MONETARY POLICY SWITCHING IN THE EURO AREA AND MULTIPLE STEADY STATES: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 1175-1188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilles Dufrénot ◽  
Guillaume A. Khayat

This paper investigates, in the case of the euro area, the standard assumption that the liquidity trap steady state, which arises from the existence of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, is locally unstable. We show that the policy function of the European Central Bank (ECB) is described by a nonlinear Taylor rule. Then, using our estimations, we show that around the liquidity trap steady state the equilibrium is locally determinate for most plausible parameter values. Finally, we find that an inflation shock is more efficient than a demand shock to escape the liquidity trap steady state.

Author(s):  
C. Randall Henning

The regime complex for crisis finance in the euro area included the European Council, Council of the European Union, and Eurogroup in addition to the three institutions of the troika. As the member states acted largely, though not exclusively, through the council system, these bodies stood at the center of the institutional mix. This chapter reviews the institutions as a prelude to examining the dilemmas that confronted them over the course of the crises. It presents a brief review of some of the basic facts about their origins, membership, and organization. Each section then delves more deeply into these institutions’ governance and principles to understand their capabilities and strategic challenges. As a consequence of different mandates and design, the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund diverged with respect to their approach to financing, adjustment, conditionality, and debt sustainability. This divergence set the stage for institutional conflict in the country programs.


Author(s):  
C. Randall Henning

European governments, against their initial instincts, invited the International Monetary Fund to design financial rescue programs during the euro crisis in cooperation with the European Commission and European Central Bank. These institutions, known as the “troika,” constitute a regime complex in the parlance of international political economy. This book poses four questions about the regime complex for crisis finance in the euro area: Why did European governments choose this particular mix of institutions? What was the strategy of key member states in directing several institutions to collaborate on lending programs? Why did this arrangement endure despite severe conflicts among the institutions? Should the member states of the euro area “go it alone” by creating a European Monetary Fund? This chapter elaborates on these questions and provides an overview of the book.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Hartwell

Abstract Worries about Italy and the unresolved issue of euro governance – coupled with uncertainty surrounding Brexit – means that the European Central Bank (ECB) may already be facing its next crisis in the euro area. Unfortunately, the ECB is still fighting the last war, deploying the tools of unconventional monetary policy to address lingering problems while unable institutionally to address needed structural change. This paper looks at the ECB as an institution amongst institutions and shows how even more unconventional approaches will not help to bolster the economy of the euro area. Indeed, given the complexity of money, the effects of expectations, and continued uncertainty, expanding the ECB’s unconventional arsenal is likely to have deleterious consequences across Europe.


Subject Outlook for euro-area uantitative easing. Significance Data released today by the European Commission showed business and consumer confidence rose to the highest in almost six years in February, further fuelling the debate over how quickly the European Central Bank (ECB) should wind down its two-year-old quantitative easing (QE) programme. Headline inflation rose to 1.8% year-on-year in January, the fastest in four years and just below the ECB’s 2.0% target. However, core inflation remains below 1.0%, justifying the continuation of the central bank’s asset purchases despite fierce resistance from Germany. Impacts The euro has fallen against the Japanese yen and the dollar this month because of rising concern about euro-area political risk. Fears of a sudden end to the 30-year bull market in bonds have eased; ten-year US yields are down over 20 basis points since mid-December. Further upside potential for the oil price is likely to be limited due to US shale and countries exempt from the OPEC cuts raising output. In this era of unconventional policy, the ECB could maintain QE to stabilise weaker members but raise rates to satisfy stronger ones.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Hochstein

Abstract There are strong indications that actual consumer inflation in the euro area is understated by official price measures. The exclusion of homeowner shelter costs and inadequate quality adjustments for certain basket items are among the reasons for a potential downward bias in Eurostat's Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, which would have widespread ramifications not only for consumers but also for the broader economy and financial markets. By focusing on the HICP as a yardstick for its primary objective of medium-term price stability, the European Central Bank relies on a too narrowly defined and error-prone inflation concept.


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