MISCARRIAGE OF JUS- TICE AS ONE OF THE REASONS FOR NOT ACHIEVING PURPOSES OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT

The article considers the hypothesis that a judicial error can significantly reduce the likelihood of achieving the goals of criminal punishment. The concepts of miscarriage of justice and the goals of punishment are formulated, and the consequences of failure to achieve the goals of criminal punishment are analyzed. Statistical data are provided that confirm the existence of the problem of inefficient implementation of the goals of criminal punishment. Possible, probable, as well as actually committed judicial errors are considered, as a result of which the goals of punishment cannot be achieved. The authors come to the conclusion that a significant reduction in the number of judicial errors will have an exceptionally positive impact not only on the judicial system, including its authority, but also on other involved systems – criminal law, penal enforcement, etc. A correct court decision regarding the size and type of punishment is a necessary basis for achieving the goals specified in Part 2 of Article 43 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

Public administration in the sphere of judicial practice problem regulation: bringing to justice for driving while intoxicated

Considering that current problems of bringing persons to legal responsibility for driving means of transportation while intoxicated are vital today, I investigated judicial practice for such cases. Also, I analyzed the legal consequences of the existing problem that occurred in connection with a legislator's failure to maintain the proper procedure for adopting changes to the current legislation in the field of road safety. The legal gaps and legal inaccuracies that exist in the current Ukrainian legislation regarding traffic rules were identified.I analyzed different approaches of the Ukrainian judicial system in the classification of offenses committed by persons who drive means of transportation or vessels under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicants that reduce attention and speed of reaction. As a result of my investigation, I identified that there is no unified judicial system in this field in Ukraine at the moment. One of the most difficult stages of legislation is the formation of an independent, competent and fair court as a standard of respect for human and civil rights and freedoms. However, judicial error does not always result from the activities of judges. Sometimes the influence of external factors, such as the ambiguity of the legislation in its wording or the obsolescence of the rule of law, is one of the influential factors that cannot be corrected or influenced by the judiciary. Based on the analysis of scientific literature, legal acts and my studies of judicial practice, I suggest improving the current system of responsibility of legal entities in the field of road safety in Ukraine by making relevant changes to the legislation.

Efficient Verification Proceedings in a Civil and Arbitration Procedure

Judicial instances are the factors of key importance in ensuring the effectiveness of court protection, an important condition for the effective implementation of the right to correct a judicial error, and minimize the costs of civil litigation. What is the role of appeal and cassation in ensuring the efficiency of Russian civil procedure at the present stage? Do verification procedures need to be rationalized at a fourth level? The answers to these questions are offered.

Filtering Tort Accidents

Conventional wisdom in the economic analysis of tort law holds that legal errors distort incentives, causing behavior to depart from the optimum. If potential injurers know that courts err, they may engage in less or more than optimal precaution. This article revisits the effect of judicial error on the incentives of potential injurers by identifying a heretofore-neglected filtering effect of uncertainty in settings of imperfect judicial decision-making. We show that when courts make errors in the application of the liability standards, uncertainty about erroneous decision-making filters out the most harmful torts but leaves unaffected less harmful accidents. Our insight applies to various procedural and institutional aspects of legal adjudication, including the randomization of case assignment, the strength of precedent, and the use of standards versus rules.

Judicial Error: Responsibility, but not the Right

In the article, the causes of judicial errors are discussed. The author examines the possibilities of imposing discipline sanctions on judges for their errors, considers a range of questions. In particular, should a judge seek the truth while hearing a case? Is a judge responsible for not only his or her errors but also for the errors of investigators, experts, and other participants of a proceeding? The author indicates various types of judicial errors and comes to a conclusion that gradual accumulation of ordinary or insignificant errors in the judge’s activity inevitably leads to systematic (or unordinary) errors. They indicate that the judge is unfair or incompetent. Drawing on personal professional experience and judicial practice, positions of the Russian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights, the author makes a link between judicial errors and the quality of justice. He emphasizes that the judge should follow the legal rules concerning adjudication and maintain his or her level of competence.

ABSTENTION AT THE BORDER

The lower federal courts have been invoking “international comity abstention” to solve a wide array of problems in cross-border cases. In doing so, they are using a wide array of tests that vary not just across the circuits, but within them as well. That confusion will only grow, as both scholars and the Supreme Court have yet to clarify what exactly “international comity abstention” entails. Meanwhile, the breadth of “international comity abstention” stands in tension with the Supreme Court’s renewed embrace of the federal judiciary’s virtually unflagging obligation to exercise the jurisdiction given to the courts by Congress. Indeed, loose applications of “international comity abstention” risk undermining not only the interests of Congress, but the interests of the states as well.This Article argues against “international comity abstention” both as a label and as a generic doctrine. As a label, it has led courts to conflate abstention with other comity doctrines that are not about abstention at all, increasing the risk of judicial error and jeopardizing federalism protections. And as a generic doctrine, it encourages judges to decline their jurisdiction too readily, in contrast to the Court’s emphasis on the principle of jurisdictional obligation. The solution, however, is not to deny all judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction. Even if such a complete bar on abstention were intended as an act of judicial humility, it may serve to empower the judiciary instead. Absolute rules, whether based on constitutional limits or strict textualism, can override or exclude the other branches’ views regarding the proper scope of transnational litigation in U.S. courts. Leaving some space for judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction also leaves some space for the other branches to continue that conversation.In lieu of a single broad doctrine of “international comity abstention,” then, this Article proposes identifying more narrow bases for abstention in transnational litigation — bases that can be separately justified, candidly addressed, and analyzed through judicially manageable frameworks. In particular, the federal courts need a clear and consistent framework for when to stay cases in light of parallel litigation in foreign courts. A separate doctrine for deferring to foreign comprehensive remedial schemes may also be appropriate.Evaluating the doctrinal design of abstention in transnational litigation also serves as a lens through which to revisit a long-standing debate: To the extent that the principle of jurisdictional obligation reflects separation-of-powers concerns, those concerns can be addressed without insisting that judges’ hands are tied. True judicial humility recognizes both Congress’s role in defining the federal courts’ jurisdiction and the impossibility of asking judges to read Congress’s mind. Leaving space for carefully cabined discretion in hard cases recognizes both the complexity of life and the continuing need for inter-branch dialogue.