THE TROLLEY PROBLEM AND AGGRESSION

Abstract:This essay considers complications introduced by the Trolley Problem to the discussion of whether and when harming some for the sake of helping others would be unjustified. It first examines Guido Pincione’s arguments for the conclusion that the permissibility of a bystander turning a runaway trolley from killing five people toward killing one other person instead may undermine one moral argument for political libertarianism and against redistributive taxation, namely that we may not harm some people in order to help others to a greater degree. It then considers both the bearing on Pincione’s argument of recent objections to the permissibility of turning the trolley, as well as the soundness of the objections. Finally, the essay considers the relevance of trolley cases for developing a theory of aggression, insofar as aggression is the unjustified use of force that is either foreseen or intended.

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The Ethics of Automated Vehicles: Why Self-driving Cars Should not Swerve in Dilemma Cases

Res Publica ◽

10.1007/s11158-021-09519-y ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Rob Lawlor

Keyword(s):

Social Sciences ◽

Model Building ◽

Trolley Problem ◽

Automated Vehicles ◽

Safe Spaces ◽

The Social ◽

Legal Responsibilities ◽

Self Driving Cars ◽

Trolley Cases ◽

Do So

AbstractIn this paper, I will argue that automated vehicles should not swerve to avoid a person or vehicle in its path, unless they can do so without imposing risks onto others. I will argue that this is the conclusion that we should reach even if we start by assuming that we should divert the trolley in the standard trolley case (in which the trolley will hit and kill five people on the track, unless it is diverted onto a different track, where it will hit and kill just one person). In defence of this claim, I appeal to the distribution of moral and legal responsibilities, highlighting the importance of safe spaces, and arguing in favour of constraints on what can be done to minimise casualties. My arguments draw on the methodology associated with the trolley problem. As such, this paper also defends this methodology, highlighting a number of ways in which authors misunderstand and misrepresent the trolley problem. For example, the ‘trolley problem’ is not the ‘name given by philosophers to classic examples of unavoidable crash scenarios, historically involving runaway trolleys’, as Millar suggests, and trolley cases should not be compared with ‘model building in the (social) sciences’, as Gogoll and Müller suggest. Trolley cases have more in common with lab experiments than model building, and the problem referred to in the trolley problem is not the problem of deciding what to do in any one case. Rather, it refers to the problem of explaining what appear to be conflicting intuitions when we consider two cases together. The problem, for example, could be: how do we justify the claim that automated vehicles should not swerve even if we accept the claim that we should divert the trolley in an apparently similar trolley case?

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Evil and Divine Power: A Response to James Sterba’s Argument from Evil

Religions ◽

10.3390/rel12060442 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 12 (6) ◽

pp. 442

Author(s):

Elizabeth Burns

Keyword(s):

Positive Energy ◽

Human Beings ◽

Moral Argument ◽

Doctrine Of Double Effect ◽

Existence Of God ◽

Divine Power ◽

Argument From Evil ◽

Charles Hartshorne ◽

Horrendous Evils ◽

Trolley Cases

In this article, I offer a response to James P. Sterba’s moral argument for the non-existence of God. Sterba applies to God the so-called Pauline Principle that it is not permissible to do evil in order that good may come. He suggests that this is the underlying element in discussions of the Doctrine of Double Effect, a doctrine that has been largely overlooked by philosophers of religion. Although, as hypothetical trolley cases demonstrate, human beings sometimes cannot avoid doing or permitting evil in order to prevent a greater evil, Sterba argues that the same cannot be said of an omnipotent God and that, since our world contains horrendous evils, the existence of a God who is both omnipotent and good is therefore logically impossible. I argue that, if God is thought to be a conscious being with unlimited power to prevent horrendous evils, Sterba’s argument might be valid. I also argue, however, that divine power need not be construed in this way. Drawing on some ideas derived from the work of Charles Hartshorne, I suggest that God is not a kind of divine micromanager and that it is more coherent and, indeed, helpful to think of God as a social influencer whose power is a source of positive energy for the promotion of goodness.

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