Response to Slater review ofCompetitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 388-389
Author(s):  
Steven Levitsky ◽  
Lucan A. Way

Dan Slater offers thoughtful and incisive comments. We respond here to three of his points. The first is that by limiting our study to the post–Cold War period, we convert it into a “period piece,” akin to studies of fascist and communist regimes. Although this may be true, a historically bounded analysis is essential because of the changing character of the international environment. World historical time powerfully shapes regime outcomes. The prospects for democracy and authoritarianism during the Cold War, which was marked by global superpower rivalry, differed dramatically from those during periods of Western liberal hegemony. During the Cold War, for example, nearly all military coups ushered in authoritarian rule; after 1989, nearly 70 percent of coups led to multiparty elections In 1989, single-party rule predominated in Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa; five years later, it had disappeared.

1999 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 409-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bolade M. Eyinla

The end of the Cold War freed donors' aid policies from the co-ordinate system of East/West competition around the world. As a result, it was no longer necessary for the United States and its allies to continue providing aid on ideological grounds and/or geo-strategic needs. In the post-Cold War era, it became necessary for donor countries to evolve new rationales to convince their sceptical publics of the continued necessity for aid. One such new rationale was the imperative of promoting democracy and good governance as a way of guaranteeing international peace and security. This article examines the Japanese response to this development by identifying the factors that led to the inauguration of the ODA Charter. Thereafter, the content and intent of the Charter is examined and its application in Sub-Saharan Africa is analysed to highlight the changing objectives of Japanese aid policy in the continent.


Author(s):  
Rebecca Tapscott

Although militias have received increasing scholarly attention, the concept itself remains contested by those who study it. Why? And how does this impact contemporary scholarship on political violence? To answer these questions, we can focus on the field of militia studies in post–Cold War sub-Saharan Africa, an area where militia studies have flourished in the past several decades. Virtually all scholars of militias in post–Cold War Africa describe militias as fluid and changing such that they defy easy definition. As a result, scholars offer complex descriptors that incorporate both descriptive and analytic elements, thereby offering nuanced explanations for the role of militias in violent conflict. Yet the ongoing tension between accurate description and analytic definition has also produced a body of literature that is diffuse and internally inconsistent, in which scholars employ conflicting definitions of militias, different data sources, and often incompatible methods of analysis. As a result, militia studies yield few externally valid comparative insights and have limited analytic power. The cumulative effect is a schizophrenic field in which one scholar’s militia is another’s rebel group, local police force, or common criminal. The resulting incoherence fragments scholarship on political violence and can have real-world policy implications. This is particularly true in high-stakes environments of armed conflict, where being labeled a “militia” can lead to financial support and backing in some circumstances or make one a target to be eliminated in others. To understand how militia studies has been sustained as a fragmented field, this article offers a new typology of definitional approaches. The typology shows that scholars use two main tools: offering a substantive claim as to what militias are or a negative claim based on what militias are not and piggy-backing on other concepts to either claim that militias are derivative of or distinct from them. These approaches illustrate how scholars combine descriptive and analytic approaches to produce definitions that sustain the field as fragmented and internally contradictory. Yet despite the contradictions that characterize the field, scholarship reveals a common commitment to using militias to understand the organization of (legitimate) violence. This article sketches a possible approach to organize the field of militia studies around the institutionalization of violence, such that militias would be understood as a product of the arrangement of violence. Such an approach would both allow studies of militias to place their ambiguity and fluidity at the center of analyses while offering a pathway forward for comparative studies.


Author(s):  
Manuel Vogt

This chapter provides both quantitative and qualitative evidence from post–Cold War sub-Saharan Africa for how ethnic organizations affect outcomes of equality and peace in decolonized states. It first addresses the group-level relationship between ethnic organizations and ethnic inequality. These analyses show that groups that are politically mobilized through an ethnic party are more likely to become politically dominant than groups that lack the infrastructural power that such parties provide. The following part then moves to the systemic level to analyze the effect of group mobilization on the risk of ethnic civil conflict. The results reveal that it is the concurrence of group mobilization and ethnic inequality that makes the outbreak of violent conflict most likely in Africa’s decolonized states.


Author(s):  
Oasis Kodila-Tedika ◽  
Sherif Khalifa

Abstract This paper examines the effect of the presence of a military ruler on military expenditure using a panel of sub-Saharan Africa countries. The paper also explores whether the relationship reflects a capture effect, is an outcome of the confrontational climate of the cold war or is a self-preservation effort by military rulers. The panel data estimations show that the presence of a military ruler has a statistically significant negative effect on military spending as a percentage of GDP. The coefficients are also not significantly different before or after the end of the cold war era. This implies that the negative relationship is driven by an effort by military rulers to preempt the ability of their peers to overthrow them from power. We also attempt to deal with potential endogeneity and consider the possibility of persistence in military spending. The paper uses the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimation technique that shows a negative but insignificant effect of the presence of a military ruler on military expenditure, while military spending shows a high degree of persistence.


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