Xi Jinping’s foreign policy took the assertive turn that had begun under his predecessor and made it more confident, consistent, and ambitious. From the United Nations to the World Trade Organization, Beijing’s diplomats promoted their vision for global order: a world safe for autocratic rule, preferably bankrolled by China. The change of approach led to a global pushback against China, which led many in the country to feel that Xi had overreached and was now raising the costs of China’s continued rise. As Chinese diplomats played catch-up with Xi’s ambitious agenda, they found themselves hobbled by the same limitations and shortcomings that their predecessors had faced for generations. Diplomatic reforms reinforced the demand for military discipline in the country’s diplomatic corps as its international influence expands.
While there have been numerous recent analyses of the legitimacy of suprastate governance institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or United Nations Security Council, few accounts have considered individual duties in relation to those institutions, broadly analogous to suprastate political obligation. Identified in this chapter are three categories of duties that should be salient to a range of institutions. These include duties to support their reform, to resist specific institutional features or practices, and to reject the continued operation of some institutions and support the creation of alternate ones. These duties would correspond roughly to how well an institution would appear to fit into a global institutional scheme that actually would fulfill cosmopolitan aims for rights promotion and protections and related global moral goods. An implication is that the current global system itself is a candidate for rejection, given its inherent tendencies toward the gross underfulfillment of individual rights.
At the fourth Cambridge conference on development problems, the role of industry was discussed by ministers, senior officials, economic advisers, and business executives, from 22 African, Asian, and Caribbean countries, the United Nations, and the World Bank. Have some, if not all, of Africa's new nations now reached the stage when it would pay them to put their biggest bets on quick industrialisation? Or must they go on putting most of their money and brains into bringing about an agricultural revolution first, before striving for industrial take-off? These questions started the conference off on one of its big themes.
The World Health Organization (who) was established in 1946 as a specialized agency of the United Nations (un). Since its establishment, the who has managed outbreaks of infectious diseases from a regulatory, as well as an operational perspective. The adoption of the International Health Regulations (ihrs) has been an important achievement from the former perspective. When the Ebola epidemic intensified in 2014, the who Director General issued temporary recommendations under the ihrs in order to reduce the spread of the disease and minimize cross-border barriers to international trade. The un Secretary General and then the Security Council and the General Assembly have also taken action against the Ebola epidemic. In particular, the Security Council adopted a resolution under Chapter vii of the un Charter, and thus connected the maintenance of the international peace and security to the health and social emergency. After dealing with the role of the who as a guide and coordinator of the reaction to epidemics, this article shows how the action by the Security Council against the Ebola epidemic impacts on the who ‘authority’ for the protection of health.
This chapter sheds light on the relationship between the composition of the bench and the sociological legitimacy of the judicial branch of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Two identity characteristics are consistently part of the criticism of the WTO’s bench: the lack of female adjudicators as well as individuals with academic experience. Overall, however, the identity of the bench does not appear to matter greatly for how WTO Members evaluate its exercise of authority. We suggest that the role of the WTO’s Legal Affairs Division and the Appellate Body Secretariat in streamlining outcomes and procedures may best explain this, as it helps prevent such diversity from manifesting in dispute rulings. Alternatively, it tells us that judicial diversity matters more for the bench’s normative legitimacy—and for scholars—than it does for governments.
Trade and Climate Change: A Report by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Trade Organization by UNEP and the WTOGeneva: WTO, 2009