International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons. Edited by Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Philippe Sands. Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xxviii, 592. ISBN 0-521-65242-1. US$90.00. - 
            Nuclear Weapons and the World Court. By Ved. P. Nanda and David Krieger. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1998. Pp. vii, 379. ISBN 1-57105-051-5. US$95.00.

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to examine whether the possibility of a genuine non liquet is ruled out by a so-called ‘closing rule’underlying public international law. The answer to this question largely determines the relevance of the debate on the legality and legitimacy of the pronouncement of a non liquet by an international court. This debate was recently provoked by the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons. In this opinion, the Court held that it could not definitively conclude whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was contrary to international law in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which the survival of a state is at stake. Nevertheless, some authors have argued that, since international law contains a closing rule stating that the absence of a prohibition is equivalent to the existence of a permission (or vice versa), the Court had in fact decided the legality of nuclear weapons. By virtue of this closing rule, the pronouncement of a non liquet would be impossible. In our analysis, we have taken issue with this view and claim that there are no a priori reasons for the acceptance of a closing rule underlying international law. It is possible indeed that a legal system is simply indifferent towards a certain type of conduct. Moreover, even if a closing rule would be assumed, this rule would be of no help in determining the legality or illegality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons, since the Court asserted that the current state of international law and the facts at its disposal were insufficient to enable it to reach a definitive conclusion. Nothing follows from this assertion, except the assurance that international law cannot definitively settle the question of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons: to be permitted or not to be permitted, that is still the question. Hamlet's dilemma precisely.

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Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons under international law — A few thoughts on its strengths and weaknesses

International Review of the Red Cross ◽

10.1017/s0020860400084333 ◽

1997 ◽

Vol 37 (316) ◽

pp. 92-102 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Manfred Mohr

Keyword(s):

International Law ◽

Nuclear Weapons ◽

Advisory Opinion ◽

International Court Of Justice ◽

The Public ◽

Court Of Justice ◽

International Court

On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice finally rendered its Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The procedure had been dragging on since the start of the public sittings on 30 October 1995. Several deadlines set by the Court for reaching a decision came and went, ultimately giving rise to the fear that there would be no decisive majority to affirm the basic unlawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons. This would have been a bitter setback for the initiators of the Advisory Opinion proceeding and for the development of international law.

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Precarious Finality? Reflections on Res Judicata in the Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Case

10.31228/osf.io/saegw ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

Niccolo Ridi

Keyword(s):

Continental Shelf ◽

Nuclear Weapons ◽

International Court Of Justice ◽

Res Judicata ◽

Court Of Justice ◽

International Court ◽

The World ◽

The Icj ◽

International Adjudication ◽

Rare Situation

This article considers the approach to the res judicata principle taken by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and, specifically, its application in its 2016 judgment on preliminary objections in the latest dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia. The judgment joins the small number of ICJ decisions in which the Court was evenly split, an altogether rare situation, which, at the time of the decision, had not occurred since the Nuclear Weapons Avisory Opinion. Intriguingly, such a fracture seems to have been prompted by differences over the operation of a procedural principle the understanding of which is comparatively uncontroversial. Upon closer analysis, however, the disagreement reveals that more significant questions were at stake, with members of the minority issuing a vocal joint dissent and several individual declarations. This study will move in three parts: first, it will provide an overview of the nature and purpose of the principle of res judicata, its application in international adjudication, and its use by the ICJ; second, it will analyse the Court’s reading of the principle in the case at issue; third, it will expose the broader implications of one such approach for the role and authority of the World Court and the international judiciary.

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International humanitarian law and nuclear weapons

International Review of the Red Cross ◽

10.1017/s002086040008493x ◽

1996 ◽

Vol 36 (313) ◽

pp. 500-502

Author(s):

The Review

Keyword(s):

International Law ◽

Nuclear Weapons ◽

World Health ◽

International Humanitarian Law ◽

Advisory Opinion ◽

Humanitarian Law ◽

International Court Of Justice ◽

Court Of Justice ◽

International Court ◽

Health Organization

On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice gave its advisory opinion in response to two enquiries as to the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Whilst the Court did not examine in detail the request put forward by the World Health Organization, it did give very close attention to the question presented by the General Assembly:“Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?”

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Introduction

The American Journal of International Law ◽

10.2307/2202132 ◽

1987 ◽

Vol 81 (1) ◽

pp. 77-78 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Harold G. Maier

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

International Law ◽

The United States ◽

United States Government ◽

Special Importance ◽

International Court Of Justice ◽

Court Of Justice ◽

International Court ◽

The World ◽

States Government

The ultimate authority of the International Court of Justice flows from the same source as the ultimate authority of all other judicial bodies. Every court’s decisions are an authoritative source of law in a realistic sense only because they are accepted as such by the community whose controversies the court is charged to resolve. In the case of the World Court, it is the community of nations that confers that authority and under the Court’s Statute, its jurisdiction is conferred solely by the consent of the nations whose disputes it is called to adjudicate. It is for this reason that the case Nicaragua v. United States and the actions of both the Court and the United States Government in connection with it are of special importance to those who are concerned with international law.

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