Introduction

This chapter introduces the puzzle that the book seeks to explain. Ethnic movements—that is, organized political campaigns by groups whose collective identity is defined by language, religion, or other ethnic markers to influence state policy—have haunted politics in almost all of today’s states. Yet, while they have provoked violent conflict in some countries, they have remained peaceful in others. Strikingly, some of the most unequal societies of today’s world have experienced mostly nonviolent ethnic group mobilization. Starting from concrete case examples, the chapter presents the book’s central question: why is ethnic mobilization more likely to trigger violent conflict in some countries than in others? By discussing the merits and shortcomings of existing studies, it reveals the need for a theory that explains both why ethnic groups rebel and how they rebel. The chapter then describes the study’s empirical approach and outlines the plan of the book.

The Logic of Nonviolent Ethnic Movements

Focusing on Latin America, this chapter examines the consequences of ethnic mobilization in the colonial settler states. It draws on a novel data set on ethnic organizations covering all Latin American states from 1946 to 2009. The statistical analyses reveal that indigenous and African-descendant groups that are represented by ethnic organizations have a higher chance of inclusion in executive state power at either the national or regional level than groups without such organizational representatives. Yet this effect depends on the level of democratic freedom. In addition, the results confirm that ethnic organizations in these states also foment peaceful ethnopolitical contention, in the form of collective protest. Thus, in stratified societies, ethnic organizations assume an emancipatory function, promoting the empowerment of the historically subordinated groups, while promoting nonviolent contentious action.

Cleavage Types and Conflict in Multiethnic States

This chapter tests the structural part of the book’s theory from a global perspective. It analyzes the relationship between ethnic cleavage types and the prevalence of different forms of ethnopolitical contention. Relying on large-n statistical analyses, it shows, first, that the extremely unequal colonial settler states experience fewer and less lethal ethnic civil conflicts but higher levels of peaceful ethnopolitical contention than the decolonized states and other multiethnic countries. These results are robust when considering the immediate postindependence period of the settler states and when testing for the possible endogeneity of cleavage types. Second, the chapter confirms that the theorized effects of hierarchization and social integration apply to all multiethnic states in general. Ethnic civil conflict is generally more likely the more segmented and less hierarchically structured multiethnic states are. Specifically, stable between-group hierarchies reduce the risk of governmental conflict, whereas segmentation only affects secessionist conflicts.

The Power and Limits of Nonviolent Ethnic Movements

This chapter analyzes the impact of, and obstacles to, ethnic mobilization in Guatemala and Ecuador. Using evidence from in-depth interviews with leaders of ethnic organizations, state officials, political party leaders, and other elite individuals, it sheds light on the causal path between ethnic group mobilization, inclusion, and contention in the stratified societies of Latin America’s colonial settler states. Specifically, the within-country comparison of Afro-Ecuadorian and indigenous mobilization in Ecuador demonstrates the importance of autonomous ethnic organizations for the prospects of marginalized groups’ political empowerment. Their infrastructural power facilitates the aggregation of the interests of discriminated individuals into ethnopolitical movements and enables groups to carry out large-scale popular protests. However, the evidence from the Guatemalan case also uncovers the strategies employed by state elites from the dominant ethnoclass to block fundamental change and maintain the status quo.

The Logic of Violent Ethnic Competition

This chapter provides both quantitative and qualitative evidence from post–Cold War sub-Saharan Africa for how ethnic organizations affect outcomes of equality and peace in decolonized states. It first addresses the group-level relationship between ethnic organizations and ethnic inequality. These analyses show that groups that are politically mobilized through an ethnic party are more likely to become politically dominant than groups that lack the infrastructural power that such parties provide. The following part then moves to the systemic level to analyze the effect of group mobilization on the risk of ethnic civil conflict. The results reveal that it is the concurrence of group mobilization and ethnic inequality that makes the outbreak of violent conflict most likely in Africa’s decolonized states.

Inside Ethnic Movements

This chapter looks inside ethnic movements to shed light on the role of ethnic organizations as agents of collective action. It theorizes the three causal mechanisms through which ethnic organizations influence outcomes of equality or inequality, and peace or violence in multiethnic states: the “aggregating and institutionalizing,” the “power seizing,” and the “mobilizing” mechanisms. The outcomes of these mechanisms differ as a consequence of countries’ ethnic cleavage types. In segmented unranked societies, ethnic organizations exacerbate existing intergroup competition, undermining ethnic equality and increasing the risk of civil conflict. In contrast, in stratified societies, ethnic organizations assume an emancipatory function, fostering the political inclusion of historically marginalized groups and, thus, enhancing ethnic equality while promoting nonviolent contentious action.

Elite Alliances and Conflict in Decolonized States

What explains different degrees of ethnic group mobilization and exclusion across decolonized states? And how can ethnic civil conflict be avoided in these states? This chapter addresses these questions on the basis of a comparative case study of Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon. Relying on evidence from in-depth elite interviews, collected during three months of field research, and secondary sources, the chapter illuminates the causal path leading from inequality and mobilization to violent conflict—or from transethnic cooperation and ethnic inclusion to peace—in these two cases. It also examines the historical origins of ethnic and transethnic organizations in the two countries. Highlighting the crucial impact of elite behavior, the evidence from Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon suggests that the historical nature of elite alliances decisively shapes patterns of inequality, mobilization, and, ultimately, violence in decolonized states.

Two Logics of Ethnic Mobilization

This chapter first summarizes the main empirical findings of the foregoing chapters. It then elaborates on their theoretical and practical implications, describing how they contribute to a number of central debates in recent conflict research and related fields of political science. In particular, the chapter discusses how the book’s theory and empirical results relate to other types of political contention and violence, such as ethnonationalist terrorism, ethnic cleansing, and state repression, and what they imply for the study of conflict outcomes and diffusion. The chapter concludes by elaborating the adequate political responses to ethnic mobilization in different types of multiethnic states. Specifically, stratified societies require political institutions that permit the collective mobilization of historically discriminated groups in order to rectify the existing inequalities. In contrast, the decolonized states and other segmented unranked societies need institutions that promote strong transethnic organizations to counter the threat of violent conflict.

A Theory of Ethnic Cleavages, Group Mobilization, and Conflict in Multiethnic States

This chapter argues that the consequences of ethnic group mobilization depend on countries’ ethnic cleavage types. It introduces two ideal types of multiethnic societies: segmented unranked and stratified societies. The chapter traces the origins of these cleavage types back to the legacies of European overseas colonialism. It explains why the colonial settler states and the decolonized states constitute archetypical cases of stratified and segmented unranked societies, respectively. It then theorizes how these ethnic cleavage types affect the prevalence of different forms of conflict in multiethnic states today. In stratified societies, stable between-group hierarchies and a high degree of social integration deprive the marginalized groups of the capacity for armed rebellion and make the relative opportunity structure more conducive to peaceful direct action than to violence. In contrast, unstable group hierarchies and high social segmentation stimulate the capacity for violence and increase the relative opportunities for armed revolt compared to nonviolent strategies.