Children's interpretation of negation and quantifier scope in L3 English

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Kyuhee Jo ◽  
Kitaek Kim ◽  
Hyunwoo Kim
Keyword(s):  
Quantifier Scope ◽  
Value Judgment ◽  
L3 Acquisition ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
L1 And L2 ◽  
Interpretation Patterns

Abstract Languages differ in the preferences for the interpretation of the scope relation between negation and a quantifier. This study investigates the understudied issue of how interpretive preferences associated with a quantifier scope in learners’ L1 and L2 affect their scope interpretations in L3 acquisition. Based on the current models of L3 acquisition, we tested which language, L1 or L2, exerts a stronger effect on the L3 acquisition of quantifier scope. To this end, the study involved two groups of multilingual children (11–13 years old) with different L1s (Chinese or Russian) but with the same L2 (Korean) and L3 (English). The participants completed truth-value judgment tasks designed to investigate their interpretation patterns for English sentences with negation and a quantifier (e.g., Tom did not cut all the trees). The results showed that both groups preferred the L3 interpretation similar to that preferred in their L2, but not in their L1, suggesting a potential L2 influence on L3 acquisition. The study evaluates L3 acquisition theories in light of these results.

scholarly journals Difficulties in Comprehending Affirmative and Negative Sentences: Evidence From Chinese Children With Reading Difficulties

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shenai Hu ◽  
Maria Vender ◽  
Gaetano Fiorin ◽  
Denis Delfitto
Keyword(s):  
Mandarin Chinese ◽  
Reading Difficulties ◽  
Judgment Task ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
Chinese Children ◽  
Behavioral Data ◽  
Poor Readers ◽  
Value Judgment ◽  
General Validity ◽  
Truth Value

Recent experimental results suggest that negation is particularly challenging for children with reading difficulties. This study looks at how young poor readers, speakers of Mandarin Chinese, comprehend affirmative and negative sentences as compared with a group of age-matched typical readers. Forty-four Chinese children were tested with a truth value judgment task. The results reveal that negative sentences were harder to process than affirmative ones, irrespective of the distinction between poor and typical readers. Moreover, poor readers performed worse than typical readers in comprehending sentences, regardless of whether they were affirmative or negative sentences. We interpret the results as (a) confirming the two-step simulation hypothesis, based on the result that the difficulty in processing negation has a general validity (persisting in pragmatically felicitous contexts), and (b) disconfirming that negation, as far as behavioral data are concerned, can be used as a reliable linguistic predictor of reading difficulties.

Linguistic cues facilitate children’s understanding of belief-reporting sentences

2021 ◽  
pp. 014272372110486
Author(s):  
Xiaowen Zhang ◽  
Peng Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Gold Medal ◽  
Judgment Task ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Value Judgment ◽  
Additional Information ◽  
Linguistic Cues ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Underlying Mechanisms ◽  
Mental Verbs

It has been well-documented that although children around 4 years start to attribute false beliefs to others in classic false-belief tasks, they are still less able to evaluate the truth-value of propositional belief-reporting sentences, especially when belief conflicts with reality. This article investigates whether linguistic cues, verb factivity in particular, can facilitate children’s understanding of belief-reporting sentences. Two experiments were implemented, one testing children’s knowledge of verb factivity using a gold medal task, and one investigating children’s interpretation of belief-reporting sentences using a truth-value-judgment task. Both experiments took advantage of the contrast between neutral non-factive mental verbs and strong negatively biased mental verbs. What sets the two apart is that the complement clause following a strong negatively biased mental verb is definitely false, whereas the one following a neutral non-factive mental verb remains indeterminate in the absence of additional information. The findings were that, first, 4-year-old children were able to tell the difference between the two types of mental verbs in factivity, and second, children’s performance was significantly improved when a strong negatively biased mental verb than when a neutral non-factive mental verb was used as the main verb of the belief-reporting sentences. The findings suggest that the use of strong negatively biased mental verbs facilitates children’s understanding of belief-reporting sentences. Implications of the findings are discussed in relation to the underlying mechanisms connecting verb factivity and false-belief understanding.

scholarly journals Conditionals on crutches: Expanding the modal horizon

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dario Paape ◽  
Malte Zimmermann
Keyword(s):  
Computational Modeling ◽  
Reaction Times ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Value Judgments ◽  
Value Judgment ◽  
Counterfactual Conditionals ◽  
Modeling Techniques ◽  
On Line ◽  
Truth Value

Using truth-value judgment tasks, we investigated the on-line processing of counterfactual conditionals such as "If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over". Face-value plausibility of the counterfactual as well as the complexity of the antecedent were manipulated. Results show that readers' judgments deviate from face-value plausibility more often when the antecedent is complex, and when the counterfactual is plausible rather than implausible. We interpret our results based on the modal horizon assumption of von Fintel (2001) and argue that they are compatible with a variably strict semantics for counterfactuals (Lewis, 1973). We make use of computational modeling techniques to account for reaction times and truth-value judgments simultaneously, showing that implementing detailed process models deepens our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms triggered by linguistic stimuli.

scholarly journals Do All Eagles Fly High? The Generic Overgeneralization Effect: The Impact of Fillers in Truth Value Judgment Tasks

2020 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edyta Wajda ◽  
Daniel Karczewski
Keyword(s):  
Native Speakers ◽  
Neutral Condition ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Value Judgment ◽  
Negative Condition ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
Acceptance Rates ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThe generic overgeneralization effect is an attested tendency to accept false universal generalizations such as “all eagles fly” or “all snakes lay eggs” as true. In this paper, we discuss the generic overgeneralization effect demonstrated by Polish adult speakers. We asked 313 native speakers of Polish to evaluate universal quantified generalizations such as “all eagles fly” or “all snakes lay eggs” as true or false. The control group of 107 respondents provided data on the acceptance rates of the corresponding generic generalizations such as “eagles fly” or “snakes lay eggs”. By determining the impact of test fillers on the participants’ acceptance rates, the study aimed to identify the scope of the generic overgeneralization effect. We manipulated four conditions: the universal negative, positive, neutral, and generic control conditions. The results showed significant differences between the first two conditions, but neither the negative nor the positive condition differed from the neutral one. The overall acceptance rates of universal statements were 63% for the negative condition, 49% for the positive condition, 55% for the neutral condition, and 90% for the control group. Overall, the participants accepted universal quantified statements at high rates even when they were prompted to reject them. The results may be interpreted as another piece of evidence in support of the generic overgeneralization effect.

scholarly journals When “one” can be “two”: Cross-linguistic differences affect children’s interpretation of the numeral one

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-313
Author(s):  
Sarah Dolscheid ◽  
Franziska Schleussinger ◽  
Martina Penke
Keyword(s):  
Judgment Task ◽  
Value Judgment ◽  
Linguistic Differences ◽  
Linguistic Difference ◽  
German Speaking ◽  
English Speaking ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
Do So ◽  
The Way

In English, a lexical distinction is drawn between the indefinite determiner “a” and the numeral “one”. English-speaking children also interpret the two terms differently, with an exact, upper bounded interpretation of the numeral “one”, but no upper bounded interpretation of the indefinite determiner “a”. Unlike English, however, German does not draw a distinction between the indefinite determiner and the numeral one but instead uses the same term “ein/e” to express both functions. To find out whether this cross-linguistic difference affects children’s upper bounded interpretation of “ein/e”, we tested German-speaking children and adults in a truth-value-judgment task and compared their performance to English-speaking children. Our results revealed that German-speaking children differed from both English children and German adults. Whereas the majority of German adults interpreted “ein/e” in an upper bounded way (i.e. as exactly one, not two), the majority of German-speaking children favored a non-upper bounded interpretation (thus accepting two as a valid response to “ein/e”). German-speaking children’s proportion of upper bounded responses to “ein/e” was also significantly lower than English children’s upper bounded responses to “one”. However, German children’s rate of upper bounded responses increased once a number-biasing context was provided. These findings suggest that German-speaking children can interpret “ein/e” in an upper bounded way but that they need additional cues in order to do so. When no such cues are present, German-speaking children differ from both German-speaking adults and from their English-speaking peers, demonstrating that cross-linguistic differences can affect the way speakers interpret numbers.

scholarly journals Information Structure and Scope Interactions: Disjunction Wide Scope Induced by Focus

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cécile Larralde ◽  
Alina Konradt ◽  
Kriszta Eszter Szendrői
Keyword(s):  
Information Structure ◽  
Wide Scope ◽  
Value Judgment ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Narrow Scope ◽  
Subject Design ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
Scope Interactions ◽  
Scope Reading ◽  
Prosodic Focus

In this paper we investigate the scopal reading of disjunctions in French negative sentences with pre-schoolers. We posit that the French disjunctor “ou” does not fit the traditional disjunction PPI/non-PPI dichotomy according to which a wide scope is taken by a PPI disjunction and a narrow scope when the disjunction is not a PPI. We hypothesized that focus could be a succesful scopal manipulator. Using Truth Value Judgment Tasks (TVJT), we tested French pre-schoolers' scopal reading of negated disjunctions in a neutral prosody condition and with prosodic focus on the disjunctor in a between subject design. We found that as predicted, prosodic focus often enduced participants to adopt a disjunction wide scope reading whereas a disjunction narrow scope reading was favored in the neutral prosody condition. This confirmed our hypothesis that focus can manipulate disjunction scope paramaters. It also shows that, when the disjunction is focalised, children have access to the disjunction wide scope reading earlier than previously thought. Finally, we can conclude that the distinction between PPI-disjunctor vs. non-PPI disjunctor languages needs to be more fine-grained.

scholarly journals Plurality inferences are scalar implicatures: Evidence from acquisition

2015 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lyn Tieu ◽  
Cory Bill ◽  
Jacopo Romoli ◽  
Stephen Crain
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Judgment Task ◽  
Title Page ◽  
Scalar Implicature ◽  
Scalar Implicatures ◽  
Value Judgment ◽  
Downward Entailing ◽  
Truth Value

<div class="page" title="Page 1"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p><span>This paper provides novel experimental evidence for a scalar implicature approach to the plurality inferences that are associated with English plural morphology (</span><span>Emily fed giraffes </span><span>-&gt; </span><span>Emily fed more than one giraffe</span><span>). Using a Truth Value Judgment Task, we show that both adults and 4–5-year-old children compute more plurality inferences in upward-entailing than downward-entailing environments, but children compute fewer plurality inferences overall than adults do. These findings are consistent with previous research demonstrating children’s relative insensitivity to scalar implicatures. We discuss the implications of these findings for theories of plurality inferences, and for the acquisition of scalar inferences more generally. </span></p></div></div></div>

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