scholarly journals Work incentives in the Social Security Disability benefit formula

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
GOPI SHAH GODA ◽  
JOHN B. SHOVEN ◽  
SITA NATARAJ SLAVOV

AbstractWe examine the connection between taxes paid and benefits accrued under the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program on both the intensive and extensive margins. We perform these calculations for stylized workers given the existing benefit structure and disability hazard rates. On the intensive margin, we examine the effect of an additional dollar of earnings on the marginal payroll taxes contributed and future benefits earned. We find that the present discounted value of disability benefits received from an additional dollar of earnings, net of the SSDI payroll tax, generally declines with age, becoming negative around age 40 and reaching almost zero at age 63. On the extensive margin, we determine the effect of working an additional year on the additional payroll taxes and future benefits as a percentage of income. The return to working an additional year at an income level just large enough to earn Social Security credits for the year is large and positive through age 60. However, the return to working an additional full year is substantially smaller and becomes negative at approximately age 57. Thus, older workers face strong incentives to earn enough to obtain creditable coverage through age 60, but they face disincentives for additional earnings. In addition, workers aged 61 and older face work disincentives at any level of earnings. We repeat this analysis for stylized workers at different levels of earnings and find that, while the program transfers resources from high earners to low earners, the workers experience similar patterns in the returns to working.

2007 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjorie F. Olney

It is estimated that 15-30 percent of people who are on the Social Security Administration's (SSA) disability benefit programs would like to work. However, despite a number of incentives, few leave benefit programs and become employed. A qualitative study with SSA recipients, all of whom expressed a desire to work, was conducted to augment findings from previous quantitative studies. The most common barrier to employment mentioned by participants was the SSA system itself which was viewed as an institution breeding fear and mistrust. Respondents identified three scenarios that would allow them to work: a full-time job with medical benefits, a part-time job that would allow them to maintain SSA benefits, or a full-time job with sufficient income to afford medical benefits.


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
April Yanyuan Wu ◽  
Jody Schimmel Hyde

Older workers who develop significant limitations in health or functioning face declines in income and consumption and an increased likelihood of poverty in the years prior to retirement. We assess the extent to which those differences persist after reaching retirement age. We use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) linked to Social Security Administration (SSA) records to compare the postretirement financial well-being of workers who experienced disability onset during their working years with those who did not, based on their claiming behavior for Social Security disability and retirement benefits. We find that even after full retirement age, gaps that emerged prior to retirement persist; those who experienced disability prior to retirement had lower incomes, were more likely to be in poverty, and had significantly lower wealth. Workers with disabilities who claimed Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) fared better than those who were rejected for such benefits, yet both groups were worse off than those who delayed claiming benefits until they were eligible for Social Security Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) benefits. Our findings indicate that any changes to the Social Security benefit structure must be mindful of the short- and longer term implications for already-vulnerable groups of workers.


Author(s):  
Sven-Olov Daunfeldt ◽  
Anton Gidehag ◽  
Niklas Rudholm

AbstractOne way for policymakers to reduce labor costs and stimulate the recruitment of marginalized groups of labor in a highly unionized economy is to lower payroll taxes. However, the efficiency of this policy instrument has been questioned, and previous evaluations have mostly found small employment effects for such reforms. We investigate the effects of a payroll tax cut in Sweden that decreased firms’ labor costs in relation to the number of young employees that they had employed when the reform was implemented in 2007. We find that most firms received small labor cost savings as a result of the reform, but those that received larger cost savings increased their number of employees significantly more than firms that received no, or minor, labor cost savings. Our findings also suggest that the payroll tax cut increased the total wages paid to incumbent workers, but the wage effect was too small to offset the positive extensive-margin employment effect of the reform. In total, we find that the Swedish payroll tax reform created 18,100 jobs over the period 2006–2008; most of these jobs were within the targeted group of young employees.


2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa I. Iezzoni ◽  
Long Ngo ◽  
R. Philip Kinkel

Studies suggest that more than half of working-age Americans with multiple sclerosis (MS) are unemployed because of their health. Many turn to public disability insurance for income support, applying through the Social Security Administration for either Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), which provides benefits to formerly employed people, or Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which supports impoverished individuals. Anecdotal reports suggest that many patients with MS face considerable problems when applying for federal disability benefits. To gather more systematic information about these experiences, we surveyed 983 working-age people with MS nationwide from May through November 2005. Most (60.2%) were unemployed; 36.4% had federal disability insurance, with 27.8% having SSDI alone. Almost one third (31.3%) had their initial SSDI application denied, and 31.9% used legal assistance when applying for this benefit. Although the time elapsed between SSDI application and approval was <12 months for 60.4% of applicants, 12–23 months passed for 19.8% and 24+ months for another 19.8%. Among people without SSDI, 15.4% had applied for this benefit at some time. Failure to meet disability criteria caused 60.3% of rejections, and inadequate documentation contributed to 32.1%. Neurologists must fully document the breadth of MS-related impairments in their patients' disability applications.


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