How signalling games explain mimicry at many levels: from viral epidemiology to human sociology

Mimicry is exhibited in multiple scales, ranging from molecular, to organismal, and then to human society. ‘Batesian’-type mimicry entails a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, reflected in a deceptive mimic signal. ‘Müllerian’-type mimicry occurs when there is perfect common interest between sender and receiver in a particular type of encounter, manifested by an honest co-mimic signal. Using a signalling games approach, simulations show that invasion by Batesian mimics will make Müllerian mimicry unstable, in a coevolutionary chase. We use these results to better understand the deceptive strategies of SARS-CoV-2 and their key role in the COVID-19 pandemic. At the biomolecular level, we explain how cellularization promotes Müllerian molecular mimicry, and discourages Batesian molecular mimicry. A wide range of processes analogous to cellularization are presented; these might represent a manner of reducing oscillatory instabilities. Lastly, we identify examples of mimicry in human society that might be addressed using a signalling game approach.

Ambiguity and context learning in signalling games

Lexical ambiguity is present in many natural languages, but ambiguous words and phrases do not seem to be advantageous. Therefore, the presence of ambiguous words in natural language warrants explanation. We justify the existence of ambiguity from the perspective of context dependence. The main contribution of the paper is that we constructed a context learning process such that each interlocutor can infer their opponent’s private belief from the conversation. A sufficient condition for successful learning is provided. Furthermore, for cases in which learning fails, we investigate how the interlocutors choose among degrees of ambiguous expressions through an adaptive learning process. Lastly, we apply our model in the lattice network, demonstrating that structural evolution favours ambiguity as well.

Functions of Indeterminacy

This chaptersheds light on the potential use of linguistic indeterminacy. It identifies conditions under which indeterminacy in general (if not semantic vagueness) can be strategically used.The negative results of this examination are that most arguments for the value of semantic vagueness are unsound and that even our best game theoretic models of vagueness only show that some form of indeterminacy is beneficial under some conditions. On the positive side, the examination provides evidence based on formal models of signalling games for the possibility to strategically use conversational vagueness, ambiguity, and pragmatic indeterminacy - at least for certain conditions: for example, if there is a conflict of interests. Thus, while most forms of linguistic indeterminacy arguably can have a positive function, there is considerable doubt about any potential value of semantic vagueness.

Origin of biomolecular games: deception and molecular evolution

Biological macromolecules encode information: some of it to endow the molecule with structural flexibility, some of it to enable molecular actions as a catalyst or a substrate, but a residual part can be used to communicate with other macromolecules. Thus, macromolecules do not need to possess information only to survive in an environment, but also to strategically interact with others by sending signals to a receiving macromolecule that can properly interpret the signal and act suitably. These sender–receiver signalling games are sustained by the information asymmetry that exists among the macromolecules. In both biochemistry and molecular evolution, the important role of information asymmetry remains largely unaddressed. Here, we provide a new unifying perspective on the impact of information symmetry between macromolecules on molecular evolutionary processes, while focusing on molecular deception. Biomolecular games arise from the ability of biological macromolecules to exert precise recognition, and their role as units of selection, meaning that they are subject to competition and cooperation with other macromolecules. Thus, signalling game theory can be used to better understand fundamental features of living systems such as molecular recognition, molecular mimicry, selfish elements and ‘junk’ DNA. We show how deceptive behaviour at the molecular level indicates a conflict of interest, and so provides evidence of genetic conflict. This model proposes that molecular deception is diagnostic of selfish behaviour, helping to explain the evasive behaviour of transposable elements in ‘junk’ DNA, for example. Additionally, in this broad review, a range of major evolutionary transitions are shown to be associated with the establishment of signalling conventions, many of which are susceptible to molecular deception. These perspectives allow us to assign rudimentary behaviour to macromolecules, and show how participation in signalling games differentiates biochemistry from abiotic chemistry.

One problem, too many solutions: How costly is honest signalling of need?

The “cost of begging” is a prominent prediction of costly signalling theory, suggesting that offspring begging has to be costly in order to be honest. More specifically, it predicts that there is a single cost function for the offspring (depending on e.g. offspring quality) that maintains honesty and it must be proportional to parent’s fitness loss. Here we show another interpretation of the cost. We demonstrate that cost, proportional to the fitness gain of the offspring, also results in honest signalling. Since the loss of the parent does not necessarily coincide with the gain of the offspring, it is provable that any linear combination of the two cost functions (one proportional to parent’s loss, one to offspring’s gain) also leads to honest signalling. Our results, applied for a specific model, support the previous general conclusion that signalling games have different cost functions for different equilibria. Consequently, costly signalling theory cannot predict a unique equilibrium cost in signalling games especially in case of parent-offspring conflicts. As an important consequence, any measured equilibrium cost in real cases has to be compared both to the parent’s fitness loss and to the offspring’s fitness gain in order to provide meaningfully interpretation.