Josiah Royce's Philosophy of the Community: Danger of the Detached Individual

1985 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 153-176
Author(s):  
John J. McDermott

The popular mind is deep and means a thousand times more than it knows.It is fitting that the Royal Institute of Philosophy series on American philosophy include a session on the thought of Josiah Royce, for his most formidable philosophical work, The World and the Individual, was a result of his Gifford lectures in the not too distant city of Aberdeen in 1899 and 1900. The invitation to offer the Gifford lectures was somewhat happenstance, for it was extended originally to William James, who pleaded, as he often did in his convenient neurasthenic way, to postpone for a year on behalf of his unsettled nerves. James repaired himself to the Swiss home of Theodore Flournoy, with its treasure of books in religion and psychology, so as to write his Gifford lectures, now famous as The Varieties of Religious Experience. In so doing, however, James was able to solicit an invitation for Royce to occupy the year of his postponement. Royce accepted with alacrity, although this generosity of James displeased his wife Alice, who ranted, ‘Royce!! He will not refuse, but over he will go with his Infinite under his arm, and he will not even do honour to William's recommendation.’ Alice was partially correct in that Royce, indeed, did carry the Infinite across the ocean to the home of his intellectual forebears, although on that occasion as on many others, he acknowledged the support of his personal and philosophical mentor, colleague and friend, William James.

1985 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 153-176
Author(s):  
John J. McDermott

The popular mind is deep and means a thousand times more than it knows.It is fitting that the Royal Institute of Philosophy series on American philosophy include a session on the thought of Josiah Royce, for his most formidable philosophical work, The World and the Individual, was a result of his Gifford lectures in the not too distant city of Aberdeen in 1899 and 1900. The invitation to offer the Gifford lectures was somewhat happenstance, for it was extended originally to William James, who pleaded, as he often did in his convenient neurasthenic way, to postpone for a year on behalf of his unsettled nerves. James repaired himself to the Swiss home of Theodore Flournoy, with its treasure of books in religion and psychology, so as to write his Gifford lectures, now famous as The Varieties of Religious Experience. In so doing, however, James was able to solicit an invitation for Royce to occupy the year of his postponement. Royce accepted with alacrity, although this generosity of James displeased his wife Alice, who ranted, ‘Royce!! He will not refuse, but over he will go with his Infinite under his arm, and he will not even do honour to William's recommendation.’ Alice was partially correct in that Royce, indeed, did carry the Infinite across the ocean to the home of his intellectual forebears, although on that occasion as on many others, he acknowledged the support of his personal and philosophical mentor, colleague and friend, William James.


Horizons ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 256-275
Author(s):  
Cara Anthony

Abstract“Religious experience” is an ambiguous theological term. American philosophers William James and John Dewey contribute to an understanding of religious experience as private and strictly affective, which reinforces belief in a denuminized communal sphere. Another American philosopher, Josiah Royce, accounts for religious experience in ways that resonate with Catholic experience and that counteract current American tendencies to privacy and insularity. Royce envisions an alternative to both William James' individualism and John Dewey's naturalism that illumines two typically Catholic experiences: encountering God sacramentally in the community called “church,” and discovering God's gracious power within human knowledge and freedom. His description of the sources of religious insight affirm the intellectual and actional elements of religious experience as well as its affective dimensions. His description of the act of interpretation explains how many selves can take part in a single experience, and thereby create a shared life together.


1989 ◽  
Vol 82 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne Proudfoot

In a volume of speeches published in 1799 and addressed to those whom he called “the cultured among the despisers of religion,” Friedrich Schleiermacher offered a description of religious experience, doctrine, and practice designed to convince his readers that the conventional pieties they deplored in the churches and synagogues were not genuine religion. Instead, true religion was the sense and taste for the infinite that they themselves were cultivating in poetry, criticism, conversation, and other aesthetic pursuits of their romantic circle. He was especially concerned to allay their fears that religious beliefs might conflict with the growth of knowledge about the world of nature or the mind. “Religion,” he wrote, “leaves you, your physics and … also your psychology untouched.”


Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 94
Author(s):  
Alfred Collins

“Experience” is a category that seems to have developed new meaning in European thought after the Enlightenment when personal inwardness took on the weight of an absent God. The inner self (including, a little later, a sub- or unconscious mind) rose to prominence about 200–300 years ago, around the time of the “Counter-Enlightenment” and Romanticism, and enjoyed a rich and long life in philosophy (including Lebensphilosophie) and religious studies, but began a steep descent under fire around 1970. The critique of “essentialism” (the claim that experience is self-validating and impervious to historical and scientific explanation or challenge) was probably the main point of attack, but there were others. The Frankfurt School (Adorno, Benjamin, et al.) claimed that authentic experience was difficult or impossible in the modern capitalist era. The question of the reality of the individual self to which experience happens also threatened to undermine the concept. This paper argues that the religious experience characteristic of Sāṃkhya and Yoga, while in some ways paralleling Romanticism and Lebensphilosophies, differs from them in one essential way. Sāṃkhyan/Yogic experience is not something that happens to, or in, an individual person. It does not occur to or for oneself (in the usual sense) but rather puruṣārtha, “for the sake of [artha] an innermost consciousness/self”[puruṣa] which must be distinguished from the “solitude” of “individual men” (the recipient, for William James, of religious experience) which would be called ahaṃkāra, or “ego assertion” in the Indian perspectives. The distinction found in European Lebensphilosophie between two kinds of experience, Erlebnis (a present-focused lived moment) and Erfahrung (a constructed, time-binding thread of life, involving memory and often constituting a story) helps to understand what is happening in Sāṃkhya and Yoga. The concept closest to experience in Sāṃkhya/Yoga is named by the Sanskrit root dṛś-, “seeing,” which is a process actualized through long meditative practice and close philosophical reasoning. The Erfahrung “story” enacted in Sāṃkhya/Yoga practice is a sort of dance-drama in which psychomaterial Nature (prakṛti) reveals to her inner consciousness and possessor (puruṣa) that she “is not, has nothing of her own, and does not have the quality of being an ‘I’” (nāsmi na me nāham). This self exposure as “not I” apophatically reveals puruṣa, and lets him shine for them both, as pure consciousness. Prakṛti’s long quest for puruṣa, seeking him with the finest insight (jñāna), culminates in realization that she is not the seer in this process but the seen, and that her failure has been to assert aham (“I”) rather than realize nāham, “Not I.” Her meditation and insight have led to an experience which was always for an Other, though that was not recognized until the story’s end. Rather like McLuhan’s “the medium is the message,” the nature or structure of experience in Sāṃkhya and Yoga is also its content, what religious experience is about in these philosophies and practices. In Western terms, we have religious experience only when we recognize what (all) experience (already) is: the unfolding story of puruṣārtha. Experience deepens the more we see that it is not ours; the recognition of non-I, in fact, is what makes genuine experience possible at all.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 207-224
Author(s):  
Katja Thörner

In this paper I will show that you can distinguish two main types of argumentation in respect to feeling and emotions in the philosophy of religion of William James, which point to two different kind of criticism of religion. Especially in his early works, James argues that you may lawfully adopt religious beliefs on the basis of passional grounds. This argumentation points to a type of criticism of religion, which denies that beliefs based on such emotional grounds may be justified. In his famous study The Varieties of Religious Experience, James defines religious experience as an experience of inner conversion, where the individual gets in touch with a higher self. The philosophical interpretation of religious experience points not at least to a type of criticism of religion in the tradition of Ludwig Feuerbach, which is known as the theory of projection.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
James Wilberding

The concept of the world soul is difficult to understand in large part because over the course of history it has been invoked to very different ends and within the frameworks of very different ontologies, with very different concepts of the world soul emerging as a result. Yet there are three principal contexts in which the world soul is traditionally called upon to do philosophical work: the individual soul’s relation to the world (and other souls), natural science and cosmology, and especially metaphysical mediation. These three contexts are set out with reference to the following chapters and reflections.


2009 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sébastien Gandon

Résumé Dans l’Appendice au livre I de The World and the Individual (1898), le philosophe américain Josiah Royce développe, en se fondant sur Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen ? de Dedekind, une critique détaillée du livre de Bradley Appearance and Reality. Se concentrant sur le fameux § 66, Royce maintient que la théorie de Dedekind peut être vue comme l’accomplissement du mouvement de pensée inauguré par Fichte et Hegel : le « Soi idéal » est infini et l’arithmétique est la théorie de sa structure formelle. Ce texte curieux et négligé est intéressant pour au moins deux raisons. En premier lieu, la critique que Royce adresse à Bradley ressemble à celle de Russell : les deux auteurs fondent leur rejet du scepticisme bradleyien sur les mathématiques de Cantor et de Dedekind ; cependant, au lieu de rompre avec l’idéalisme, Royce plaide pour un retour à l’idéalisme rationnel de Fichte et de Hegel. Je présenterai les raisons qu’il a de procéder de la sorte et montrerai, contre l’opinion de Russell, qu’elles ne sont pas sans force. La seconde raison de lire Royce est que ce texte offre une interprétation originale, purement métaphysique, de la pensée de Dedekind. Je soutiendrai, à la fin de l’article, que cette analyse n’est pas sans pertinence, et que le philosophe allemand H. Lotze, un collègue de Dedekind à Göttingen, pourrait avoir été le canal par lequel des thèmes issus de l’idéalisme hégélien et fichtéen sont parvenus jusqu’à Dedekind.


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