Supreme Court Approves Judicial Discretion in Crack Cocaine Case

2008 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Crack Cocaine ◽  
Judicial Discretion

The Israeli judiciary-centered constitutionalism

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ariel L Bendor
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Judicial Discretion ◽  
The Law ◽  
Israeli Supreme Court

Abstract The article argues that over the years a series of gradual developments has taken place in the judicial review policies of Israel’s Supreme Court, whereby the Court expanded its ad hoc discretion in determining the constitutional limits that apply to primary legislation. Israeli constitutionalism has become judiciary-centered. The article suggests that judicial discretion that the Israeli Supreme Court tends to exercise in constitutional matters is of two types: substantive judicial discretion, which concerns the interpretation or application of the law; and adjudicative discretion, which includes both the discretion to deny in limine petitions in which the Court does not deem it necessary to grant relief according to considerations such as standing or delay; and the Court’s discretion in the manner of the hearing. The article suggests three illuminations of Israeli judiciary-centered constitutionalism: expenditure of the justices’ awareness of their discretion; the decline of the rules structuring judicial discretion; and a re-rise of the justices’ recognition of legitimacy of adjudicative discretion due to the expansion of substantive judicial discretion.

scholarly journals Role of the Plenum of Russian Supreme Court in the judicial practice formation

2022 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 209-225
Author(s):  
Yu. S. Pestereva ◽  
I. G. Ragozina ◽  
E. I. Chekmezova
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Complex Analysis ◽  
The Other ◽  
Judicial Discretion ◽  
Dialectical Theory ◽  
Judicial Practice ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Law

The subject. The article considers the role of the Plenum of Russian Supreme in forming judicial practice on the example of giving qualification to the crimes committed against sexual freedom and inviolability, as well as against property and public health.The objective of the article is to conduct a complex analysis of the function of the decisions, taken by the Plenum of Russian Supreme Court, in the formation of a unified vector of judicial practice. The authors dare to refute the hypothesis hat judicial practice can be recognized as a source of law.The methodological basis of the research is the dialectical theory of development and interrelation of phenomena. Historical, formal-logical, systematic methods of knowledge have been identified as relevant to the topic of the study.The main results, scope of application. The authors draw attention to the problem of evaluative features used in the process of law enforcement when interpreting the norms of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. A norm with such signs acquires an unformalized essence from the point of view of the boundaries of criminalization of a particular phenomenon. On the other hand, the nature of crimes is so diverse that without the flexibility of criminal law regulation (allowing the use of evaluative features), the application of the norm taking into account specific circumstances in a particular case may not be possible. The authors also consider issues related to the characteristics of the objective side, the end time of these crimes, the application of the formula of a single ongoing crime and its separation from related compounds. The process of law enforcement is based on such guidelines as the norms of law, judicial discretion, established judicial practice, the position of the Plenum of Russian Supreme Court. Attributing an explanatory role to the decisions of the Plenum of Russian Supreme Court does not completely eliminate the shortcomings inherent in legal technology. Correcting the current situation with the help of judicial discretion is not always justified, since this is possible only if there is a legitimate alternative. Assigning the status of a precedent to a judicial decision may lead to the substitution of the law by decisions taken in a particular case.Conclusions. The judicial practice concerning these issues is completely different. Despite the existence of similar situations, courts, as a rule, qualify an offense using various norms of the law, which negatively affects compliance with the principle of legality. The issue related to the function of the decisions of the Plenum of Russian Supreme Court in the formation of a single vector of judicial practice has been and remains debatable. The continued addition of new articles to criminal legislation, on the one hand, indicates the desire of the legislator to bring it to perfection, but, on the other hand, forms a mechanism for clarifying the rules of its application, which sometimes leads to their contradictory interpretation. At the same time, crime and punishment should be determined only by legislation.

ABSTENTION AT THE BORDER

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maggie Gardner
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
The Other ◽  
Judicial Discretion ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Error ◽  
Hard Cases

The lower federal courts have been invoking “international comity abstention” to solve a wide array of problems in cross-border cases. In doing so, they are using a wide array of tests that vary not just across the circuits, but within them as well. That confusion will only grow, as both scholars and the Supreme Court have yet to clarify what exactly “international comity abstention” entails. Meanwhile, the breadth of “international comity abstention” stands in tension with the Supreme Court’s renewed embrace of the federal judiciary’s virtually unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given to the courts by Congress. Indeed, loose applications of “international comity abstention” risk undermining not only the interests of Congress, but the interests of the states as well.This Article argues against “international comity abstention” both as a label and as a generic doctrine. As a label, it has led courts to conflate abstention with other comity doctrines that are not about abstention at all, increasing the risk of judicial error and jeopardizing federalism protections. And as a generic doctrine, it encourages judges to decline their jurisdiction too readily, in contrast to the Court’s emphasis on the principle of jurisdictional obligation. The solution, however, is not to deny all judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction. Even if such a complete bar on abstention were intended as an act of judicial humility, it may serve to empower the judiciary instead. Absolute rules, whether based on constitutional limits or strict textualism, can override or exclude the other branches’ views regarding the proper scope of transnational litigation in U.S. courts. Leaving some space for judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction also leaves some space for the other branches to continue that conversation.In lieu of a single broad doctrine of “international comity abstention,” then, this Article proposes identifying more narrow bases for abstention in transnational litigation — bases that can be separately justified, candidly addressed, and analyzed through judicially manageable frameworks. In particular, the federal courts need a clear and consistent framework for when to stay cases in light of parallel litigation in foreign courts. A separate doctrine for deferring to foreign comprehensive remedial schemes may also be appropriate.Evaluating the doctrinal design of abstention in transnational litigation also serves as a lens through which to revisit a long-standing debate: To the extent that the principle of jurisdictional obligation reflects separation-of-powers concerns, those concerns can be addressed without insisting that judges’ hands are tied. True judicial humility recognizes both Congress’s role in defining the federal courts’ jurisdiction and the impossibility of asking judges to read Congress’s mind. Leaving space for carefully cabined discretion in hard cases recognizes both the complexity of life and the continuing need for inter-branch dialogue.

scholarly journals Interpretative Discretion of Judiciary and the Well-Being of the Child

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 187
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Hanas
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Judicial Discretion ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
The Law ◽  
Common Criterion ◽  
Full Protection ◽  
Law Making

<p>The well-being of the child is a common criterion in many Polish normative regulations pertaining to different branches of law. It is both a tool for the law-making and the executive bodies, employed to direct the law-applying bodies towards ensuring full protection of the child. This article is focused on analysing interpretative judicial discretion with respect to the well-being of the child as manifested in the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court and in the judgements of the Supreme Administrative Court and Constitutional Tribunal. In the course of the research, the author undertakes to determine the essence of interpretative judicial discretion in cases predominantly focused on establishing the current and postulated situation of the child with a view to ensuring the most favourable ruling for the same.</p>

scholarly journals Which Kraft of Statutory Interpretation? A Supreme Court of Canada Trilogy on Intellectual Property Law

2008 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cameron J. Hutchison
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Discretion ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Intellectual Property Law ◽  
Law Making

The techniques used by courts to interpret statutes can be characterized as inconsistent, and at times, excessive. Current methodologies of statutory interpretation often reflect deeply normative views about the appropriate institutional role of the legislative and judicial branches of law-making, but this characterization of the debate is misleading. Rather, the problem lies with properly discerning legislative meaning and intent in full awareness of the limitations and possibilities of statutes as communicative devices. The author suggests a new methodology of statutory interpretation, whereby courts analogize the facts before them with certain paradigm cases. This methodology serves to constrain judicial discretion and enables courts to fill gaps in legislation in connection with novel cases.

Judicial Discretion as Political Choice: The Supreme Court of Canada's Costs Awarding Power

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 929-947
Author(s):  
Emmanuelle Richez ◽  
Erin Crandall
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Access To Justice ◽  
Judicial Discretion ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Discretionary Power ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Public Interest Litigation ◽  
The Supreme Court

AbstractThis article analyzes an important discretionary power of the Supreme Court of Canada, the ability to award costs. With the use of an original data set, we explore trends in costs awarding in public interest litigation at the Supreme Court from 1970 to 2012. Our findings suggest that, over time, the Court has tended to favour nongovernment parties over government parties where the former are less likely to pay costs when they lose and more likely to receive costs when they win. In these cases, costs orders were more likely to benefit public interest litigants, such as nongovernmental organizations, than individual litigants and businesses. Together, these findings suggest a sensitivity to access to justice concerns when making costs orders, though some may argue that this sensitivity by the Court does not extend far enough.

scholarly journals Statutory Interpretation, Judicial Discretion, and Equitable Defenses

2018 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Leigh Anenson
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Default Rule ◽  
Judicial Discretion ◽  
Court Cases ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Considerable Controversy ◽  
Case Basis ◽  
Equal Concern

Equitable defenses were given up for dead after eBay v. MercExchange. But they have been resurrected. The Supreme Court is raising the dead in recent decisions. It is integrating these judge-made doctrines into federal law despite their omission from the language of the legislation. The fusion of equitable defenses into federal statutes is important because it allows judges discretion to vary statutory outcomes on a case-by-case basis. As a result, an assortment of indeterminate defenses may stand in the way of remedying statutory violations.The Supreme Court’s approach to equity exerts a decisive influence on legislative developments. There is considerable controversy surrounding the judicial use of equitable principles to deny statutory relief. Of equal concern is that courts engage in interest balancing or policy-making that may appear inconsistent with the federal judicial role. Also questionable is whether these elusive concepts can be adequately contained and comprehensible. Scholars have trained a precise lens on the issues of judicial authority and institutional competence involving statutory remedies. A corollary concern—one so intuitive we lose sight of it—is equitable defenses. The Court has yet to account for the recognition of equitable defenses that forfeit congressionally-created causes of action.This Article begins to outline an approach to the interaction between written statutes and unwritten equitable defenses. Concentrating on Supreme Court cases, it examines the decisional law of eight defenses across almost as many statutory subjects over the last two centuries. The Article exposes an equity-protective principle of interpretation that favors these ancient doctrines in modern Supreme Court practice. It also identifies possible bases for this assumption. It additionally responds to potential objections to this default rule that approves equitable defenses in legislation that does not directly provide for them. Taken as a whole, the Article explains and defends the recognition of equitable defenses in statutory law.

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