and the legal regulation of war. It is especially concerned with the conduct of individuals, including whether they are required to follow orders to go to war, what moral constraints there are on killing in war, what makes people liable to be killed in war, and the extent to which the laws of war ought to reflect the morality of war. It defends a largely anti-authority view about the morality of war, and defends familiar moral constraints on killing in war, such as the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing and a version of the Doctrine of Double Effect. However, it argues that a much wider range of people are liable to be harmed or killed in war than is normally thought to be the case, on grounds of both causal involvement and fairness, and it argues that the laws of war should converge much more closely with the morality of war than is currently the case.


Author(s):  
Victor Tadros

This chapter introduces issues in the ethics of war by considering the Vietnam War. It describes the main aim of the book as to totalize the humanitarian impulse in the moral assessment of war. By that it means to understand the morality of war by understanding the significance of each human life in war, and to regulate our actions in accordance with this significance. It widens the focus to the relationship between state responsibility for war. and individual responsibility for wrongdoing. It then outlines the main themes of the book.


Author(s):  
Helen Frowe ◽  
Seth Lazar

War is not the only or even the major cause of human suffering. But it is the cause for which we are most often most directly responsible. Our voluntary choices result in huge increases in mortality, massive refugee crises, and the dislocation of whole generations. So while there are other equally pressing problems facing humanity, none of them raises as pointed moral questions as those to do with whether and when we may take our polities to war and how we must fight if we do so. This Handbook offers a guide to thinking through the morality of war, from the perspective of contemporary analytical just war theory. This introduction explains the methodological and substantive choices made in designing the volume, then summarizes the key insights of the chapters to follow.


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