The Political Economy of National Security

1990 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 15-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan B. Kapstein

In recent years, public officials in the United States and abroad have expressed increasing concern over the economic effects of defense spending. It has been alleged that defense spending is a major cause of the budget deficit and is at the root of America's economic “decline.” Even in the Soviet Union, questions are now being raised about the impact of military spending on the civilian economy.As director of a research program at Harvard that focuses on economics and national security, I decided it was important to offer a course on the “political economy of national security.” While Harvard and other major universities in the Boston area offer courses in political economy on the one hand and national security on the other, students have few opportunities to examine national defense from an economic perspective. Given that national security is the largest single economic activity in the United States and many other countries, and given intense student interest in the topic, the time was ripe to devise such a course.The course was first offered in the Harvard Summer School, which is open to undergraduate and graduate students from Harvard and other universities. The only prerequisite was an introductory course in economics. As it turns out, most of the students were more than adequately prepared; among those who attended were students from Harvard Business School, the Kennedy School of Government, some local defense industry executives, military officers, and a number of Ph.D. candidates. For those who might consider offering such a course, I would suggest that the required economics course not be waived in any circumstances; otherwise you will spend a lot of time explaining basic concepts.

1989 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron L. Friedberg

Recent discussions whether or not the United States is strategically “overextended” raise two important questions. First, to what extent can the fiscal and industrial difficulties of the last several decades be attributed to the comparatively high military budgets of the post-1945 period? Second, can the United States continue to maintain something resembling its postwar strategic posture without doing itself grievous economic harm? Although the issue remains open, defense spending would appear to bear only a small part of the responsibility for present U.S. economic problems. As to the future, the question is not so much whether the burden of an extended posture can be borne as whether it should be borne, and who, precisely, should bear it. These are political issues: they are conditioned but not determined by economic factors.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-37
Author(s):  
Armend Muja

Economists have often talked about the European Paradox:” - Europe having the necessary knowledge and research but failing to utilize these advantages and bring them to the markets. The perception, largely attributable to the media reporting, is that Europe lags behind the United States in innovation. While it is true that most of the e-commerce innovations were developed in the United States, Europe’s economies did well over the 1990s despite the lack of major breakthroughs in high-tech sphere. Thus, it is hard to say that Europe is facing an innovation crisis, and I will argue that Europe has other advantages that make it competitive globally. While Europe might not have as much success in innovation as the United States, it nevertheless, has been successful in more developed and mature segments of the markets. Moreover, I will argue that country’s specialization depends on the setup of the institutions in the political economy. The countries utilize their comparative institutional advantage (CIA) to maintain competitive globally. Finally, I will argue against the idea of drastic deregulation of the product and labor markets in Europe. Doing so would be like shooting yourself in the foot since individual European countries would lose their comparative institutional advantage that allows them to stay competitive globally in the market for incremental innovation products.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda J. Bilmes

AbstractThe United States has traditionally defined national security in the context of military threats and addressed them through military spending. This article considers whether the United States will rethink this mindset following the disruption of the Covid19 pandemic, during which a non-military actor has inflicted widespread harm. The author argues that the US will not redefine national security explicitly due to the importance of the military in the US economy and the bipartisan trend toward growing the military budget since 2001. However, the pandemic has opened the floodgates with respect to federal spending. This shift will enable the next administration to allocate greater resources to non-military threats such as climate change and emerging diseases, even as it continues to increase defense spending to address traditionally defined military threats such as hypersonics and cyberterrorism.


2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 659-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Waddell

Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson's Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class is both a work of political science and a contribution to broad public discussion of distributive politics. Its topic could not be more relevant to a US polity wracked by bitter partisan disagreements about taxes, social spending, financial regulation, social insecurity, and inequality. The political power of “the rich” is a theme of widespread public attention. The headline on the cover of the January–February 2011 issue of The American Interest—“Inequality and Democracy: Are Plutocrats Drowning Our Republic?”—is indicative. Francis Fukuyama's lead essay, entitled “Left Out,” clarifies that by “plutocracy,” the journal means “not just rule by the rich, but rule by and for the rich. We mean, in other words, a state of affairs in which the rich influence government in such a way as to protect and expand their own wealth and influence, often at the expense of others.” Fukuyama makes clear that he believes that this state of affairs obtains in the United States today.Readers of Perspectives on Politics will know that the topic has garnered increasing attention from political scientists in general and in our journal in particular. In March 2009, we featured a symposium on Larry Bartels's Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. And in December 2009, our lead article, by Jeffrey A. Winters and Benjamin I. Page, starkly posed the question “Oligarchy in the United States?” and answered it with an equally stark “yes.” Winner-Take-All Politics thus engages a broader scholarly discussion within US political science, at the same time that it both draws upon and echoes many “classic themes” of US political science from the work of Charles Beard and E. E. Schattschneider to Ted Lowi and Charles Lindblom.In this symposium, we have brought together a group of important scholars and commentators who offer a range of perspectives on the book and on the broader themes it engages. While most of our discussants are specialists on “American politics,” we have also sought out scholars beyond this subfield. Our charge to the discussants is to evaluate the book's central claims and evidence, with a focus on three related questions: 1) How compelling is its analysis of the “how” and “why” of recent US public policy and its “turn” in favor of “the rich” and against “the middle class”? 2) How compelling is its critique of the subfield of “American politics” for its focus on the voter–politician linkage and on “politics as spectacle” at the expense of an analysis of “politics as organized combat”? 3) And do you agree with its argument that recent changes in US politics necessitate a different, more comparative, and more political economy–centered approach to the study of US politics?—Jeffrey C. Isaac, Editor


2015 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-367

Benjamin J. Cohen of University of California, Santa Barbara reviews “Currency Politics: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy”, by Jeffry A. Frieden. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Analyzes the politics surrounding exchange rates, including the influence of industries on the political process. Discusses the political economy of currency choice; a theory of currency policy preferences; the United States─from greenbacks to gold, 1862-79; the United States─silver threats among the gold, 1880-96; European monetary integration─from Bretton Woods to the euro and beyond; Latin American currency policy, 1970-2010; the political economy of Latin American currency crises; and the politics of exchange rates─implications and extensions.” Frieden is Professor of Government at Harvard University.


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