The “Polemical” Spirit of European Constitutional Law: On the Importance of Conflicts in EU Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1343-1374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Martinico
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Cautious Approach ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The One ◽  
The Eu

Recently, scholars have argued of the necessity of going beyond “judicial dialogues” and “conflict-and-power” approaches to the analysis of the role of national Constitutional Courts in the Union. On the one hand, there are risks connected to a “too welcoming an approach by national constitutional courts to EU law”; on the other hand, it is possible to criticize both the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and some national Constitutional Courts for other, less cooperative, decisions. I share this cautious approach for many reasons, and primarily because the preliminary ruling mechanism does not exhaust all the possible means of communication between constitutional courts and the CJEU. For instance, what Komárek calls “parallel references” can serve, in some circumstances, as a technique of alternative (or hidden) dialogue, that has favored a sort of “remote dialogue” over the years. My sole point of disagreement with this scholarly position is over the role of conflicts in this scenario. Whilst Komárek seems to confine conflicts to phenomena of mere resistance or to “‘cold’ strategic considerations,” in this work I am going to adopt a much broader idea of conflict, which goes beyond mere “conflicts and power games.”

Review by Constitutional Courts of the Obligation of National Courts of Last Instance to Refer a Preliminary Question to the Court of Justice of the EU

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The Eu

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.

scholarly journals Territoriality Beyond the State: The EU’s Territorial Claims and the Search for Their Legitimacy

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 650-672
Author(s):  
Josef Weinzierl
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Political Community ◽  
The Other ◽  
Main Question ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
European Level ◽  
Territorial Claims ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Eu

AbstractQuite a few recent ECJ judgments touch on various elements of territorial rule. Thereby, they raise the profile of the main question this Article asks: Which territorial claims does the EU make? To provide an answer, the present Article discusses and categorizes the individual elements of territoriality in the EU’s architecture. The influence of EU law on national territorial rule on the one hand and the emergence of territorial governance elements at the European level on the other provide the main pillars of the inquiry. Once combined, these features not only help to improve our understanding of the EU’s distinctly supranational conception of territoriality. What is more, the discussion raises several important legitimacy questions. As a consequence, the Article calls for the development of a theoretical model to evaluate and justify territoriality in a political community beyond the state.

The Role of the CJEU in the Strengthening of the Participation of Third-Country Nationals in the Academic Life in the EU – Analysis of the Ruling of the CJEU in Case M.A. v Consul of the Republic of Poland in N

2021 ◽  
pp. 91-106
Author(s):  
Anna Magdalena Kosińska
Keyword(s):  
National Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Foreign National ◽  
Residence Permit ◽  
Voluntary Service ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Republic ◽  
New Student ◽  
The Eu

The analyzed ruling is the first judgement which the Court of Justice passed in order to provide interpretationfor the new Student Directive (2016/801 of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence ofthird-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemesor educational projects and au pairing). Due to its judiciary activism, the Court was able to find a connectionbetween the case pending before a national court and EU law in the case of M.A. In the end, the Court finallydecided that in the case at issue, regarding the rights of a foreign national to apply for a residence permit for thepurpose of enrolling in second-cycle studies programme in Poland, the procedure of applying for a long-stay visaon the grounds of national law must be safeguarded by the guarantees under Article 47 of the Charter of FundamentalRights. The guarantees apply to the actual states in which EU law is applicable – in this case the “StudentDirective.” It seems that the ruling in the case of M.A. will play a crucial role in facilitating students’ – TCNs’ – entryinto the territory of the Republic of Poland, while the Polish legislator, in all probability, will be obliged to changethe provisions of the national law in such a way as to make it possible for future students to access a full array oflegal remedies against the negative decisions of consuls.

The German Constitutional Court and Preliminary References—Still a Match not Made in Heaven?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
The Eu

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).

‘But the Last Word Is Ours’: The Monopoly of Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Light of the Investment Court System

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 1187-1220
Author(s):  
Francisco de Abreu Duarte
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
General Framework ◽  
External Action ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court System ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The One ◽  
The Eu

Abstract This article develops the concept of the monopoly of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) through the analysis of the case study of the Investment Court System (ICS). By providing a general framework over the criteria that have been developed by the Court, the work sheds light on the controversial principle of autonomy of the European Union (EU) and its implications to the EU’s external action. The work intends to be both pragmatic and analytical. On the one hand, the criteria are extracted as operative tools from the jurisprudence of the CJEU and then used in the context of the validity of the ICS. This provides the reader with some definitive standards that can then be applied to future cases whenever a question concerning autonomy arises. On the other hand, the article questions the reasons behind the idea of the monopoly of jurisdiction of the CJEU, advancing a concept of autonomy of the EU as a claim for power and critiquing the legitimacy and coherence of its foundations. Both dimensions will hopefully help to provide some clarity over the meaning of autonomy and the monopoly of jurisdiction, while, at the same time, promoting a larger discussion on its impact on the external action of the EU.

scholarly journals The Randstad Case: Melki Reloaded? The Fundamental Right to Effective Judicial Protection as Battleground for Judicial Supremacy in European Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-68
Author(s):  
Orlando Scarcello
Keyword(s):  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
European Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Judicial Supremacy ◽  
Judicial Protection ◽  
The Eu

This paper will examine the recent preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice issued by the Italian Court of Cassation in the Randstad case, aimed at rearranging the internal constitutional separation between ordinary and administrative courts (article 111(8) of the Constitution). I will first provide some context on both the relations between Italian and EU courts (2.1) and on the confrontation between the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court in interpreting article 111 (2.2). I will then specifically examine the referring order to the Court of Justice of the EU (3), focusing on the role of general clauses of EU law as articles 4(3) and 19 TEU and 47 of the Charter in it. Finally, I will consider the instrumental use of EU law made by the Cassation to overcome an unpleasant constitutional arrangement. This aligns Randstad with previous cases such as Melki or A v. B and may foster constitutional conflict in the future. 

scholarly journals EU Law and the Discretion of Private National Decision-Makers in Light of the Court's Judgement in Case C-22/18 TopFit and Biffi

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-94
Author(s):  
Angelica Ericsson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Makers ◽  
The Other ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Private Regulation ◽  
Prior Authorisation ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Regulatory Bodies ◽  
Scope Of Application ◽  
The One ◽  
Movement Rules

This contribution aims to introduce the reader to a judgement from the Court of Justice which seems to broaden the scope of application of EU free movement rules to private regulatory bodies in two ways. One the one hand, this judgment expands our understanding of what type of private regulation can fall within this scope. On the other hand, it shows that EU law requires a private prior authorisation scheme to be infused with the same objectivity safeguards as those that have been required for public ones.

scholarly journals The Principles of Article 102(c) TFEU in Cases of Non-exclusionary Secondary Line Discrimination on Grounds Other than Nationality Case Comment to the Judgment of EU Court of Justice of 19 April 2018 Meo-Serviços de Comunicações e Multimédia (C-525/16)

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 269-278
Author(s):  
Jan Szczodrowski
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Competitive Disadvantage ◽  
Secondary Line ◽  
The One ◽  
The Eu

Although the instances of application of Article 102(c) TFEU can hardly be described as rare, to date it has been applied to essentially two sets of diverging situations, namely to discrimination on grounds of nationality on the one hand, and other forms of discrimination on the other. While there is a relatively high number of instances of the former category of applications, and the criteria of the application of Article 102(c) TFEU to such situations seem straightforward, fewer cases exist in which Article 102(c) TFEU was applied to non-exclusionary secondary line discrimination on grounds other than nationality, and the criteria of application are arguably less clear. The judgment in case C-525/16 MEO represents a significant, yet not a revolutionary step in its interpretation. While in some respects, it may be seen as bringing some novelty (for example, the delineation of the respective scopes of application of Article 102(b) and Article 102(c) TFEU), in others (that is, the notion of competitive disadvantage), it rather confirms the principles which have been previously established. Arguably, the Court’s teaching on the elements which the competition authorities and courts across the EU may have at their disposal to establish the existence of competitive disadvantage, within the meaning of Article 102(c) TFEU, is open to various interpretations. Yet it does to a certain extent shape the toolkit that these authorities and courts may have at their disposal and leaves some room for reasonable welfare related arguments.

scholarly journals The interpretation complying with EU law manifested in the case law unifying judgment No. 15/2013 of the Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 82-96
Author(s):  
Carla Machado
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
The Other ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Public ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The One

This article aims to address the interpretation that has been made by Portuguese courts in relation to the concept of “communication of the work to the public” enshrined in Article 3 (1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001, duly transposed into the Portuguese legal order by Law No. 50/2006 of 24 August, which culminated in the drafting of the case law unifying judgment No. 15/2013. By verifying its content and analysing the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU), concerning the interpretation of that concept, we conclude that the said case law unifying judgment does not comply with EU law. Therefore, we will list, on the one hand, the inherent consequences regarding the upkeep of the interpretation that has been held by the Portuguese judicial authorities and, on the other, we will suggest solutions for the resolution of similar cases by appealing to the principle of conforming interpretation.

THE EU COURT OF JUSTICE: THE GROWING CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY

2021 ◽  
pp. 40-51
Author(s):  
N.V. Kravchuk ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Academic Community ◽  
Court Cases ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
The Eu

The review is focused to the problem of reducing the legitimacy of the EU Court, which is noted in the works of a number of scientists. In this context, the review analyzes court cases concerning the extraterritorial effect of EU law, as well as the observance and protection of human rights, considered by the EU Court in recent years. The positions of the EU Court cause not only criticism of representatives of the academic community, but also resistance of national constitutional courts.

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