Toward a Science of Human Rule Systems

1969 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Hogan ◽  
Nancy M. Henley
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan

This chapter discusses conflict-resolution tools and develops an analytical structure building on rules and principles in international intellectual property (IP) treaties, other rule-systems, and general international law to define norm relationships of interpretation and of conflict. Several tools are taken from the ‘toolbox’ developed in the Fragmentation Report of the International Law Commission and other fragmentation literature. Depending on the type of relationship at stake, the most appropriate legal tools to address them may vary. The ILC Report and Conclusions provide for some of the tools and to some extent for an analytical structure, a logical order for examining these relationships. As the chapter shows, for some types of legal relations other approaches are more adequate. They hence complement the ILC principles and need to be integrated in the set of tools available.


Author(s):  
Giles Reger ◽  
David Rydeheard

AbstractParametric runtime verification is the process of verifying properties of execution traces of (data carrying) events produced by a running system. This paper continues our work exploring the relationship between specification techniques for parametric runtime verification. Here we consider the correspondence between trace-slicing automata-based approaches and rule systems. The main contribution is a translation from quantified automata to rule systems, which has been implemented in Scala. This then allows us to highlight the key differences in how the two formalisms handle data, an important step in our wider effort to understand the correspondence between different specification languages for parametric runtime verification. This paper extends a previous conference version of this paper with further examples, a proof of correctness, and an optimisation based on a notion of redundancy observed during the development of the translation.


2000 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 487-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
James S. Wunsch

The political revolution of contemporary Africa has so far largely been limited to the centre and to re-establishing the same institutional forms and processes which failed Africa in the 1960s. These regimes are already showing signs of erosion. This problem can be understood through the theory of public goods. Key collective or ‘public’ goods problems impede the collective action necessary for institutional development. Top-down strategies cannot surmount these problems because they cannot integrate and unify the population or structure consensual and sustained collective action.As currently constituted, national levels of government in Africa will be poor partners with local communities in development, be it of democracy or of the economy. In many cases, national regimes only exist at all because minimal contributing sets or political monopolists controlled, were given, or mobilised the resources to establish constituting rule systems which they used to sustain their existing relative advantages during the break-up of imperial systems. As this advantage is usually at the expense of the majority which lives outside the capitals, resources and policies to improve these areas are slow in coming. The slow, bottom-up process by which a true public constitution is built, one which reflects and elaborates generally held values, is built on existing political relationships, and protects social diversity, has never been allowed to develop.Refounding the African state must resolve these problems if it is to succeed. Ethnically and religiously diverse peoples will rule themselves better under federal and consociational systems which give local leaders space to lead local institutional development, authority to play a role in national governance, a process to develop consensus on central policy and to check the centre when there is no consensus. This requires a foundation of viable, real, developed structures of local governance if it is to succeed.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (12) ◽  
pp. e51468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shang-Ming Zhou ◽  
Ronan A. Lyons ◽  
Sinead Brophy ◽  
Mike B. Gravenor

Author(s):  
James Bailey ◽  
Guozhu Dong ◽  
Kotagiri Ramamohanarao
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Christian Freudlsperger

The concluding chapter of Trade Policy in Multilevel Government not only elaborates on the theoretical model’s explanatory power and its limits in the light of the three analysed polities, but also turns to raising questions as to the democratic legitimacy of the multilevel pattern of trade policy described in the book. Questions of democratic legitimacy in multilevel systems are complicated by the fact that a popular and a territorial logic of representation coexist and, at times, compete. Both citizens and constituent units are entitled to input into the system. The ensuing tension between popular and territorial logics of representation also permeates multilevel trade governance. In the EU and the Canadian cases, territorial legitimacy clearly takes precedence over popular representation. Seen from this perspective, the US case appears in a somewhat different light. In the face of adaptational pressures arising from economic and political globalization, popular representation could also be regarded as an additional layer of autonomy in self-rule systems of multilevel government.


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