On generic extensions without the axiom of choice

1983 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. P. Monro

AbstractLet ZF denote Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (without the axiom of choice), and let M be a countable transitive model of ZF. The method of forcing extends M to another model M[G] of ZF (a “generic extension”). If the axiom of choice holds in M it also holds in M[G], that is, the axiom of choice is preserved by generic extensions. We show that this is not true for many weak forms of the axiom of choice, and we derive an application to Boolean toposes.

1978 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 635-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petr Štěpánek

We shall describe Boolean extensions of models of set theory with the axiom of choice in which cardinals are collapsed by mappings definable from parameters in the ground model. In particular, starting from the constructible universe, we get Boolean extensions in which constructible cardinals are collapsed by ordinal definable sets.Let be a transitive model of set theory with the axiom of choice. Definability of sets in the generic extensions of is closely related to the automorphisms of the corresponding Boolean algebra. In particular, if G is an -generic ultrafilter on a rigid complete Boolean algebra C, then every set in [G] is definable from parameters in . Hence if B is a complete Boolean algebra containing a set of forcing conditions to collapse some cardinals in , it suffices to construct a rigid complete Boolean algebra C, in which B is completely embedded. If G is as above, then [G] satisfies “every set is -definable” and the inner model [G ∩ B] contains the collapsing mapping determined by B. To complete the result, it is necessary to give some conditions under which every cardinal from [G ∩ B] remains a cardinal in [G].The absolutness is granted for every cardinal at least as large as the saturation of C. To keep the upper cardinals absolute, it often suffices to construct C with the same saturation as B. It was shown in [6] that this is always possible, namely, that every Boolean algebra can be completely embedded in a rigid complete Boolean algebra with the same saturation.


1974 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 579-583 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul E. Cohen

Suppose M is a countable standard transitive model of set theory. P. J. Cohen [2] showed that if κ is an infinite cardinal of M then there is a one-to-one function Fκ from κ into the set of real numbers such that M[Fκ] is a model of set theory with the same cardinals as M.If Tκ is the range of Fκ then Cohen also showed [2] that M[Tκ] fails to satisfy the axiom of choice. We will give an easy proof of this fact.If κ, λ are infinite we will also show that M[Tκ] is elementarily equivalent to M[Tλ] and that (] in M[Fλ]) is elementarily equivalent to (] in M[FK]).Finally we show that there may be an N ∈ M[GK] which is a standard model of set theory (without the axiom of choice) and which has, from the viewpoint of M[GK], more real numbers than ordinals.We write ZFC and ZF for Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, respectively with and without the axiom of choice (AC). GBC is Gödel-Bernays' set theory with AC. DC and ACℵo are respectively the axioms of dependent choice and of countable choice defined in [6].Lower case Greek characters (other than ω) are used as variables over ordinals. When α is an ordinal, R(α) is the set of all sets with rank less than α.


Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss

This is a mainly technical chapter concerning the causal embodiment of the Axiom of Choice from set theory. The Axiom of Choice powered a construction of an infinite fair lottery in Chapter 4 and a die-rolling strategy in Chapter 5. For those applications to work, there has to be a causally implementable (though perhaps not compatible with our laws of nature) way to implement the Axiom of Choice—and, for our purposes, it is ideal if that involves infinite causal histories, so the causal finitist can reject it. Such a construction is offered. Moreover, other paradoxes involving the Axiom of Choice are given, including two Dutch Book paradoxes connected with the Banach–Tarski paradox. Again, all this is argued to provide evidence for causal finitism.


1982 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 739-754
Author(s):  
C.P. Farrington

This paper is devoted to the proof of the following theorem.Theorem. Let M be a countable standard transitive model of ZF + V = L, and let ℒ Є M be a wellfounded lattice in M, with top and bottom. Let ∣ℒ∣M = λ, and suppose κ ≥ λ is a regular cardinal in M. Then there is a generic extension N of M such that(i) N and M have the same cardinals, and κN ⊂ M;(ii) the c-degrees of sets of ordinals of N form a pattern isomorphic to ℒ;(iii) if A ⊂ On and A Є N, there is B Є P(κ+)N such that L(A) = L(B).The proof proceeds by forcing with Souslin trees, and relies heavily on techniques developed by Jech. In [5] he uses these techniques to construct simple Boolean algebras in L, and in [6] he uses them to construct a model of set theory whose c-degrees have orderlype 1 + ω*.The proof also draws on ideas of Adamovicz. In [1]–[3] she obtains consistency results concerning the possible patterns of c-degrees of sets of ordinals using perfect set forcing and symmetric models. These methods have the advantage of yielding real degrees, but involve greater combinatorial complexity, in particular the use of ‘sequential representations’ of lattices.The advantage of the approach using Souslin trees is twofold: first, we can make use of ready-made combinatorial principles which hold in L, and secondly, the notion of genericity over a Souslin tree is particularly simple.


2010 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 996-1006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyriakos Keremedis ◽  
Eleftherios Tachtsis

AbstractWe establish the following results:1. In ZF (i.e., Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory minus the Axiom of Choice AC), for every set I and for every ordinal number α ≥ ω, the following statements are equivalent:(a) The Tychonoff product of ∣α∣ many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact.(b) The union of ∣α∣ many non-empty finite subsets of I is well orderable.2. The statement: For every infinite set I, every closed subset of the Tychonoff product [0, 1]Iwhich consists offunctions with finite support is compact, is not provable in ZF set theory.3. The statement: For every set I, the principle of dependent choices relativised to I implies the Tychonoff product of countably many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact, is not provable in ZF0 (i.e., ZF minus the Axiom of Regularity).4. The statement: For every set I, every ℵ0-sized family of non-empty finite subsets of I has a choice function implies the Tychonoff product of ℵ0many non-empty finite discrete subsets of I is compact, is not provable in ZF0.


Axioms ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dmitri Shakhmatov ◽  
Víctor Yañez

We give a “naive” (i.e., using no additional set-theoretic assumptions beyond ZFC, the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set theory augmented by the Axiom of Choice) example of a Boolean topological group G without infinite separable pseudocompact subsets having the following “selective” compactness property: For each free ultrafilter p on the set N of natural numbers and every sequence ( U n ) of non-empty open subsets of G, one can choose a point x n ∈ U n for all n ∈ N in such a way that the resulting sequence ( x n ) has a p-limit in G; that is, { n ∈ N : x n ∈ V } ∈ p for every neighbourhood V of x in G. In particular, G is selectively pseudocompact (strongly pseudocompact) but not selectively sequentially pseudocompact. This answers a question of Dorantes-Aldama and the first listed author. The group G above is not pseudo- ω -bounded either. Furthermore, we show that the free precompact Boolean group of a topological sum ⨁ i ∈ I X i , where each space X i is either maximal or discrete, contains no infinite separable pseudocompact subsets.


1962 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 105-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katuzi Ono

The theory of mathematical objects, developed in this work, is a trial system intended to be a prototype of set theory. It concerns, with respect to the only one primitive notion “proto-membership”, with a field of mathematical objects which we shall hereafter simply call objects, it is a very simple system, because it assumes only one axiom scheme which is formally similar to the aussonderung axiom of set theory. We shall show that in our object theory we can construct a theory of sets which is stronger than the Zermelo set-theory [1] without the axiom of choice.


2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (6) ◽  
pp. 1234-1256 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS STREICHER

In a sequence of papers (Krivine 2001; Krivine 2003; Krivine 2009), J.-L. Krivine introduced his notion of classical realisability for classical second-order logic and Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. Moreover, in more recent work (Krivine 2008), he has considered forcing constructions on top of it with the ultimate aim of providing a realisability interpretation for the axiom of choice.The aim of the current paper is to show how Krivine's classical realisability can be understood as an instance of the categorical approach to realisability as started by Martin Hyland in Hyland (1982) and described in detail in van Oosten (2008). Moreover, we will give an intuitive explanation of the iteration of realisability as described in Krivine (2008).


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