The Lockean proviso

2013 ◽  
pp. 47-55
Author(s):  
Tim Mulgan
Keyword(s):  
Lockean Proviso

Implications

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Widerquist ◽  
Grant S. McCall
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
The State ◽  
Natural Property ◽  
Government Failure ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Lockean Proviso ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Taking Action ◽  
Disadvantaged People

Earlier chapters of this book found that the Hobbesian hypothesis is false; the Lockean proviso is unfulfilled; contemporary states and property rights systems fail to meet the standard that social contract and natural property rights theories require for their justification. This chapter assesses the implications of those findings for the two theories. Section 1 argues that, whether contractarians accept or reject these findings, they need to clarify their argument to remove equivocation. Section 2 invites efforts to refute this book’s empirical findings. Section 3 discusses a response open only to property rights theorists: concede this book’s empirical findings and blame government failure. Section 4 considers the argument that this book misidentifies the state of nature. Section 5 considers a “bracketing strategy,” which admits that observed stateless societies fit the definition of the state of nature, but argues that they are not the relevant forms of statelessness today. Section 6 discusses the implications of accepting both the truth and relevance of the book’s findings, concluding that the best response is to fulfil the Lockean proviso by taking action to improve the lives of disadvantaged people.

The Birth of a Nationalist

2020 ◽  
pp. 119-126
Author(s):  
Yael Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Private Property ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
Lockean Proviso ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Way

This chapter explores the differences between nationalists and globalists. The chapter asserts that being a nationalist or a globalist is not a constitutive state of mind; on the contrary, in light of changing circumstances, individuals locate themselves at different points along the global—national (G—N) continuum. The chapter sheds new light on the correlation among education, rationality, and the way individuals position themselves on the G—N continuum. It argues that individuals are better of if they structure their preferences in light of actual risks and opportunities. The chapter also recounts social and economic circumstances affecting a person's scheme of risks and opportunities. The chapter elaborates the discussion concerning moral luck. It also assesses the impact of Lockean proviso, in which individuals have the right to acquire as much private property as they can (mostly land in Locke's days), as long as what they leave behind for others is enough and “as good.”

The Hobbesian Hypothesis: How a Colonial Prejudice Became an Essential Premise in the Most Popular Justification of Government

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Widerquist ◽  
Grant S. McCall
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Contract Theory ◽  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
Social Contract Theory ◽  
The State ◽  
Moral Standard ◽  
Empirical Claim ◽  
Lockean Proviso ◽  
Disadvantaged People

This chapter introduces the role of “the Hobbesian hypothesis” in social contract theory by discussing how Thomas Hobbes introduced it. It defines the version of “the Lockean proviso” relevant to social contract theory as the following moral standard: for a state to be justified virtually everyone must be better off under the state than they could reasonably expect to be in any stateless environment. The chapter defines the contractarian version of “the Hobbesian hypothesis” as the empirical claim that the Lockean proviso is fulfilled by the state: the state benefits everyone or at least everyone who prefers safety to a perilous environment devoid of security. The chapter argues that any plausible justification of existing states drawn from broadly Hobbesian or contractarian principles relies on this hypothesis as an empirical premise comparing the welfare of disadvantaged people in state society and people in stateless societies.

John Locke and the Hobbesian Hypothesis: How a Similar Colonial Prejudice Became an Essential Premise in the Most Popular Justification of Private Property Rights

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Widerquist ◽  
Grant S. McCall
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Natural Rights ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Property Theory ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Property System ◽  
Lockean Proviso ◽  
Ownership Of Land

This chapter introduces the role of “the Hobbesian hypothesis” (the claim that “the Lockean proviso” is fulfilled) in the natural rights justification of private property by discussing John Locke’s use of it in his “appropriation” theory. The chapter defines the property-theory version of “the Lockean proviso” as the claim that everyone is better off in a society with private ownership of land and natural resources than they could reasonably expect to be in any society in which land remains a commons as it was for many small-scale stateless peoples in history and prehistory. The chapter defines the property-theory version of “the Hobbesian hypothesis” as the empirical claim that the Lockean proviso is fulfilled by the property rights system: even the least advantage people under the private property system are better off than they could reasonably expect to be in a small-scale society with common land. It argues that any plausible natural rights justification of the private property system relies on this hypothesis as an empirical premise comparing the welfare of disadvantaged people in societies with a well-develop private property system and people in small-scale, stateless societies that treat land as a commons.

Welfare and Outcome

2002 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-115
Author(s):  
Robert Shaver
Keyword(s):  
Main Concern ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Intuitive Appeal ◽  
Lockean Proviso ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Mere Addition ◽  
Mere Addition Paradox ◽  
Better Than

In Inequality, Larry Temkin attacks ‘The Slogan’: ‘One Situation cannot be [morally] worse (or better) than another in any respect if there is no one for whom it is worse (or better) in any respect.’ Temkin notes that the Slogan has great intuitive appeal. It underlies, for example, the conviction that it is irrational to prefer a Pareto-inferior outcome; the transition from egalitarianism to the difference principle; Robert Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain example; defense of appropriation under the Lockean proviso; and Derek Parfit's Mere Addition Paradox. As an egalitarian, Temkin's main concern with the Slogan is the support it gives to the ‘leveling down objection’ to egalitarianism: the egalitarian finds it to be in some respect an improvement that the better-off are leveled down to the position of the worse-off, without any gain to the worse-off. The Slogan condemns this: leveling down cannot be better in any respect, since there is no one for whom it is better in any respect.

EMBODIMENT AND SELF-OWNERSHIP

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel C. Russell
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Fair Share ◽  
Property Ownership ◽  
Personal Property ◽  
Property Owners ◽  
Lockean Proviso ◽  
The Right

AbstractMany libertarians believe that self-ownership is a separate matter from ownership of extra-personal property. “No-proviso” libertarians hold that property ownership should be free of any “fair share” constraints (e.g., the Lockean Proviso), on the grounds that the inability of the very poor to control property leaves their self-ownership intact. By contrast, left-libertarians hold that while no one need compensate others for owning himself, still property owners must compensate others for owning extra-personal property. What would a “self” have to be for these claims to be true? I argue that both of these camps must conceive of the boundaries of the self as including one's body but no part of the extra-personal world. However, other libertarians draw those boundaries differently, so that self-ownership cannot be separated from the right to control extra-personal property after all. In that case, property ownership must be subject to a fair share constraint, but that constraint does not require appropriators to pay compensation. This view, which I call “right libertarianism,” differs importantly from the other types primarily in its conception of the self, which I argue is independently more plausible.

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