scholarly journals The Many-faced Court: The Value of Participation in Annulment Proceedings

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 220-246
Author(s):  
Michał Krajewski

European Court of Justice – General Court – EU procedural law and practice – Procedural rights of the parties to judicial proceedings before the EU Courts – Participation of the parties to judicial proceedings and the legitimacy of judicial decisions – Accuracy of decision-making, the right to a hearing and procedural economy as guiding values of EU procedural law and practice – Different procedural practices of the General Court and the Court of Justice – The filtering of appeals by the Court of Justice – The accountability of the EU Courts for their procedural law and standards

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-34
Author(s):  
Rob Widdershoven

This article examines the recent approach of the European Court of Justice of the EU towards the applicability of procedural national law in cases falling within the scope of Union law. It argues that the Court increasingly assesses such rules within the framework of the principle of effective judicial protection, as bindingly codified in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the EU since December 2009. This test is gradually replacing the rather deferential test on the Rewe principles of equivalence and effectiveness and implies a further limitation of procedural autonomy of the Member States. The reason for the shift seems to be the necessity to coordinate the Court's case law on Article 47 CFR with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 6 ECHR, because this coordination requires the application of a similar standard by both European Courts. As a result, the importance of, in particular, the Rewe principle of effectiveness, has already decreased to a considerable extent and might decrease further in future. Nevertheless, it is not to be expected that this standard will be abolished completely. First, because it may provide an adequate standard for assessing procedural issues that are not related to effective judicial protection or Article 47 CFR. Secondly, because incidentally it may be used by the Court for modifying national procedural law with a view to the effective application of substantive EU rules.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-209
Author(s):  
Jenna Uusitalo

Abstract European Union (EU) was founded to strengthen European integration through purely economic cooperation while disregarding human rights. However, throughout its existence the EU has been challenged to take a stand on human rights. In fact, the application and promotion of human rights has increased significantly in recent years, especially during the last 15 years, mainly thanks to the establishment of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000. Through the selected cases concerning emergency medical services, this paper examines how the arguments of the European Court of Justice have eventually been shifting from purely economic ideology towards more human rights based approach. However, the article essentially argues that the full potential of human rights to support the claims that are inherently economic in their nature has not yet been utilized and therefore the essential aim of the Charter to strengthen human rights protection in the EU remains unachieved.


2000 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 621-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Looijestijn-Clearie

InCentros Ltd and Erhvers-og Selskabsstyrelesen (hereinafter Centros),1 the European Court of Justice ruled that it is contrary to Article 52 (now Article 432) and Article 58 (now Article 48) of the EC Treaty for the authorities of a member State (in casu Denmark) to refuse to register a branch of a company formed under the law of another member State (in casu the United Kingdom) in which it has its registered office, even if the company concerned has never conducted any business in the latter State and intends to carry out its entire business in the State in which the branch is to be set up. By avoiding the need to form a company there it would thus evade the application of the rules governing the provision for and the paying-up of a minimum share capital in force in that State. According to the Court, this does not, however, prevent the authorities of the member State in which the branch is to be set up from adopting appropriate measures for preventing or penalising fraud, either with regard to the company itself, if need be in co-operation with the member State in which it was formed, or with regard to its members, where it has been determined that they are in fact attempting, by means of the formation of a company, to evade their obligations towards creditors established in the territory of the member State of the branch.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (83) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Carmen Adriana Domocos

The Romanian legislation establishes in the new penal procedure law the right to silence and the right of non-incrimination of the defendant in the criminal trial.The right to silence (to remain silent) is the implicit procedural guarantee of the right to a fair trial, which results from the case law of the European Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, according to which judicial authorities cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected of having committed a criminal offence), a suspect or a defendant to make statements, while having, however, a limited power to draw conclusions against them, from their refusal to make statements.Therefore, the right to silence involves not only the right not to testify against oneself, but also the right of the suspect or defendant not to incriminate oneself. The suspect or defendant cannot be compelled to assist in the production of evidence and cannot be sanctioned for failing to provide certain documents or other evidence. Obligation to testify against personal will, under the constraint of a fine or any other form of coercion constitutes an interference with the negative aspect of the right to freedom of expression which must be necessary in a democratic Romanian society.The right not to contribute to one’s own incrimination (the privilege against self-incrimination) is the implicit procedural guarantee of the right to a fair trial, which results from the case law of the European Court of Justice within the meaning of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention, according to which judicial bodies or any other state authority cannot oblige a perpetrator (suspected of having committed a criminal offence), a suspect, a defendant or a witness to cooperate by providing evidence which might incriminate him or which could constitute the basis for a new criminal charge. It is essential to clarify certain issues as far as this right is concerned.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 275-287
Author(s):  
Martin Böse

The right of the accused person to be present at the trial and defend himself in person forms an essential part of the right to a fair trial. In this regard, the minimum standard enshrined in Art. 6 ECHR has been further developed by the minimum rules on procedural rights established by the EU legislator. According to a recent judgment of the Union’s Court of Justice, the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant still allows the executing state to surrender a person convicted in absentia even if the EU minimum standard is not met. This paper will argue that common minimum standards have repercussions on cross-border cooperation based on mutual recognition and may emerge as a ground for refusal.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the European Court of Justice (CoJ). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 503-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Riffel

Abstract In Opinion 1/17, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) found the investment court system compatible with European Union (EU) law. The ruling concerned the mechanism in the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) but the Court’s reasoning is equally applicable to other investment courts as established, for example, in the EU’s investment protection agreements with Singapore and Vietnam. This outcome was far from clear, given that in the past the accession to international dispute settlement bodies regularly foundered on the autonomy of the EU legal order. The present article parses the CETA Opinion and explores its implications. It particularly focuses on autonomy as a constitutional principle and its advancement in Opinion 1/17. Importantly, the ECJ accepted the superiority of a court created by international agreement in relation to the said agreement. Furthermore, it clarified that it is not prerequisite for the Court to rule first on the meaning to be given to an act of EU law before that act can be the subject matter of an investment dispute. Finally, the pdrerogative of the EU to autonomously set the level of protection of a public welfare goal must be secured in a treaty for the EU to join it.


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