An Analysis of Prudential Value

Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN M. CAMPBELL
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Good For ◽  
The Relationship

This essay introduces and defends a new analysis of prudential value. According to this analysis, what it is for something to be good for you is for that thing to contribute to the appeal or desirability of being in your position. I argue that this proposal fits well with our ways of talking about prudential value and well-being; enables promising analyses of luck, selfishness, self-sacrifice and paternalism; preserves the relationship between prudential value and the attitudes of concern, love, pity and envy; and satisfies various other desiderata. I also highlight two ways in which the analysis is informative and can lead to progress in our substantive theorizing about the good life.

Human Flourishing Versus Desire Satisfaction

1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Arneson
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Surprising Result ◽  
Human Flourishing ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Desire Satisfaction ◽  
Individual Good ◽  
Helping Others ◽  
Good For

What is the good for human persons? If I am trying to lead the best possible life I could lead, not the morally best life, but the life that is best for me, what exactly am I seeking?This phrasing of the question I will be pursuing may sound tendentious, so some explanation is needed. What is good for one person, we ordinarily suppose, can conflict with what is good for other persons and with what is required by morality. A prudent person seeks her own good efficiently; she selects the best available means to her good. If we call the value that a person seeks when she is being prudent “prudential value,” then an alternative rendering of the question to be addressed in this essay is “What is prudential value?” We can also say that an individual flourishes or has a life high in well-being when her life is high in prudential value. Of course, these common-sense appearances that the good for an individual, the good for other persons, and the requirements of morality often are in conflict might be deceiving. For all that I have said here, the correct theory of individual good might yield the result that sacrificing oneself for the sake of other people or for the sake of a morally worthy cause can never occur, because helping others and being moral always maximize one's own good. But this would be the surprising result of a theory, not something we should presuppose at the start of inquiry. When a friend has a baby and I express a conventional wish that the child have a good life, I mean a life that is good for the child, not a life that merely helps others or merely respects the constraints of morality. After all, a life that is altruistic and perfectly moral, we suppose, could be a life that is pure hell for the person who lives it—a succession of horrible headaches marked by no achievements or attainments of anything worthwhile and ending in agonizing death at a young age. So the question remains, what constitutes a life that is good for the person who is living it?

scholarly journals Sports as a Mechanism for Reaching Your Potential: The Relationship between Positive Psychology and Sports

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Positive Psychology ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Human Potential ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
The Relationship

People have been searching for the good life or personal well-being since the ancient Greeks. During this same period, people have been expressing themselves through sport, participating in games of athleticism as a means of discovering who they are and reaching their potential. This chapter examines the relationship between sports and a flourishing life. By examining sports as a mechanism of achieving specific traits of positive psychology associated with flourishing, the researcher is able to determine that sports are a matrix in which human potential can be nourished.

Self-Esteem and Individual Well-Being

2018 ◽  
pp. 91-112
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Mruk
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Positive Psychology ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Self Esteem ◽  
Human Values ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Sense Of Purpose ◽  
Intrinsic Values ◽  
The Relationship

Chapter 5 focuses on understanding the connection between self-esteem and positive psychology. It begins by looking at self-esteem in relation to two theories of mental health and then moves on to explore research concerning two forms of happiness, namely, hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. The chapter also highlights the relationship between self-esteem and basic human values that positive psychologists have associated with the good life in an Aristotelian sense. This material includes appreciating the importance of identifying one’s own intrinsic values concerning such things as wisdom, compassion, balance, beauty, courage, and more. Special attention is given to the idea that making these types of values a greater part of one’s life may increase a sense of purpose and meaning or well-being. Practical suggestions and activities round out this chapter to make its concepts more useful.

Darwall on Rational Care

Utilitas ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 400-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOSEPH RAZ
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
List Type ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Good For

Stephen Darwall's understanding of what kind of life is a good life, good for the person whose life it is, belongs in the same family as, among others, Scanlon's and mine. It is a family of views about well-being which descends from Aristotle, and Darwall has much of interest to say about the good life, and particularly about Aristotle's views on the subject. Many of the observations central to his position seem to me cogent, and are shared by other writers. These include three important propositions: that a good life, one which is good for those whose life it is, is not necessarily the same as a life which they think is good for them, nor does it necessarily consist in their desires being satisfied, nor in the satisfaction of any subset of their desires (e.g. their considered desires, or those not based on any false assumptions).that people aim or intend to do what is worth doing, to have relationships worth having, and engage in goals worth pursuing, and so on, and that all of these, and their combination, are distinct from having a good life (and this explains how people can knowingly sacrifice their own good), andthat what makes the well-being of people worth pursuing, to the extent that it is, what provides reasons for those same people and for others to protect or promote it, is that people are valuable in themselves.

scholarly journals The Prudential Value of Autonomy

2020 ◽  
pp. 234-258
Author(s):  
Jonathan Pugh
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Central Values ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
Respect For Autonomy ◽  
Special Value

The principle of respect for autonomy is undeniably afforded particular salience in Western bioethics. At least part of the reason for this is that autonomy is often understood to have a central role in the good life. In this chapter, the author argues that autonomy does not have merely instrumental prudential value; instead, autonomy is at least partly constitutive of well-being, since there is a special value in living a life that is one’s own. He defends a well-known argument that speaks in favour of this conclusion, before going on to consider the value of different elements of autonomy, according to the framework adopted in this book. The author concludes by assessing how autonomy can conflict with other central values in bioethics, and how the claim that autonomy has significant prudential value has important implications for how we should understand the concept of beneficence in bioethics.

scholarly journals Neural correlates of the ‘good life’: eudaimonic well-being is associated with insular cortex volume

2013 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 615-618 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary J. Lewis ◽  
Ryota Kanai ◽  
Geraint Rees ◽  
Timothy C. Bates
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Insular Cortex ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
The Good Life

A Critique of Raz’s Liberal Perfectionism: Morality and Politics

1996 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-364
Author(s):  
Bi‐Hwan Kim
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Objective Knowledge ◽  
Self Identity ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Liberal Perfectionism

Joseph Raz Has Long Been Well Known as a Legal philosopher and theorist of practical reason. But it is only in the last decade that he has come to be widely identified as the most prominent defender of a distinctive interpretation of the liberal tradition. Raz wholeheartedly endorses the communitarian view that the individual is a social being, who needs society to establish his/her self-identity and to gain objective knowledge of the good, rather than a self-contained subject abstracted from any specific social experience. Unlike neutralist liberals, such as Rawls and Dworkin, he rejects ‘the priority of right over the good’, stressing the interdependent relationship between right and the good. Yet he remains very much a liberal in his commitment to the value of autonomy (or freedom) and argues powerfully for the desirability (or necessity) of incommensurable plural conceptions of the good life for the well-being of people, as well as for the liberal virtue of toleration, and for their attendant liberal democratic political institutions.

Toward the Pursuit of What People Value

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-73
Author(s):  
Mendiola Teng-Calleja ◽  
Jose Antonio R. Clemente ◽  
Ma. Ligaya Menguito ◽  
Donald Jay Bertulfo
Keyword(s):  
Low Income ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Living Wage ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Initial Attempt ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Research And Policy ◽  
The Capability Approach

Abstract. This study sought to initiate conversations on the utility of the capability approach and a psychological lens in approximating a living wage. We put forth the concept of capability gap – defined as the difference between what one values and what one perceives as attainable. We used a set of valued domains of a good life that were identified based on well-being indicators in determining capability gaps. Five hundred workers (all breadwinners) belonging to households selected through stratified random sampling from purposively chosen middle- and low-income communities in the Philippines participated in the survey. From the data, we constructed a weighted capability measure that determines the capability gap, weighted by the perceived importance of each of the good life domains. We likewise derived an estimate of a living wage that yields a weighted capability that represents individuals' capabilities to achieve and pursue valued outcomes, freedoms, and entitlements. This initial attempt at estimating a living wage based on individuals' capability to achieve and pursue a good life is presented as the main contribution of the research. The limitations of the study as well as its implications to living wage research and policy are discussed.

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