Defaults versus framing: Revisiting Default Effect and Framing Effect with replications and extensions of Johnson and Goldstein (2003) and Johnson, Bellman, and Lohse (2002)

People tend to stick with a default option instead of switching to another option. For instance, Johnson and Goldstein (2003) found a default effect in an organ donation scenario: if organ donation is the default option, people are more inclined to consent to it. Johnson et al. (2002) found a similar default effect in a health-survey scenarios: if receiving more information about your health is the default, people are more inclined to consent to it. Much of the highly cited, impactful work on these default effects, however, has not been replicated in well-powered samples. In two well-powered samples (N = 1920), we conducted a close replication of the default effect in Johnson and Goldstein (2003) and in Johnson, Bellman, and Lohse (2002). We successfully replicated Johnson and Goldstein (2003). In an extension of the original findings, we also show that default effects are unaffected by the permanence of these selections. We, however, failed to replicate the findings of Johnson, Bellman, and Lohse’s (2002) study; we did not find evidence for a default effect. We did, however, find a framing effect: participants who read a positively-framed scenario consented to receive health-related information at a higher rate than participants who read a negatively framed scenario. We also conducted a conceptual replication of Johnson et al. (2002) that was based on an organ-donation scenario, but this attempt failed to find a default effect. Our results suggest that default effects depend on framing and context. Materials, data, and code are available on: https://osf.io/8wd2b/.

Actively Open-Minded Thinking, Bullshit Receptivity, and Susceptibility to Framing: Evaluating the Dual-Process Account in North America and Bulgaria

The framing effect occurs when different presentations of the same problem lead to predictably different preferences. The dual-process framework of higher cognition assumes that the effect violates rational principles, but alternative accounts and recent evidence have contested this interpretation. Contributing to this debate, we tested the dual-process assumption by investigating associations between susceptibility to framing and the willingness and ability to think in line with rational norms, conceptualized as actively open-minded thinking and pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity. We conducted two online studies among North American (N = 259) and Bulgarian (N = 248) university students and administered several framing problems within subjects, presumably a necessary condition for the associations to appear. Confirmatory factor analyses showed that susceptibility to framing was associated with decreased actively open-minded thinking and increased bullshit receptivity in both sites. Exploratory multi-group analyses demonstrated partial strong invariance and showed that the findings generalize across both sites in terms of direction and partially in terms of magnitude. These results broadly support the dual-process account of the framing effect. Our study further contributes to adapting existing measures to a novel setting and expanding the findings across borders and populations.

Null results for the steal-framing effect on out-group aggression

Whether intergroup conflict is a necessary condition for the evolution of human prosociality has been a matter of debate. At the center of the debate is the coevolutionary model of parochial altruism—that human cooperation with in-group members has coevolved with aggression toward out-group members. Studies using the intergroup prisoner’s dilemma–maximizing difference game to test the model have repeatedly shown that people do not exhibit out-group aggression, possibly because of an inappropriate operationalization and framing of out-group aggression. The coevolutionary model predicts out-group aggression when the actor understands that it will lead to the in-group’s benefit. However, in the game, such an aspect of out-group aggression that benefits the in-group is typically not well communicated to participants. Thus, this study tested the hypothesis that out-group aggression in the game would be promoted by a framing that emphasizes that attacking out-group members enhances the in-group’s gain. Results of two laboratory experiments with 176 Japanese university students in total showed that such a framing did not promote out-group aggression and individuals invested more money to cooperate with in-group members only, avoiding the strategy of cooperating with in-group members to harm out-group members. These results do not support the coevolutionary model.

How Cues of Being Watched Promote Risk Seeking in Fund Investment in Older Adults

Social cues, such as being watched, can subtly alter fund investment choices. This study aimed to investigate how cues of being watched influence decision-making, attention allocation, and risk tendencies. Using decision scenarios adopted from the “Asian Disease Problem,” we examined participants’ risk tendency in a financial scenario when they were watched. A total of 63 older and 66 younger adults participated. Eye tracking was used to reveal the decision-maker’s attention allocation (fixations and dwell time per word). The results found that both younger and older adults tend to seek risk in the loss frame than in the gain frame (i.e., framing effect). Watching eyes tended to escalate reckless gambling behaviors among older adults, which led them to maintain their share in the depressed fund market, regardless of whether the options were gain or loss framed. The eye-tracking results revealed that older adults gave less attention to the sure option in the eye condition (i.e., fewer fixations and shorter dwell time). However, their attention was maintained on the gamble options. In comparison, images of “watching eyes” did not influence the risk seeking of younger adults but decreased their framing effect. Being watched can affect financial risk preference in decision-making. The exploration of the contextual sensitivity of being watched provides us with insight into developing decision aids to promote rational financial decision-making, such as human-robot interactions. Future research on age differences still requires further replication.

Causative dynamics of overconfidence, optimism, framing effects and demographic attributes as capital structure determinants for publicly listed firms in Indonesia

This study examines whether capital structure determinations by Indonesian publicly listed firms (Tbks) are influenced by the behavioural biases of overconfidence and optimism, with the underlying rationality frameworks being framed by relevant financial information and impacted by decision-makers’ demographic attributes. Data were obtained from survey respondents and statistically analysed using partial least squares structural equation modelling to identify the indicators of causative dynamics within the hypothesised relationships. Sampled Tbks’ management (CEOs/CFOs) displayed the inherent behavioural traits of overconfidence and optimism in their capital structure determinations. However, such behavioural variables were not statistically proven to significantly influence capital structure decision-making and, hence, were not validated as capital structure determinants. The pecking order framework was revealed to have a significant framing effect on capital structure decision-making by sampled managers. Sampled managers’ demographic attributes and backgrounds were found to be capital structure determinants but did not have a mediating or moderating influence on the modelled relationship between behavioural variables and capital structure.

Relations between metacognitive processes and differences in framing effect performance

In this paper we discuss the link between risky decisions and regret, uncertainty about choice and willing to change the chosen option. We used a classic and modified versions of “Asian disease” task. The modification consisted in adding a series of side effects to the sure option to decrease it's the preferability. An attempt to replicate framing effect, action effect and its inversion in certain and uncertain decision-makers was made. The estimation of utility through integration of information about alternatives and role of metacognitive processes in choice are discussed. Accordingly to results the uncertain decision-makers tend to feel regret about choosing safe option in loss domain. Action effect and its inversion were not found. The inversion of framing-effect in uncertain decision-makers in loss domain was shown. In conclusion, the absence of framing effect in loss domain can be explained by strong the differences between certain and uncertain decision-makers.

Cultural Variability in the Attribute Framing Effect

An intriguing phenomenon that arises from decision making is that the decision maker’s choice is often influenced by whether the option is presented in a positive or negative frame, even though the options are, de facto, identical to one another. Yet, the impact of such differential framing of equivalent information, referred to as the attribute framing effect, may not be the same for every culture; rather, some cultures may be more readily influenced by the differentially valenced frames than others (i.e., showing a greater difference in evaluation in a positive vs. negative frame). The present study investigates to what extent and why cultures may differ in their sensitivity to the attribute framing effect. Participants were recruited from South Korea and the United States, cultures characterized by their focus on prevention and promotion, respectively, to test for the cultural variability in the attribute framing effect. The results revealed that Korean participants were markedly more influenced by the valence of the frame than North American participants. Regulatory focus explained why Koreas showed a greater sensitivity toward the attribute framing effect than North Americans. Specifically, a greater prevention (vs. promotion) orientation of Korean participants led them to show a greater evaluation gap in the positive and negative frames. Implications for cultural significance on the attribute framing effect are discussed.

How consumer opinions are affected by marketers: an empirical examination by deep learning approach

PurposeThe natural language processing (NLP) technique enables machines to understand human language. This paper seeks to harness its power to recognise the interaction between marketers and consumers. Hence, this study aims to enhance the conceptual and future development of deep learning in interactive marketing.Design/methodology/approachThis study measures cognitive responses by using actual user postings. Following a typical NLP analysis pipeline with tailored neural network (NN) models, it presents a stylised quantitative method to manifest the underlying relation.FindingsBased on consumer-generated content (CGC) and marketer-generated content (MGC) in the tourism industry, the results reveal that marketers and consumers interact in a subtle way. This study explores beyond simple positive and negative framing, and reveals that they do not resemble each other, not even in abstract form: CGC may complement MGC, but they are incongruent. It validates and supplements preceding findings in the framing effect literature and underpins some marketing wisdom in practice.Research limitations/implicationsThis research inherits a fundamental limitation of NN model that result interpretability is low. Also, the study may capture the partial phenomenon exhibited by active reviewers; lurker-consumers may behave differently.Originality/valueThis research is among the first to explore the interactive aspect of the framing effect with state-of-the-art deep learning language model. It reveals research opportunities by using NLP-extracted latent features to assess textual opinions. It also demonstrates the accessibility of deep learning tools. Practitioners could use the described blueprint to foster their marketing initiatives.

Time to Pay Attention? Information Search Explains Amplified Framing Effects Under Time Pressure

Decades of research have established the ubiquity and importance of choice biases, such as the framing effect, yet why these seemingly irrational behaviors occur remains unknown. A prominent dual-system account maintains that alternate framings bias choices because of the unchecked influence of quick, affective processes, and findings that time pressure increases the framing effect have provided compelling support. Here, we present a novel alternative account of magnified framing biases under time pressure that emphasizes shifts in early visual attention and strategic adaptations in the decision-making process. In a preregistered direct replication ( N = 40 adult undergraduates), we found that time constraints produced strong shifts in visual attention toward reward-predictive cues that, when combined with truncated information search, amplified the framing effect. Our results suggest that an attention-guided, strategic information-sampling process may be sufficient to explain prior results and raise challenges for using time pressure to support some dual-system accounts.