Angola: A case study in the challenges of achieving peace and the question of amnesty or prosecution of war crimes in mixed armed conflicts

2002 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 3-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Doria

On 22 February 2002, Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, who led the UNITA rebel movement during the bloody armed conflict in Angola and who had battled to take power by force since Angola's independence from Portugal in 1975, was killed in a gun battle with the Angolan Army. During the Cold War, Savimbi was a proxy for the United States against the then-Marxist government of Angola. But after the end of the Cold War, he lost international support for rejecting peace efforts. He was accused of perpetuating a bloody internal conflict to advance his own interests and was exposed to international sanctions. Meanwhile, the government of President José Eduardo dos Santos moved closer to the United States.The 27-year-long armed conflict is believed to have killed approximately one million people and driven four million others from their homes, creating a humanitarian crisis. In addition, the conflict destroyed almost all of the country's infrastructure, and effectively disrupted every effort by the government to start the long desired national reconstruction after independence, and the building of prosperity for the nation's children.

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 150-196
Author(s):  
A. A. Manukhin

In the present paper the author continues the study of the challenges faced by Colombia in its struggle to overcome the internal armed conflict, as well as the role of the United States in this process. By 2010 the confrontation between the government forces and the armed rebels had reached a breaking point opening the way to a successful conclusion of the Government of Colombia–FARC peace negotiations and the beginning of the country’s post-conflict reconstruction. The paper thoroughly examines the negotiations process, identifies the key disputed issues and the measures outlined for their resolution, including mechanisms of transitional justice, agrarian reform, programmes for demobilization and reintegration of the former combatants. The results of these talks laid the foundation for the historic Peace Accord of September 26, 2016. However, against all hopes and expectations, the agreement failed to bring an end to the long-standing internal conflict in Colombia. The failure of the national referendum, which was designed to approve the agreement, not only revealed deep divisions in the society, but forced the government to make serious concessions to the opponents of the negotiations with FARC. The author emphasizes the growing erosion of the hard-won consensus in the Colombian society, accompanied by the consolidation of the right-wing conservative camp. In this context the role of external sponsors of the peaceful agreement in general and the United States in particular becomes crucial. The paper presents a comparative analysis of approaches to providing aid to Colombia demonstrated by the administrations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump. The author concludes that despite substantial differences, for both administrations the ultimate objective was national security of the United States. That was clearly demonstrated by the fact that the US foreign aid to Colombia focused primarily on the fight against the illegal production of and trafficking in drugs, while the issues of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction received less attention. Assessing Colombia’s experience in overcoming the internal conflict and the role of the United States in that process, the author concludes that although prioritization of security issues may have a considerable organizing potential, at the same time it may be detrimental to the process of post-conflict reconstruction in general.


2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-334
Author(s):  
Jianwei Wang

Ever since the end of the Cold War, the United States—from the government to the public, from the White House to Congress, from policymakers to pundits, from China specialists to people who know little about China—has engaged itself in the seemingly endless debate on China. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, people debated whether China was still important to the United States and whether the Sino-U.S. special relationship was worth preserving. Since the early 1990s, with China's remarkable economic “soft landing” and the consequent robust and sustained economic growth, Americans seemed to have reached a consensus that China still matters to the United States for better or worse. U.S.-China relations were often referred to as one of the most important bilateral relations to the United States. But important in what way? Much debate ensued with a series of frictions between the two countries that climaxed in the dispatch of two U.S. aircraft carriers to the South China Sea during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, the U.S.-led NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the midair collision between the two air forces in 2001. The U.S. media tirelessly asked the question: “China: friend or foe?” The pattern for U.S. China policy since the end of the Cold War is that whenever the relationship appeared to be stabilizing and a consensus was shaping, new crises emerged and destroyed the hard-won progress, triggering another round of debate on China as if people never learned anything from the previous debate; the old and familiar discourse started all over again.


1985 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 337-341
Author(s):  
Ngo Vinh Long

AbstractsThe book under review has been hailed by its supporters as one of the finest examples of “the new Vietnam scholarship.” Like other writings of this genre, this book claims that the United States caused the loss of South Vietnam by going to the Paris peace talks in 1968 and by yielding “far too much to Communist demands” after that. What makes this book stand out from the other writing, however, is its author's unabashed use of highly questionable sources and techniques; he attempts to show that the government of Vietnam is so absolutely evil, its policies and programs such unmitigated failures, and its leaders and cadres so totally inept, corrupt, devious, and callous that the United States and its allies should continue to exert pressure to break that government and to make it capitulate to entire sets of impossible demands prescribed by the author. Given the Cold War climate at present, this book may help to rally people to the anti-Communist cause, but it contributes nothing to scholarship.


1997 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 77-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joaquín Roy

On April 11, 1997, the European Commission, represented by its vice president and UK commissioner, Leon Brittan, responsible for foreign trade and relations with North-America; and the government of the United States, represented by Under Secretary of State for Foreign Trade Stuart Eizenstat, agreed on a compromise that in effect would temporarily neutralize the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, better known as the Helms-Burton law, just a year after its approval. In the event that all the portions of the agreement are implemented, this accommodation will represent the end of one of the most serious episodes of disagreement between Washington and Brussels since the end of the Cold War, as well as between the United States and its partners in NAFTA.


Author(s):  
Toby C. Rider

It is the early Cold War. The Soviet Union appears to be in irresistible ascendance and moves to exploit the Olympic Games as a vehicle for promoting international communism. In response, the United States conceives a subtle, far-reaching psychological warfare campaign to blunt the Soviet advance. Drawing on newly declassified materials and archives, this book chronicles how the U.S. government used the Olympics to promote democracy and its own policy aims during the tense early phase of the Cold War. The book shows how the government, though constrained by traditions against interference in the Games, eluded detection by cooperating with private groups, including secretly funded émigré organizations bent on liberating their home countries from Soviet control. At the same time, the United States appropriated Olympic host cities to hype the American economic and political system while, behind the scenes, the government attempted clandestine manipulation of the International Olympic Committee. The book also details the campaigns that sent propaganda materials around the globe as the United States mobilized culture in general, and sports in particular, to fight the communist threat.


2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 867-878
Author(s):  
Eleonora Mattiacci ◽  
Benjamin T Jones

Abstract Governments involved in civil wars often gain a strategic advantage from intentionally killing civilians. However, targeting civilians might also tarnish perceptions of the government’s legitimacy abroad, increasing the risk of foreign actors punishing the government. How can governments attempt to navigate this dilemma? Focusing on the United States as one of the most frequent interveners in civil wars after the Cold War, we examine one particular strategy governments might employ: public diplomacy campaigns (PDCs) targeting both the public and elites in the United States. PDCs can help governments restore perceptions of their legitimacy abroad in the face of civilian targeting by mobilizing coalitions of support and undermining critics. When governments can achieve plausible deniability for civilian deaths via militias, PDCs enable governments to reduce the damage to foreign perceptions of their legitimacy. When rebels engage in civilian targeting, PDCs allow governments to publicize these actions. We compile data PDCs in the United States by governments engaged in civil wars. Our results have important implications for current understandings of civil war combatant foreign policies, foreign interventions, and international human rights laws and norms.


This book uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The chapters in this volume look at how the “emotional” side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.


Author(s):  
Anne Searcy

During the Cold War, the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union developed cultural exchange programs, in which they sent performing artists abroad in order to generate goodwill for their countries. Ballet companies were frequently called on to serve in these programs, particularly in the direct Soviet-American exchange. This book analyzes four of the early ballet exchange tours, demonstrating how this series of encounters changed both geopolitical relations and the history of dance. The ballet tours were enormously popular. Performances functioned as an important symbolic meeting point for Soviet and American officials, creating goodwill and normalizing relations between the two countries in an era when nuclear conflict was a real threat. At the same time, Soviet and American audiences did not understand ballet in the same way. As American companies toured in the Soviet Union and vice versa, audiences saw the performances through the lens of their own local aesthetics. Ballet in the Cold War introduces the concept of transliteration to understand this process, showing how much power viewers wielded in the exchange and explaining how the dynamics of the Cold War continue to shape ballet today.


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