After the Cold War: U.S. Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa

1990 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
David D. Newsom
2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 388-389
Author(s):  
Steven Levitsky ◽  
Lucan A. Way

Dan Slater offers thoughtful and incisive comments. We respond here to three of his points. The first is that by limiting our study to the post–Cold War period, we convert it into a “period piece,” akin to studies of fascist and communist regimes. Although this may be true, a historically bounded analysis is essential because of the changing character of the international environment. World historical time powerfully shapes regime outcomes. The prospects for democracy and authoritarianism during the Cold War, which was marked by global superpower rivalry, differed dramatically from those during periods of Western liberal hegemony. During the Cold War, for example, nearly all military coups ushered in authoritarian rule; after 1989, nearly 70 percent of coups led to multiparty elections In 1989, single-party rule predominated in Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa; five years later, it had disappeared.


Author(s):  
Oasis Kodila-Tedika ◽  
Sherif Khalifa

Abstract This paper examines the effect of the presence of a military ruler on military expenditure using a panel of sub-Saharan Africa countries. The paper also explores whether the relationship reflects a capture effect, is an outcome of the confrontational climate of the cold war or is a self-preservation effort by military rulers. The panel data estimations show that the presence of a military ruler has a statistically significant negative effect on military spending as a percentage of GDP. The coefficients are also not significantly different before or after the end of the cold war era. This implies that the negative relationship is driven by an effort by military rulers to preempt the ability of their peers to overthrow them from power. We also attempt to deal with potential endogeneity and consider the possibility of persistence in military spending. The paper uses the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimation technique that shows a negative but insignificant effect of the presence of a military ruler on military expenditure, while military spending shows a high degree of persistence.


2007 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
ELIZABETH SCHMIDT

When the Cold War broke out in Western Europe at the end of the Second World War, France was a key battleground. Its Cold War choices played out in the empire as well as in the métropole. After communist party ministers were ousted from the tripartite government in 1947, repression against communists and their associates intensified – both in the Republic and overseas. In French sub-Saharan Africa, the primary victims of this repression were members of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), an interterritorial alliance of political parties with affiliates in most of the 14 territories of French West and Equatorial Africa, and in the United Nations trusts of Togo and Cameroon. When, under duress, RDA parliamentarians severed their ties with the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) in 1950, grassroots activists in Guinea opposed the break. Their voices muted throughout most of the decade, Leftist militants regained preeminence in 1958, when trade unionists, students, the party's women's and youth wings, and other grassroots actors pushed the Guinean RDA to reject a constitution that would have relegated the country to junior partnership in the French Community, and to proclaim Guinea's independence instead. Guinea's vote for independence, and its break with the interterritorial RDA in this regard, were the culmination of a decade-long struggle between grassroots activists on the political Left and the party's territorial and interterritorial leadership for control of the political agenda.


1999 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 409-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bolade M. Eyinla

The end of the Cold War freed donors' aid policies from the co-ordinate system of East/West competition around the world. As a result, it was no longer necessary for the United States and its allies to continue providing aid on ideological grounds and/or geo-strategic needs. In the post-Cold War era, it became necessary for donor countries to evolve new rationales to convince their sceptical publics of the continued necessity for aid. One such new rationale was the imperative of promoting democracy and good governance as a way of guaranteeing international peace and security. This article examines the Japanese response to this development by identifying the factors that led to the inauguration of the ODA Charter. Thereafter, the content and intent of the Charter is examined and its application in Sub-Saharan Africa is analysed to highlight the changing objectives of Japanese aid policy in the continent.


Author(s):  
Douglas A. Yates

The end of colonial rule in Africa brought into existence new independent states that lacked both effective government institutions and modern national identities. Postcolonial African leaders therefore immediately faced the dual challenges of state-building and nation-building. Most started out by adopting democratic constitutions copied from their European colonizers, but then quickly descended into various forms of authoritarianism. Many reasons account for this, including the legacy of authoritarianism inherent to colonial rule, the ideological battles of the Cold War, the organizational advantages of the military, ethno-political competition, and even traditional patterns of political culture. Authoritarian rule thus became the central tendency of African politics during the Cold War, until the “Third Wave of Democratization” in the 1990s ushered in a new age of constitutionalism, rule of law, multiparty elections, and alternance of power. Today the norm is democracy, albeit flawed, with most African governments coming to power through competitive elections, and most rulers following civilian rather than military careers. But the struggle for democracy has not been entirely successful, with major reversals appearing frequently in every region. First, certain rulers have successfully established family dynasties, or ethnic clan-based systems of neo-patrimonial rule. Next, new military rulers have come to power through coups d’état, or as warlords in failed or collapsed states. Finally, parties and presidents have learned how to survive the advent of multiparty elections. Denying basic freedoms of association, speech, and the press are instruments of such “illiberal” democracies. Others are manipulating registration lists, denying voters’ rights, and engaging in fraudulent counts. Political scientists working on the continent today recognize that many authoritarian rulers have simply learned how to master and manipulate the new environment of democracy. Articles, conference papers, and books about the growing phenomenon of post-election violence, both as an outcome of discontent and as a campaign technique, are becoming something of a new sub-literature bridging the disciplines of conflict resolution and electoral studies, joining other more positive new thinking about democracy that has focused attention on the development of “civil society,” and in its more radical variant, “social movements,” in democracy building. The critique that Western democracy may not be suitable for Africa, as well as responsive scholarship on alternative forms of government based on indigenous cultural experience, raises the possibility that elections may not be the only democratic game in town. Looking at recent elections, more countries in Africa are experiencing democratic decline than democratic gains: part of a current global trend. Yet many of the most important states in Africa are consolidating their democracies, demonstrating that democratic suitability to African conditions depends on the quality of leaders, political institutions, and continued external support.


Author(s):  
Carolien van Ham ◽  
Staffan Lindberg

The quality of elections in Africa demonstrates considerable progress from the early attempts in the 1950s and 1960s to the increasingly democratic era following the end of the Cold War. In terms of scope, 46 of 49 countries in sub-Saharan Africa now select the most powerful public offices (i.e., the executive and/or legislature) via elections, and reserved power domains have become relatively uncommon. In terms of choice, single-party elections, once so common across Africa, have now all but vanished from the continent. However, the integrity of elections still varies widely, ranging from elections with serious irregularities to elections that are fully free and fair. Even so, considerable progress is apparent over the last three decades. A full 47% of countries in sub-Saharan Africa now hold elections that are free and fair or only involve minor irregularities. Equally important, electoral interruptions in the form of coup d’état, civil war, or annulment of elections have become very rare. Africa is also a continent where the contemporary trend of elections generating broader democratization is particularly palpable. By providing opportunities for citizens to remove incumbents from office and generating expansion of civil liberties after elections are over, stimulating citizens and other actors to increase pressure for more democratic freedoms, elections seem on average to have been conducive to democratic developments in Africa. Elections also increasingly lead to turnovers, especially elections of high electoral integrity, where on average 34% are associated with alternations in power. Taking a long-term view on developments from 1960 until 2017, African elections have seen an impressive increase in quality over time, and provide a much more significant contribution to democratization in sub-Saharan Africa than is often acknowledged in the literature.


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