Intra-Church Property Disputes and the Failure of Neutral Principles: A Call for a Return to the Deference Standard

2022 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-58
Author(s):  
Trevor Fortenberry

The issue of intra-church property disputes is one that is simultaneously quite old in American history and perhaps of greater relevance now than ever before. Given ever-increasing dissension within Christian church bodies over issues including homosexuality, women's ordination and racial justice, there are currently numerous church property disputes outstanding in the courts, and there are likely to be many more in the near future. From 1871 until 1979, the Supreme Court of the United States consistently took a deferential approach in property cases that involved church bodies with their own authorities and tribunals. When a dispute arose over church doctrine, polity or discipline and a hierarchical church reached its own decisions regarding proper ownership of the church's property, the Supreme Court determined that civil courts should defer to that church's internal decision-making process. The court first created this doctrine as a matter of ‘federal common law’ but in 1952 anchored it in the First Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment clauses, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. During the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court consistently extended the deference standard against any state-level attempts to restrict or circumvent it. However, in the 1979 case of Jones v Wolf the court changed its standard significantly and adopted a ‘neutral principles’ approach, which weighs a church's internal documents and deliberations against property deeds, state property and trust statutes, and other sources, in an attempt to allow secular courts to rule on such cases while avoiding potential First Amendment concerns.

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-213
Author(s):  
Nicholas S. Paliewicz

This essay analyzes how a rhetorical culture emerged in which the Supreme Court of the United States assumed corporations were constitutional persons under the Fourteenth Amendment. Approaching rhetorical culture from a networked standpoint, I argue that corporate personhood emerged from Southern Pacific Railroad Co.’s networks and alliances with environmental preservationists, politicians, publics, lawyers, judges, and immigrants in the late 19th century. Contributing to literatures on rhetorical culture and agency, this study shows how Southern Pacific Railroad Co., through networks of influence and force, was a rhetorical subject that shaped a networked rhetorical culture that expanded the boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment even though the Supreme Court of the United States had not worked out the philosophical underpinnings of corporate personhood. Corporate personhood remains theoretically restrained by legal discourses that reduce subjectivity to a singular, speaking, human subject.


2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 513-525
Author(s):  
Luke Charles Harris

AbstractIn this essay, I contend that the elevation of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court, and the evisceration of civil rights it has enabled, should be understood in part to reflect a tragic mistake on the part of Black America writ large. I will argue it represents the absence of a fully embodied vision of racial justice—one that genuinely symbolizes the entire panoply of concerns that must be addressed if the quest for racial equality is to ever be fully realized in the United States. Importantly, what this essay will point to is a political and discursive failure to center the concerns of Black females at the heart of our racial justice agenda.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 658-677
Author(s):  
Emily Zackin

AbstractIn the landmark case Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell (1934), the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a state-level debt relief statute that was quite similar to those it had long deemed to violate the Contracts Clause. The dissent even argued that the Contracts Clause was written precisely to prohibit this type of state legislation. Rather than seeking to understand or characterize this doctrinal shift, as most work on Blaisdell has done, this article argues that Contracts Clause doctrine had never actually eradicated the state practice of intervening in contracts. The article both highlights and explains the long-standing mismatch between Contracts Clause doctrine and state legislative practice that preceded this ruling. Whatever Blaisdell meant as a matter of doctrine, it should also be understood as evidence of a durable state-level commitment to protecting debtors from the potentially ruinous consequences of private economic bargains.


Author(s):  
Paula Alexander Becker

<p class="MsoBlockText" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">The future of affirmative action was the subject of a pair of consolidated cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in June 2003.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use of race in the admission of students to a University or whether diversity can provide a compelling government interest sufficient to meet Fourteenth Amendment standard was the controversy decided by the Supreme Court.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>This case will affect the future of affirmative action not only in higher education, but also in the employment arena as well. </span></span></p>


Author(s):  
Víctor J. Vázquez Alonso

En este trabajo se lleva a cabo una aproximación a la evolución del Estado Social en el Federalismo americano, destacando el papel que ha tenido en la misma el Judicial Review. Para ello, primeramente, se estudiarán las causas del denominado excepcionalismo americano, en lo referido a la falta de consagración constitucional de los derechos sociales. Se estudiarán aquí los frustrados intentos de la Corte Suprema de dotar de eficacia a ciertos derechos sociales a partir de la Enmienda Catorce. Una vez señalada esta excepción americana, se analizará cómo la construcción de un estado del bienestar en los Estados Unidos, desde el New Deal hasta nuestros días, ha ido de la mano de una interpretación de las categorías del federalismo favorable a los poderes del Congreso. Del mismo modo, se llamará la atención sobre las limitación que tienen los jueces estatales para dar eficacia a los derechos sociales de sus constituciones y de cómo a nivel estatal, se abre paso la idea de reformular la función judicial cuando se trata de aplicar disposiciones de carácter social que exigen políticas públicas. Finalmente, y a la luz de la última jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema, se insistirá en la necesaria deferencia judicial que reclaman las leyes estatales que sobre una interpretación concreta del federalismo implementan nuevas facetas del bienestar social.This paper addresses the evolution of the Welfare State in American Federalism, highlighting the role played by Judicial Review. With such an aim, we first study the causes of the so-called «American Exceptionalism», in reference to the lack of constitutional enforcement of social rights. Concretely, we will focus on the frustrated attempts of the Supreme Court to give efficacy to certain social rights through the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Once this exception and its reasons are fully acknowledged, we are able to discuss how the construction of the welfare state in the United States, since the New Deal to the present day, has been accompanied by an interpretation of Federal categories very favourable to the powers of the National Congress. Similarly, we will analyse the limitations that state judges have when enforcing social rights protected in state constitutions as well as the current debate taking place at the state level regarding possible reformulations of the judicial function when it comes to implement provisions of social nature that require public policies. Finally, and in light of the recent case law of the Supreme Court, we will insist on the necessary judicial deference in cases in which Federal categories are used to implement new welfare goals.


1910 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 483-497
Author(s):  
Eugene Wambaugh

It is indeed a substantial grist that the Supreme Court of the United States at the last term of court has ground for students of political science. The first opinion was delivered on November 1, 1909, and the last on May 31, 1910, and the court decided no less than sixty-five constitutional cases. Notice that with caution it is merely said that the court decided no less than that number; for it is often somewhat a matter of opinion whether a case should be classed as constitutional, and it may well be that there are readers who will find that the court exceeded sixty-five. And how were those sixty-five divided? Many turned on more constitutional points than one, and thus an enumeration of the cases bearing on the several clauses of the Constitution will reveal a total exceeding sixty-five. The enumeration, subject to amendment in accordance with each student's views, gives the following results: The Fourteenth Amendment, twenty-four cases; the Commerce Clause, twenty-one; the Obligation of Contracts Clause, eight; whether cases arise “under the laws of the United States,” eight; Full Faith and Credit Clause, five; and sixteen other clauses, from one to four cases each, aggregating twenty-seven.Through these dull figures some important facts shine distinctly. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause clearly took a vast part of the court's energy, and each of these provisions has to do with the curtailment of functions which prima facie belong to the several states. In other words, the chief feature of this term, as of every recent term, has been a more or less successful attempt of litigants to overthrow state statutes as denials of due process and equal protection or as interferences with interstate commerce.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brandon L Bang ◽  
Duane Stanton ◽  
Craig Hemmens ◽  
Mary K Stohr

The Supreme Court of the United States recognized in its seminal case Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966) that police used overly coercive techniques during custodial interrogations to obtain confessions. Yet, post Miranda, police officers still utilize legal coercive and deceptive techniques during custodial interrogations. Unfortunately, some of these techniques have proven to be so coercive that they lead to false confessions and innocent people being convicted for crimes they did not commit. Some states have taken measures to protect the accused during custodial interrogations and require the police to record custodial interrogations under certain conditions. The policies and procedures that mandate interrogation recording vary in scope and by state. This article sheds light on the different statutes and policies implemented at the state level that regulate custodial interrogation recording.


1988 ◽  
Vol 43 (12) ◽  
pp. 1019-1028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald N. Bersoff ◽  
Laurel P. Malson ◽  
Donald B. Verrilli

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