Herbert Simon: A software psychologist who isn't

1981 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Kearsley
Keyword(s):  
1994 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Quinet
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 439-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Wettersten

Two sharply separated traditions in the philosophy of science and in thought psychology began with Otto Selz’s psychology. The first tradition began with Karl Popper; it has been developed by many others. The developers of the second tradition have included Julius Bahle, Adriaan de Groot, Herbert Simon, and Gerd Gigerenzer. The first tradition has ignored empirical studies of thought processes. The second tradition is widely based on Simon’s inductivist philosophy. The first tradition can be improved by integrating empirical studies of rationality into its research. The second tradition can be improved by replacing its inductivist assumptions with a fallibilist framework.


2003 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.L Minkes ◽  
Gordon R Foxall
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
pp. 037
Author(s):  
Patricia Bonatti
Keyword(s):  

El proceso decisorio es el proceso que más estudios atesora y que atrae además a más profesionales de distintas disciplinas. Economistas, administradores, médicos, psicólogos, ingenieros, neurólogos y hasta cardiólogos, todos aportan a mejorar este proceso, tan omnipresente en nuestras vidas. Nos preocupa en este proceso analizar la calificación de racional o irracional según distintas corrientes de pensamiento, en el marco de la teoría de la decisión. Abordaremos un poco de historia y caracterización de la problemática de la racionalidad que ha estado vigente a lo largo de la historia del hombre, comenzando por la racionalidad fuerte: Mario Bunge (filósofo argentino), analizando los aportes de Herbert Simon y Daniel Kahneman (Premios Nobel), hasta llegar a la Teoría de la Racionalidad Instrumental Mínima (Elster, Pavesi.) Distinguiremos también conceptos morales y éticos, mal hermanados a la racionalidad.   Plantearemos como reflexiones finales los preceptos de la teoría de la decisión y algunas críticas a la Teoría Mínima de la Racionalidad Instrumental Mínima, a partir de lo investigado y con el aporte variado de los autores seleccionados, brindando especial importancia a los aspectos débiles observados en dicha teoría.


2017 ◽  
pp. 9-17
Author(s):  
Kumaraswamy Vela Velupillai
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 719-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEJANDRO HORTAL

ABSTRACT This paper contextualizes Simon’s book, Administrative Behavior, within the evolution of his ideas arguing, contrary to what some have posited, that the common element that unites this book with the rest of Simon’s work is not the criticism of the classical approach, but an epistemological frame, based on an empirical methodology. This empiricism is the element that remained constant during his career and led him to introduce psychological factors when explaining the behavior of economic agents under his models of bounded and procedural rationality.


Author(s):  
Patrick Humphreys

Problem solving has been defined as the complex interplay of cognitive, affective, and behavioural processes with the aim to adapt to external or internal demands or challenges (Heppner & Krauskopf, 1987). In the realm of organizational decision-making, Herbert Simon (1977) describes the problem-solving process as moving through three stages: intelligence, design, and choice. In this context, design focuses on “inventing, developing and analysing possible courses of action,” where the design artefact being constructed for this purpose constitutes the “representation of the problem.” While a wide range of representation means and calculi have been proposed for decision problem solving purposes, practical implementations generally involve applying one or more of these means to develop the structure of the problem within one or more frames. Typically, these are future-scenario frames, multiattributed preference frames, and rule base-frames (Chatjoulis & Humphreys, 2007). Simon (1977) characterized decision problems according to the degree of problem-structure that was pre-established (or taken for granted as “received wisdom,” or “the truth about the situation that calls for a decision”) at the time participants embark on the decision problem solving process. He placed such problems on a continuum ranging from routine (programmed, structured) problems with wellspecified solutions to novel, complex (unprogrammed, unstructured) with ambiguous solutions.


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