The Anti-Semitism of History: The Case of the Russian Neo-Pagans

2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 264-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dmitry Shlapentokh

Almost a generation has gone by since the end of the Cold War, a time that has brought many changes. It has become steadily clearer that not the affirmation of the centrality of the democratic West – as asserted by Francis Fukuyama in his famous essay – but the opposite has occurred. There has been continuous erosion of the power of the West. First, the economic and geopolitical balance has increasingly shifted to Southeast Asia, where quite a few states have authoritarian, even totalitarian, socioeconomic arrangements. China is, of course, the best-known example. Second, the demographic and cultural tides have changed. In the past, Europe sent waves of émigrés all over the world. Now the West has become the destination of millions from non-European countries. The pattern of cultural adaptation has also undergone dramatic changes. A considerable number of non-Europeans have no desire to assimilate, or at least they wish to preserve their heritage. All these processes – especially as they relate to the fact that the West is losing its economic competitiveness – cause a response that often leads to racism and neo-fascism. Those who study European neo-fascists almost instinctively compare them with pre-Second World War fascists and Nazis. This temptation is reinforced by the fact that these neo-fascists often use Nazi symbols and trappings. However, a close look at these European neo-fascists/neo-Nazis and their prewar counterparts indicates that their similarities are usually deceptive and they actually belong to quite different species. Present-day neo-fascists/neo-Nazis are not imperialists, as were the German Nazis who dreamed about a worldwide empire. Current European right-wingers are parochial isolationists. They want not an empire but the cleansing of their state from newcomers, especially those of non-European origin. Many are even suspicious of European unity; they see the European Union as the key that opens the gates of their countries, not just to Asians/Africans but to East Europeans, seen as almost an alien race. Second, their view of Jews is different from that of the Nazis. They may be anti-Semitic, but their dislike of Jews is hardly the central element of their worldview. Moreover, they are similar to many of the general public who differentiate between ‘their’ native Jews – against whom they have no grudges – and newcomers from, say, Eastern Europe, whom they consider parasitic aliens. Furthermore, they have problems with the church. Some may be neo-pagans; in this they are also quite different from the Nazis, who had a tense relationship with the church but did not openly oppose it. Russian rightists in many ways follow the model of the European far right. This is due not only to direct ideological borrowing but also to similar conditions. Russia's heartland, for example, is also a major destination for non-European migrants. Still, the Russian far right's views unquestionably have elements arising from the country's specific conditions. As a result, they have developed several peculiar ideological characteristics. They are often pagan and quite hostile to the Orthodox Church. They also see Jews as part of an unholy cabal of Asiatics set on Russia's destruction.

2004 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 301-320
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Hetzer

AbstractThe imminent entry of ten countries into the European Union is one of the greatest success stories in the contemporary history of the continent. Following the devastation of the Second World War and the political and economic paralysis during the ‘Cold War’ period the future holds promise of development opportunities of historical significance for twenty-five Member States. It must not be overlooked, however, that, due to the still prevalent differences in living standards, in income ratios and in administrative structures, the process of economic approximation is also not without risks. Among these is the tendency towards corruption. The expansion of the European Union can only succeed economically and politically if the dangers associated with corruption are minimized by far-sighted legislation and consistent implementation measures throughout Europe. This is true not only with respect to the new Member States.


2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 531-540 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell A. Orenstein

Europe is again a divided continent. When it comes to governance, political economy, or values, two contrasting poles have emerged: one Western, liberal, and democratic, another Eastern, statist, and autocratic. The dividing line between them has become ever sharper, threatening to separate Europe into two distinct worlds. This new divide in Europe arises from a clash between two geopolitical concepts for the continent: One is the Western project of a “Europe whole and free,” an enlarging zone of economic cooperation, political interdependency, and democratic values. The other is the Russian project of a “Eurasian Union” to rival the European Union. This article shows how these two sides of Europe have grown further apart in their conceptions of the European space, their values, governance, and economic models. It explores the reasons for the belated Western responses to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s program to divide Europe. The Russo-Georgian war was a turning point, but the West took a long time to recognize the full implications of Putin’s policy. The current confrontation between Russia and the West is not exactly like the Cold War. Russia’s position is weaker. And the battle will be fought out primarily with economic instruments. However, it is clear that this conflict places Central and Eastern Europe back on the front lines of a divided Europe, raising any number of demons from the past.


Author(s):  
Ian Bache ◽  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Owen Parker

This chapter charts the long history of plans for European unity, from the end of the Second World War to the Hague Congress, the Cold War, the Schuman Plan, and the Treaty of Paris. It also considers European federalism and the practical reasons why some moves to European unity found favour with the new governments of the post-war period: the threat of communism and the emergence of the Cold War; the so-called German Problem; and the need to ensure adequate supplies of coal for the post-war economic reconstruction. As a solution to these intersecting problems, Jean Monnet, came up with a proposal that paved the way for the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. The chapter examines Monnet’s proposal, national reactions to it, and the negotiations that led to the creation of the first of the European communities.


2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Wallace

The United Kingdom’s awkward relationship with the countries on the European continent reflects the ambiguity of its national identity, wavering between European engagement and the English-speaking peoples, as much as differences over economic interests. The founding narrative of West European integration, after the Second World War, has also weakened with generational change, the end of the Cold War and eastern enlargement. Developing persuasive new narratives both for the United Kingdom and the European Union (EU) are necessary but difficult tasks for continuing cooperation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-59
Author(s):  
Benjamin Tromly

AbstractThis article examines the post-war activities of the National Labor Alliance (NTS), a far-right Russian exile organisation whose members had served in German intelligence and propaganda structures during the Second World War. Using declassified CIA documents and previously untapped sources pertaining to NTS, it analyses the transformation of a semi-fascistic, collaborationist and anti-Semitic organisation into a Cold War asset of the CIA. The NTS played a role in shaping its association with US power by applying deceptive political strategies it had adopted during the interwar period and the Second World War to the new geopolitical context of divided Europe.


Author(s):  
Desmond Dinan

This chapter focuses on the historical development of the European Union. The history of the EU began when European governments responded to a series of domestic, regional, and global challenges after the Second World War by establishing new transnational institutions in order to accelerate political and economic integration. These challenges ranged from post-war reconstruction, to the Cold War, and then to globalization. Driven largely by mutually compatible national interests, Franco-German bargains, and American influence, politicians responded by establishing the European communities in the 1950s and the EU in the 1990s. The chapter examines the Schuman Plan, the European Defence Community, the European Community, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), enlargement, constitution building, and the Eurozone crisis.


Author(s):  
Andrii Smyrnov

The article deals with the history of the Orthodox Church in German-occupied Poland (Generalgouvernement), which remained autocephalous and continued to be headed by Metropolitan Dionisii Valedynskyi. In February 1941 Palladii Vydybida-Rudenko was ordained in Warsaw as archbishop of Cracow and the Lemko region. He swore to work solely for the benefit of the Ukrainian Church and the Ukrainian people; complete obedience to Archbishop Ilarion Ohiienko; and to vote during synods exactly like Ilarion, never against. After the German invasion of the USSR and the attachment of Galicia to the GG, Palladii was subsequently also named bishop of Lviv, and was elected chancellor of the Orthodox Church in the Generalgouvernement. Newly created Cracow-Lemko region eparchy numbered approximately 40 parishes. Archbishop Palladii transferred perceived Russophile priests from the region to Warsaw and replaced them with younger, Ukrainian clerics. The Ukrainian accent or language were used during church services; what constituted a ‘legal basis’ for nationalization. However, the eparchy has limited opportunities for the development of the Ukrainian national and church movement due to the opposition of the Greek Catholic lobby in German administration, lack of patriotic priests and war time difficulties. That is why Archbishop Palladii, which constantly living in Warsaw and served in Metropolitan cathedral, met with little success in the Ukrainization of Orthodoxy in Lemko region. In 1942 the synod of bishops adopted certain internal statutes that were later acknowledged by the German authorities as well. The statutes spoke very clearly about the prevailing Ukrainian spirit in the Church. The further growth of the Orthodox Church in the Generalgouvernement was, however, impeded with the withdrawal of the Germans and subsequent chaotic developments. Both Archbishop Ohiienko and Archbishop Vydybida-Rudenko sought refuge in the West.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Peter Trubowitz ◽  
Brian Burgoon

The West is turning inward. Donald Trump’s presidency, Britain’s decision to leave the European Union, and the spread of populist parties in Europe are the most visible signs of this retreat. The shift is not as recent as these examples suggest, however. Drawing on an array of cross-national data for twenty-four industrialized democracies and hundreds of political parties in those democracies, we show that domestic support for liberal internationalism has been receding for twenty-five years across the West. We show that since the end of the Cold War a large and widening gap has opened up between Western democracies’ international ambitions and their domestic political capacity to support them. As Western governments came to rely increasingly on economic globalization, institutionalized cooperation, and multilateral governance, mainstream parties that backed these efforts lost electoral ground to parties on the radical-left and increasingly, the anti-globalist radical-right that have been the vehicles of the current backlash. We discuss the implications of these trends for the Western liberal international order and the strategies now on offer to repair it.


Author(s):  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Owen Parker ◽  
Ian Bache ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Charlotte Burns

This chapter charts the long history of plans for European unity, from the end of the Second World War to the Hague Congress, the Cold War, the Schuman Plan, and the Treaty of Paris. It also considers European federalism and the practical reasons why some moves to European unity found favour with the new governments of the post-war period: the threat of communism and the emergence of the Cold War; the so-called German Problem; and the need to ensure adequate supplies of coal for the post-war economic reconstruction. As a solution to these intersecting problems, Jean Monnet, came up with a proposal that paved the way for the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. The chapter examines Monnet’s proposal, national reactions to it, and the negotiations that led to the creation of the first of the European communities.


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