GENERALITY AND EXISTENCE 1: QUANTIFICATION AND FREE LOGIC

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
GREG RESTALL

AbstractIn this paper, I motivate a cut free sequent calculus for classical logic with first order quantification, allowing for singular terms free of existential import. Along the way, I motivate a criterion for rules designed to answer Prior’s question about what distinguishes rules for logical concepts, like conjunction from apparently similar rules for putative concepts like Prior’s tonk, and I show that the rules for the quantifiers—and the existence predicate—satisfy that condition.

Author(s):  
Nils Kürbis

AbstractThis paper presents rules in sequent calculus for a binary quantifier I to formalise definite descriptions: Ix[F, G] means ‘The F is G’. The rules are suitable to be added to a system of positive free logic. The paper extends the proof of a cut elimination theorem for this system by Indrzejczak by proving the cases for the rules of I. There are also brief comparisons of the present approach to the more common one that formalises definite descriptions with a term forming operator. In the final section rules for I for negative free and classical logic are also mentioned.


1995 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 861-878 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Sambin

Pretopologies were introduced in [S], and there shown to give a complete semantics for a propositional sequent calculus BL, here called basic linear logic, as well as for its extensions by structural rules, ex falso quodlibet or double negation. Immediately after Logic Colloquium '88, a conversation with Per Martin-Löf helped me to see how the pretopology semantics should be extended to predicate logic; the result now is a simple and fully constructive completeness proof for first order BL and virtually all its extensions, including the usual, or structured, intuitionistic and classical logic. Such a proof clearly illustrates the fact that stronger set-theoretic principles and classical metalogic are necessary only when completeness is sought with respect to a special class of models, such as the usual two-valued models.To make the paper self-contained, I briefly review in §1 the definition of pretopologies; §2 deals with syntax and §3 with semantics. The completeness proof in §4, though similar in structure, is sensibly simpler than that in [S], and this is why it is given in detail. In §5 it is shown how little is needed to obtain completeness for extensions of BL in the same language. Finally, in §6 connections with proofs with respect to more traditional semantics are briefly investigated, and some open problems are put forward.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
TIMM LAMPERT ◽  
MARKUS SÄBEL

Abstract One of the central logical ideas in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus is the elimination of the identity sign in favor of the so-called “exclusive interpretation” of names and quantifiers requiring different names to refer to different objects and (roughly) different variables to take different values. In this paper, we examine a recent development of these ideas in papers by Kai Wehmeier. We diagnose two main problems of Wehmeier’s account, the first concerning the treatment of individual constants, the second concerning so-called “pseudo-propositions” (Scheinsätze) of classical logic such as $a=a$ or $a=b \wedge b=c \rightarrow a=c$ . We argue that overcoming these problems requires two fairly drastic departures from Wehmeier’s account: (1) Not every formula of classical first-order logic will be translatable into a single formula of Wittgenstein’s exclusive notation. Instead, there will often be a multiplicity of possible translations, revealing the original “inclusive” formulas to be ambiguous. (2) Certain formulas of first-order logic such as $a=a$ will not be translatable into Wittgenstein’s notation at all, being thereby revealed as nonsensical pseudo-propositions which should be excluded from a “correct” conceptual notation. We provide translation procedures from inclusive quantifier-free logic into the exclusive notation that take these modifications into account and define a notion of logical equivalence suitable for assessing these translations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marilynn Johnson

In An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is Graham Priest (2008) presents branching rules in Free Logic, Variable Domain Modal Logic, and Intuitionist Logic. I propose a simpler, non-branching rule to replace Priest’s rule for universal instantiation in Free Logic, a second, slightly modified version of this rule to replace Priest’s rule for universal instantiation in Variable Domain Modal Logic, and third and fourth rules, further modifying the second rule, to replace Priest’s branching universal and particular instantiation rules in Intuitionist Logic. In each of these logics the proposed rule leads to tableaux with fewer branches. In Intuitionist logic, the proposed rules allow for the resolution of a particular problem Priest grapples with throughout the chapter. In this paper, I demonstrate that the proposed rules can greatly simplify tableaux and argue that they should be used in place of the rules given by Priest.


1966 ◽  
Vol 63 (17) ◽  
pp. 481 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bas C. van Fraassen

2021 ◽  
pp. 268-311
Author(s):  
Paolo Mancosu ◽  
Sergio Galvan ◽  
Richard Zach

This chapter opens the part of the book that deals with ordinal proof theory. Here the systems of interest are not purely logical ones, but rather formalized versions of mathematical theories, and in particular the first-order version of classical arithmetic built on top of the sequent calculus. Classical arithmetic goes beyond pure logic in that it contains a number of specific axioms for, among other symbols, 0 and the successor function. In particular, it contains the rule of induction, which is the essential rule characterizing the natural numbers. Proving a cut-elimination theorem for this system is hopeless, but something analogous to the cut-elimination theorem can be obtained. Indeed, one can show that every proof of a sequent containing only atomic formulas can be transformed into a proof that only applies the cut rule to atomic formulas. Such proofs, which do not make use of the induction rule and which only concern sequents consisting of atomic formulas, are called simple. It is shown that simple proofs cannot be proofs of the empty sequent, i.e., of a contradiction. The process of transforming the original proof into a simple proof is quite involved and requires the successive elimination, among other things, of “complex” cuts and applications of the rules of induction. The chapter describes in some detail how this transformation works, working through a number of illustrative examples. However, the transformation on its own does not guarantee that the process will eventually terminate in a simple proof.


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