HHS Appoints Members to National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity

Since 2000 a number of controversial research projects have raised concerns that states or terrorist groups might use published research results to replicate the work for malevolent purposes. The issue came into greater focus in December 2011, after it was revealed that the U.S.-based National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity had requested one U.S. and another Dutch lab to halt publication of work describing what was done to enhance the transmissibility of the H5N1 flu virus to mammals. In spite of a decade of debate and policy development to prevent bio-attacks and the misuse of dual-use research, little effort has been made to determine whether scientific publications can indeed help replication by untrained individuals. This paper taps into the extensive science and technology literature and recent studies in the security field, to show that replication of scientific work is inherently difficult and probably inaccessible to untrained individuals. The paper also offers new policy options designed to more effectively prevent the misuse of dual-use research.

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Zika Virus Focuses the Gain-of-Function Debate

mSphere ◽

10.1128/msphere.00069-16 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 1 (2) ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Michael J. Imperiale ◽

Arturo Casadevall

Keyword(s):

Influenza Virus ◽

Middle East ◽

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome ◽

Zika Virus ◽

Advisory Board ◽

Respiratory Pathogens ◽

Gain Of Function ◽

Science Advisory ◽

National Science ◽

The U.S

ABSTRACT This year, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) will be making recommendations to the U.S. Government regarding the ongoing saga of gain-of-function (GOF) experiments with highly infectious respiratory pathogens, such as influenza virus, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus, and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) coronavirus.

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National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB)

Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense ◽

10.1002/0471686786.ebd0177 ◽

2011 ◽

Author(s):

Jacqueline N. Joliat

Keyword(s):

Advisory Board ◽

Science Advisory ◽

National Science

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The "H5N1 publication case" and its conclusions.

Acta Biochimica Polonica ◽

10.18388/abp.2012_2135 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 59 (3) ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Gregor Becker

Keyword(s):

Scientific Community ◽

H5n1 Virus ◽

Advisory Board ◽

Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽

Scientific Journals ◽

Mass Destruction ◽

Dual Use ◽

Sensitive Data ◽

Science Advisory ◽

National Science

The request of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to the editors of the scientific journals SCIENCE and NATURE not to publish details on the modified H5N1-virus has surprisingly not caused a discussion on censorship within the scientific community (NSABB, 2012a, P.1). This may show that science generally acknowledges the necessity to cut out sensitive data from research results in publications that may serve as a manual for weapons of mass destruction. In this article the policy of the NSABB and the reaction of the scientific community is discussed, as well as the meaning of censorship in dual use research and how an appropriate organisation of future surveillance in sensitive science fields could be organised: To guarantee future undisturbed work in sensitive science fields, the establishment of an internationally organised frame for scientists dealing with dual-use-research is suggested.

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