The invocation of the right to self-defence in response to armed attacks conducted by armed groups: Implications for attribution

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (01) ◽  
pp. 91-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erika de Wet

AbstractThe right to self-defence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter is increasingly being invoked in response to armed attacks conducted by armed groups located in a territory of another state, with or without the (direct) assistance of such a state. This article examines the implications of the invocation of the right to self-defence under these circumstances for the principles of attribution within thejus ad bellumparadigm. First, it illuminates how the threshold requirements for indirect armed attacks (that is, the state acting through a private actor) have been lowered since the 1986Nicaraguadecision of the International Court of Justice. In so doing, the article suggests that in order to prevent a complete erosion of the benchmarks of an indirect armed attack, the notions of ‘substantial involvement’ in an armed attack, ‘harbouring’, and ‘unwillingness’ should be interpreted as manifestations of due diligence. Thereafter, the article illustrates that there is also an increasing attribution of armed attacks directly to non-state actors, notably those located in areas over which territorial states have lost control. Such states could be depicted as being ‘unable’ to counter the activities of non-state actors. The article further submits that particularly in these instances, the principle of necessity within the self-defence paradigm can play an important role in curbing the potential for abuse inherent in the vague notion of ‘inability’, if interpreted in light of Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts.

Author(s):  
Lindsay Moir

This chapter examines the problems that could arise when a state invokes self-defence to justify action against terrorist groups in another state. It first considers indirect armed attack against armed groups and the controversy surrounding the use of self-defence where armed groups are controlled by a foreign state, with particular reference to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisprudence. It then discusses the possibility that an armed attack could occur, permitting a forcible response in the context of international law, without attribution to a state by citing the Nicaragua case in which the ICJ pronounced that self-defence is permissible against a host state in effective control of an armed group. The chapter also looks at the case of Afghanistan and its relationship to Al Qaeda as an example of a state’s claims of self-defence against terrorism.


2005 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michla Pomerance

It is hardly surprising that the controversial advisor)’ opinion of the International Court of Justice in the case concerning the Israeli security fence raised serious concerns in many quarters, on multiple grounds. Most prominently, as some of the judges and numerous commentators have noted, the restriction of the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to attacks by “states” is unwarranted on the basis of the text. It is also, of course, illogical in an era when the worldwide terrorist threats stem primarily from nonstate actors. Additionally, in the current case, while the Court assimilated “Palestine” to a state for the purpose of granting it certain rights (including procedural rights before the Court), the ICJ made no corresponding acknowledgment of Palestine’s obligation to refrain from engaging in an armed attack. This, as Judge Rosalyn Higgins recognized, was “formalism of an unevenhanded sort.”


Author(s):  
Kimberley Trapp

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force between States. In so doing, it addresses itself to a strictly interstate context and does not speak to the phenomenon of uses of force by non-state actors (NSAs). The question examined in this chapter is whether the exception to that prohibition—the right to use force in self-defence—is nevertheless responsive to the war-making capacity of NSAs. Otherwise put, is the definition of ‘armed attack’ in Article 51 of the UN Charter (and related customary international law) conditioned on the attacker being a state? In exploring this question, the chapter considers whether attribution is a necessary condition (in ratione personae terms) for the applicability of Article 51 by assessing the language of the Charter (including its travaux préparatoires), jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, and state practice.


1991 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy L. H. McCormack

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states that:Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.International lawyers are still arguing about the scope of the right of self-defence in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Most of the arguments focus on the semantics of Article 51. Those who argue for a “restrictive view” of the provision emphasise the qualifying phrase “if an armed attack occurs”.


Author(s):  
Gray Christine

This chapter discusses the general framework of the law of self-defence. The scope of the right of self-defence is the subject of the most fundamental disagreement between states and between writers. Some of the divisions over the scope of the right of self-defence, especially as to whether anticipatory self-defence against an imminent armed attack and the protection of nationals abroad are lawful, date back to the creation of the United Nations. Other divisions centre on the right to use force in self-defence in response to colonial occupation, to terrorist attacks, and to other attacks by non-state actors. This chapter also discusses the special regime of collective self-defence.


Author(s):  
Chris O'Meara

Chapter 1 introduces the topic and explains the book’s context, purpose and importance. The chapter elaborates on how the International Court of Justice, scholars and states have approached necessity and proportionality and situates the book in relation to the current understanding of each requirement. The chapter proceeds to examine the provenance of necessity and proportionality (including consideration of the much-celebrated Caroline incident), as well as explaining the approach that this author takes to explore their contemporary meaning. Chapter 1 concludes by offering some initial observations on the nature and function of necessity and proportionality and the purposes of the right of self-defence that frame and underpin the subsequent analysis.


2007 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimberley N Trapp

The International Court of Justice's decision inDRCvUgandatouches on, but fails to address, the circumstances under which a State has a right to use force in self-defence against non-State actors.1In particular, the Court holds that, because the attacks carried out by anti-Ugandan rebels operating from the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) territory are not attributable to the DRC, Uganda has no right to use force in self-defenceagainst theDRC.2The separate opinions inDRC v Ugandalament the Court's failure to take the opportunity to address the right to act in self-defence against non-State actors3–an issue of such obvious importance to the international community in an age of terrorism. As will be examined below, there are arguably good reasons–on the facts of the case–for the Court's refusal to pronounce itself on the matter. Furthermore, its decision need not be read as absolutely precluding a use of force in foreign territory in response to armed attacks by non-State actors.


2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAPHAËL VAN STEENBERGHE

AbstractThis article analyses the recent state practice in which the right of self-defence has been invoked in order to justify the use of force in response to attacks by non-state actors. The main purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the law of self-defence has evolved through this practice. It is submitted that the latter confirms the tendency, evidenced by the US operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan in 2001, towards allowing states to respond in self-defence to private armed attacks, that is, attacks which are committed by non-state actors only. The article also aims to shed some light on other fundamental conditions of the law of self-defence which played a significant role in the legal assessment of the recent state practice. It is argued in this respect that this practice confirms that any armed attack must reach some level of gravity – which may be assessed by accumulating minor uses of force – in order to trigger the right of self-defence, and that proportionality of the action taken in self-defence may be assessed in quantitative terms, but only as a means of making a prima facie judgement about the necessity of this action.


2004 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 719-735 ◽  
Author(s):  
DOMINIC RAAB

The International Court of Justice rendered its judgement on the merits in the case concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) on 6 November 2003. This article reviews the judgement, focusing on the Court's substantive legal determinations on the scope of ‘armed attack’ under the right of self-defence. The review further considers the implications of the judgement as regards the role of the Court in the judicial settlement of disputes. It concludes by considering the impact of the judgement on the legal framework for international peace and security as applied in the maritime context.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
FT Abioye

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter establishes the doctrine of the prohibition of the use of force amongst member states of the UN. Article 51 lays down exceptions to this rule in terms of the fact that there can be an individual and/or collective use of force in self-defence in the case of an armed attack. This individual or collective use of force is permitted to continue until such a time as the Security Council takes such actions as are necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has further confirmed this prohibition of the use of force in the Nicaragua case, Congo v Uganda and Oil Platforms cases. This area ofinternational law has seen a lot of discussions and developments over the years. The purpose of this article is to examine the efficacy of the use of force between Russia and Georgia; and Israel and Gaza in 2008. It would be examined if these armed attacks are justifiable by the doctrine of self-defence and the recent developments in the field in international law, or if they in fact constitute a breach of the international law prohibition on the use of force. 


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