EXTERNAL VALIDITY AND LIBRARIES OF PHENOMENA: A CRITIQUE OF GUALA'S METHODOLOGY OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS

2011 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin K. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Economics ◽  
External Validity ◽  
Economics Literature ◽  
Radical Ideas

Francesco Guala has developed some novel and radical ideas on the problem of external validity, a topic that has not received much attention in the experimental economics literature. In this paper I argue that his views on external validity are not justified and the conclusions which he draws from these views, if widely adopted, could substantially undermine the experimental economics enterprise. In rejecting the justification of these views, the paper reaffirms the importance of experiments in economics.

scholarly journals El debate sobre la validez externa en economía experimental

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-321
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Moro ◽  
Marcelo Auday
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Economics ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
External Validity ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Interpretation Of Results

We focus on the debate on the external validity of lab results in the area of experimental economics. More specifically, we focus on Colin Camerer’s and John List’s views, who postulate opposite positions on the issue. The problem is that they partially analyze the same empirical evidence and draw from it opposite conclusions. The goal of this work is to analyze such empirical evidence to try to explain the difference in interpretation of results. We argue that the dispute in interpretations can be expressed in terms of difference of criteria used to determine external validity. From our analysis we propose the formulation of different types of external validity.

scholarly journals Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions

2005 ◽  
Vol 95 (5) ◽  
pp. 1688-1699 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean S Karlan
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Economics ◽  
External Validity ◽  
Credit Markets ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Information Asymmetries ◽  
Group Lending ◽  
Financial Decisions

Questions remain as to whether results from experimental economics are generalizable to real decisions in nonlaboratory settings. Furthermore, questions persist about whether social capital helps mitigate information asymmetries in credit markets. I examine whether behavior in two laboratory games, Trust and a Public Goods, predicts loan repayments to a Peruvian group-lending microfinance program. Since this program relies on social capital to enforce repayment, this tests the external validity of the games. Individuals identified as “trustworthy” by the Trust Game are indeed less likely to default on their loans. No similar support is found for the game's identification of “trusting” individuals.

Convertible local currency and trust: ‘It’s Not You, It’s Me’ – A field experiment in the French Basque Country

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-120
Author(s):  
Hayyan Alia ◽  
Eli Spiegelman
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Experimental Economics ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Basque Country ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Local Currency ◽  
Economics Literature ◽  
Community Currencies ◽  
Weak Evidence ◽  
Community Currency

We present a field experiment investigating the mechanism by which community currencies enhance trust. Our question is the following: do I trust more when using a community currency because I am a trusting-type person or because I think that you are trustworthy? We call the former preference-based trust; while the latter is belief-based trust. We apply a modification of the standard trust game from the experimental economics literature to disentangle these mechanisms. Player A has to choose whether or not to trust player B, and player B can either reciprocate that trust or not. Our innovation is in experimentally separating the currency in which the game is played ( effective currency), from the currency preferred by the participant ( preferred currency). If the mechanism is preference-based, then preferred currency will determine trust more than effective; if it is belief-based, then the effective currency will be determinant. We find strong evidence of the preference-based mechanism of community currencies on trust, and only weak evidence of the belief-based mechanism.

THE ROLE OF EXPERIMENTS IN ECONOMICS: REPLY TO JONES

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 503-511
Author(s):  
Francesco Guala
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Economics ◽  
External Validity ◽  
Validity Claims

Martin Jones has criticized my account of the methodology of experimental economics on three points: the impossibility of testing external validity claims in the laboratory, my reconstruction of external validity inferences as analogical arguments, and the distinction between laboratory and non-laboratory sciences. I defend my account here and try to eliminate some misunderstandings that may have prompted Jones’s criticism.

An ‘Inexact’ Philosophy of Economics?

1997 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger E. Backhouse
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Experimental Economics ◽  
Framing Effect ◽  
Economic Methodology ◽  
Systematic Account ◽  
Philosophy Of Economics ◽  
Economics Literature ◽  
Critical Commentary ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Definition Of

The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics (ISSE) (Hausman, 1992) represents the most ambitious attempt to provide a systematic account of economic methodology since the first edition of Blaug's The Methodology of Economics (1980). As such, it has been the subject of extensive critical commentary (for example, Blaug, 1992b; Backhouse, 1995; Miller, 1996; Hahn, 1996; Mäki, 1996). For all the attention it has received, however, some important aspects of the book's thesis have not been developed properly. Two important ones are (1) what might be called, following the terminology used in the experimental economics literature, the ‘framing effect’ of Hausman's definition of economics, and (2) the significance of Hausman's claim that economists are committed to developing economics as a ‘separate’ science. To understand these points it is important to make explicit the position from which Hausman approaches the philosophy of science.

THE EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS TECHNIQUES: ANALYSIS OF DEMAND BEHAVIOR

1987 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID S. BROOKSHIRE ◽  
DON L. COURSEY ◽  
WILLIAM D. SCHULZE
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Economics ◽  
External Validity

The problem of external validity (or “parallelism”) in experimental economics

1999 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 555-573 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Guala
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Economics ◽  
External Validity ◽  
Real Case ◽  
Causal Relations ◽  
Laboratory Experimentation

This article is in three parts: in the first section, a real case of laboratory experimentation in economics illustrates what experimentalists do in order to test the external validity of their results. Then, it is shown that such a practice presupposes a specific conception of the causal relations economists are seeking. Some general remarks about the notions of external validity and parallelism are provided in conclusion.

scholarly journals Understanding Experimental Economics

Politik ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carsten S. Nielsen ◽  
Alexander C. Sebald ◽  
Edward J.D. Webb
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Economics ◽  
External Validity ◽  
Experimental Methods ◽  
Success Story ◽  
Methodological Tool ◽  
Powerful Means

Experiments have become a well-established methodological tool in economics. e development of experi- mental economics and the diversi cation of experimental methods have equipped economists with new and powerful means of scienti c investigation. eir worth is readily demonstrated in the exciting and promising results they have produced, and will continue to produce. Against the background of this success story, our selective discussion critically highlights four important aspects of experimentation in economics. We concen- trate on the role and importance of material incentives, potentially confounding experimenter demand e ects and strategies to minimise these, the no deception rule as well as the issue of external validity. 

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