scholarly journals On the number of normal subgroups of an uncountable group

Author(s):  
R. G. Burns ◽  
John Lawrence ◽  
Frank Okoh

AbstractIn this paper two theorems are proved that give a partial answer to a question posed by G. Behrendt and P. Neumann. Firstly, the existence of a group of cardinality ℵ1 with exactly ℵ1 normal subgroups, yet having a subgroup of index 2 with 2ℵ1 normal subgroups, is consistent with ZFC (the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms for set theory together with the Axiom of Choice). Secondly, the statement “Every metabelian-by-finite group of cardinality ℵ1 has 2ℵ1 normal subgroups” is consistent with ZFC.

2009 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Bowler ◽  
Thomas Forster

It is generally known that infinite symmetric groups have few nontrivial normal subgroups (typically only the subgroups of bounded support) and none of small index. (We will explain later exactly what we mean by small). However the standard analysis relies heavily on the axiom of choice. By dint of a lot of combinatorics we have been able to dispense—largely—with the axiom of choice. Largely, but not entirely: our result is that if X is an infinite set with ∣X∣ = ∣X × X∣ then Symm(X) has no nontrivial normal subgroups of small index. Some condition like this is needed because of the work of Sam Tarzi who showed [4] that, for any finite group G, there is a model of ZF without AC in which there is a set X with Symm(X)/FSymm(X) isomorphic to G.The proof proceeds in two stages. We consider a particularly useful class of permutations, which we call the class of flexible permutations. A permutation of X is flexible if it fixes at least ∣X∣-many points. First we show that every normal subgroup of Symm(X) (of small index) must contain every flexible permutation. This will be theorem 4. Then we show (theorem 7) that the flexible permutations generate Symm(X).


Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss

This is a mainly technical chapter concerning the causal embodiment of the Axiom of Choice from set theory. The Axiom of Choice powered a construction of an infinite fair lottery in Chapter 4 and a die-rolling strategy in Chapter 5. For those applications to work, there has to be a causally implementable (though perhaps not compatible with our laws of nature) way to implement the Axiom of Choice—and, for our purposes, it is ideal if that involves infinite causal histories, so the causal finitist can reject it. Such a construction is offered. Moreover, other paradoxes involving the Axiom of Choice are given, including two Dutch Book paradoxes connected with the Banach–Tarski paradox. Again, all this is argued to provide evidence for causal finitism.


2010 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 996-1006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyriakos Keremedis ◽  
Eleftherios Tachtsis

AbstractWe establish the following results:1. In ZF (i.e., Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory minus the Axiom of Choice AC), for every set I and for every ordinal number α ≥ ω, the following statements are equivalent:(a) The Tychonoff product of ∣α∣ many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact.(b) The union of ∣α∣ many non-empty finite subsets of I is well orderable.2. The statement: For every infinite set I, every closed subset of the Tychonoff product [0, 1]Iwhich consists offunctions with finite support is compact, is not provable in ZF set theory.3. The statement: For every set I, the principle of dependent choices relativised to I implies the Tychonoff product of countably many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact, is not provable in ZF0 (i.e., ZF minus the Axiom of Regularity).4. The statement: For every set I, every ℵ0-sized family of non-empty finite subsets of I has a choice function implies the Tychonoff product of ℵ0many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact, is not provable in ZF0.


Axioms ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dmitri Shakhmatov ◽  
Víctor Yañez

We give a “naive” (i.e., using no additional set-theoretic assumptions beyond ZFC, the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set theory augmented by the Axiom of Choice) example of a Boolean topological group G without infinite separable pseudocompact subsets having the following “selective” compactness property: For each free ultrafilter p on the set N of natural numbers and every sequence ( U n ) of non-empty open subsets of G, one can choose a point x n ∈ U n for all n ∈ N in such a way that the resulting sequence ( x n ) has a p-limit in G; that is, { n ∈ N : x n ∈ V } ∈ p for every neighbourhood V of x in G. In particular, G is selectively pseudocompact (strongly pseudocompact) but not selectively sequentially pseudocompact. This answers a question of Dorantes-Aldama and the first listed author. The group G above is not pseudo- ω -bounded either. Furthermore, we show that the free precompact Boolean group of a topological sum ⨁ i ∈ I X i , where each space X i is either maximal or discrete, contains no infinite separable pseudocompact subsets.


1962 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 105-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katuzi Ono

The theory of mathematical objects, developed in this work, is a trial system intended to be a prototype of set theory. It concerns, with respect to the only one primitive notion “proto-membership”, with a field of mathematical objects which we shall hereafter simply call objects, it is a very simple system, because it assumes only one axiom scheme which is formally similar to the aussonderung axiom of set theory. We shall show that in our object theory we can construct a theory of sets which is stronger than the Zermelo set-theory [1] without the axiom of choice.


2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 1234-1256 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS STREICHER

In a sequence of papers (Krivine 2001; Krivine 2003; Krivine 2009), J.-L. Krivine introduced his notion of classical realisability for classical second-order logic and Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. Moreover, in more recent work (Krivine 2008), he has considered forcing constructions on top of it with the ultimate aim of providing a realisability interpretation for the axiom of choice.The aim of the current paper is to show how Krivine's classical realisability can be understood as an instance of the categorical approach to realisability as started by Martin Hyland in Hyland (1982) and described in detail in van Oosten (2008). Moreover, we will give an intuitive explanation of the iteration of realisability as described in Krivine (2008).


1983 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. P. Monro

AbstractLet ZF denote Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (without the axiom of choice), and let M be a countable transitive model of ZF. The method of forcing extends M to another model M[G] of ZF (a “generic extension”). If the axiom of choice holds in M it also holds in M[G], that is, the axiom of choice is preserved by generic extensions. We show that this is not true for many weak forms of the axiom of choice, and we derive an application to Boolean toposes.


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