Who Exactly Benefits from the Treaties? The Murky Interaction Between Union and National Competence over the Capacity to Enforce EU Law

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 73-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Dougan

AbstractThe question of exactly who benefits from the Treaties, in the sense of which range of persons and bodies should be recognised as legally competent to enforce any given provision of Union law before the national courts, is surprisingly murky. This lack of clarity is due partly to the inherent complexity of the question, as well as to the complication posed by the interdependent relationship between the Union and national legal orders. The confusing approach adopted by the Court of Justice compounds the matter. This chapter discusses some observations on why this is a question which poses particular policy challenges for the Union legal order, before going on to summarise the relevant tools employed by the Court of Justice when addressing issues about the decentralised enforcement of Union law by private and public actors. It is argued that, despite the apparent confusion, it is possible to construct a workable division of labour between the role of Union law in defining its own protective scope (on the one hand) and the discretion of each Member State over access to the courts for the enforcement of Union law (on the other hand). A detailed analysis of the case law is conducted in order to identity the weakest links in the system, or at least those which suffer from the greatest degree of doctrinal and conceptual neglect. The question of who exactly benefits from the Treaties, in the sense of enjoying rights of standing to enforce Union law before the national courts, presents both surprisingly difficult challenges and promising research issues for the future.

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 73-120
Author(s):  
Michael Dougan

AbstractThe question of exactly who benefits from the Treaties, in the sense of which range of persons and bodies should be recognised as legally competent to enforce any given provision of Union law before the national courts, is surprisingly murky. This lack of clarity is due partly to the inherent complexity of the question, as well as to the complication posed by the interdependent relationship between the Union and national legal orders. The confusing approach adopted by the Court of Justice compounds the matter. This chapter discusses some observations on why this is a question which poses particular policy challenges for the Union legal order, before going on to summarise the relevant tools employed by the Court of Justice when addressing issues about the decentralised enforcement of Union law by private and public actors. It is argued that, despite the apparent confusion, it is possible to construct a workable division of labour between the role of Union law in defining its own protective scope (on the one hand) and the discretion of each Member State over access to the courts for the enforcement of Union law (on the other hand). A detailed analysis of the case law is conducted in order to identity the weakest links in the system, or at least those which suffer from the greatest degree of doctrinal and conceptual neglect. The question of who exactly benefits from the Treaties, in the sense of enjoying rights of standing to enforce Union law before the national courts, presents both surprisingly difficult challenges and promising research issues for the future.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 82-96
Author(s):  
Carla Machado

This article aims to address the interpretation that has been made by Portuguese courts in relation to the concept of “communication of the work to the public” enshrined in Article 3 (1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001, duly transposed into the Portuguese legal order by Law No. 50/2006 of 24 August, which culminated in the drafting of the case law unifying judgment No. 15/2013. By verifying its content and analysing the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU), concerning the interpretation of that concept, we conclude that the said case law unifying judgment does not comply with EU law. Therefore, we will list, on the one hand, the inherent consequences regarding the upkeep of the interpretation that has been held by the Portuguese judicial authorities and, on the other, we will suggest solutions for the resolution of similar cases by appealing to the principle of conforming interpretation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-62
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonelli

Effective judicial protection emerged as a EU law principle in the 1980s, operating alongside the Rewe principles of equivalence and effectiveness as a standard to assess national procedures for the enforcement of EU law. This article argues that the codification of effective judicial protection in Article 19 TEU and 47 of the Charter, operated by the Lisbon Treaty, has stimulated an evolution of the principle, which is evident in the recent case law of the Court of Justice. Today, effective judicial protection operates not only as a procedural principle, but also as a more substantive and structural one, and has generally acquired broader constitutional relevance. This evolution has crucial effects on the EU legal order: most importantly, it affects the division of competences between Member States and the EU, and between the Court of Justice and national courts.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1073-1098 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Derlén ◽  
Johan Lindholm

AbstractThe case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the most important sources of European Union law. However, case law's role in EU law is not uniform. By empirically studying how the Court uses its own case law as a source of law, we explore the correlation between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a CJEU case—type of action, actors involved, and area of law—and, on the other hand, the judgment's “embeddedness” in previous case law and value as a precedent in subsequent cases. Using this approach, we test, confirm, and debunk existing scholarship concerning the role of CJEU case law as a source of EU law. We offer the following conclusions: that CJEU case law cannot be treated as a single entity; that only a limited number of factors reliably affect a judgment's persuasive or precedential power; that the Court's use of its own case law as a source of law is particularly limited in successful infringement proceedings; that case law is particularly important in preliminary references—especially those concerning fundamental freedoms and competition law; and that initiating Member State and the number of observations affects the behavior of the Court.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Nic Shuibhne

Abstract This paper examines the growing significance of the ‘territory of the Union’ in EU citizenship law and asks what it reveals about Union citizenship in the wider system of the EU legal order. In doing so, it builds on scholarship constructing the idea of ‘personhood’ in EU law by adding a complementary dimension of ‘place-hood’. The analysis is premised on territory as a place within—but also beyond—which particular legal qualities are both produced by and reflect shared objectives or values. In that respect, the paper offers a comprehensive ‘map’ of Union territory as a legal construct, with the aim of uncovering what kind of legal place the territory of the Union constitutes as well as the extent to which it is dis-connectable from the territories of the Member States. It also considers how Union territory relates to what lies ‘outside’. It will be shown that different narratives of Union territory have materialized in the case law of the Court of Justice. However, it is argued that these segregated lines of reasoning should be integrated, both to reflect and to progress a composite understanding of Union territory as a place in which concerns for Union citizens, for Member States, and for the system underpinning the EU legal order are more consistently acknowledged and more openly weighed.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1343-1374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Martinico

Recently, scholars have argued of the necessity of going beyond “judicial dialogues” and “conflict-and-power” approaches to the analysis of the role of national Constitutional Courts in the Union. On the one hand, there are risks connected to a “too welcoming an approach by national constitutional courts to EU law”; on the other hand, it is possible to criticize both the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and some national Constitutional Courts for other, less cooperative, decisions. I share this cautious approach for many reasons, and primarily because the preliminary ruling mechanism does not exhaust all the possible means of communication between constitutional courts and the CJEU. For instance, what Komárek calls “parallel references” can serve, in some circumstances, as a technique of alternative (or hidden) dialogue, that has favored a sort of “remote dialogue” over the years. My sole point of disagreement with this scholarly position is over the role of conflicts in this scenario. Whilst Komárek seems to confine conflicts to phenomena of mere resistance or to “‘cold’ strategic considerations,” in this work I am going to adopt a much broader idea of conflict, which goes beyond mere “conflicts and power games.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-261
Author(s):  
Kendro Pedrosa

In the Craeynest case, the Court of Justice interpreted some of the core provisions of the Air Quality Directive 2008/50 in a preliminary ruling. Firstly, the court ruled that national courts may review the siting of sampling points. This manuscript pays special attention to the minimum standard of review that national judges must perform and considers to what extent the Court of Justice departs from its established case law. Secondly, the Court considered that, for an exceedance of a limit value within a zone to exist, it suffices that a pollution level higher than that value is measured at a single sampling point. Thus, the results of all sampling points within a zone must not be averaged. The ruling can be considered as a landmark judgment, as it strengthens the role of citizens, engo’s and national courts in the decentral enforcement of the Air Quality Directive.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 425-453
Author(s):  
Philip Strik

AbstractWhile investor–State arbitration is to a large extent detached from the EU legal order, EU law has recently started to be invoked in investor-State arbitration proceedings. In the context of intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, the Commission has expressed the view that investor-State arbitration gives rise to a number of ‘arbitration risks’ for the EU legal order. Not only can it solicit investors to engage in forum-shopping, but it can also result in questions of EU law not being litigated in Member State or Union courts. This chapter explores the extent to which the compatibility of investor–State arbitration with the EU legal order is in issue. It examines the main features of investor-State arbitration as concerns its interplay with the EU legal order, as well as the Court of Justice’s case law on issues of compatibility between systems of international dispute settlement and the EU legal order. The chapter highlights that the way in which investor–State arbitral tribunals handle issues of EU law, as well as the involvement of interested parties, may foster the synergy between investor–State arbitration and the EU legal order.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-41
Author(s):  
Roman Kwiecień

The paper addresses the issue of a judicial forum entitled to resolve conflicts between European Union law and national constitutional rules. First and foremost, the issue is discussed under the old primacy/supremacy of EU law controversy. The author seeks to answer whether the national law, including constitutional rules, of a Member State can be ineffective owing to being contradictory to EU law. If so, by whom can national laws be held ineffective? In other words, which of the two judicial fora (national and European) have the last word in these conflicts or who is the ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality of law within the European legal space? The author argues that legal reasoning should reconcile, on the one hand, the specificity of the EU’s unique legal order and effective application of its provisions and, on the other hand, the international legal status of the Member States and their constitutions. This approach leads to the conclusion that there is no ultimate judicial arbiter within the European legal space.


Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter discusses the doctrine of supremacy of EU law, which was developed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) based on its conception of the ‘new legal order’. The ECJ ruled that the aim of creating a uniform common market between different states would be undermined if EU law could be made subordinate to national law of the various states. The validity of EU law can therefore, according to the ECJ, never be assessed by reference to national law. National courts are required to give immediate effect to EU law, of whatever rank, in cases that arise before them, and to ignore or to set aside any national law, of whatever rank, which could impede the application of EU law. Thus, according to the ECJ, any norm of EU law takes precedence over any provision of national law, including the national constitutions. This broad assertion of the supremacy of EU law has not however been accepted without qualification by national courts, and the chapter examines the nature of the qualifications that have been imposed by some national courts.


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