The Subjective Value of Cognitive Effort: A Behavioral Economics Approach

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Westbrook ◽  
Todd S. Braver
2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (6) ◽  
pp. 704-705 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Andrew Westbrook ◽  
Todd S. Braver

AbstractIf cognitive effort indexes opportunity costs, it should be investigated like other cost factors including risk and delay. We discuss recent methodological advances in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics, highlighting our own work in measuring the subjective (economic) value of cognitive effort. We discuss the implications of Kurzban et al.'s proposal and how some of its predictions may be untestable without behavioral economic formalisms.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd A Vogel ◽  
Zachary M. Savelson ◽  
A Ross Otto ◽  
Mathieu Roy

Cognitive effort is described as aversive, and people will generally avoid it when possible. This aversion to effort is believed to arise from a cost–benefit analysis of the actions available (e.g., study hard for an upcoming test or socialize with friends). The comparison of cognitive effort against other primary aversive experiences, however, remains relatively unexplored. Here, we offered participants choices between performing a cognitively demanding task or experiencing thermal pain. We found that cognitive effort can be traded off for physical pain and that people generally avoid exerting high levels of cognitive effort. We also used computational modelling to examine the subjective value of effort and its effects on response behaviours. Applying this model to decision times revealed asymmetric effects of effort and pain, suggesting that cognitive effort may not share the same basic influences on avoidance behaviour as more primary aversive stimuli such as physical pain.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Polania

"Which meal would you like, chicken or pasta? Chicken please. ...hmmm not sure. No sorry, I prefer pasta". Confidence, the subjective estimate of decision quality, is an essential component of decision making. It is necessary for learning from mistakes in the absence of immediate feedback and guiding future actions. Despite its importance, it remains unclear where confidence judgments originate from, especially for decisions that rely on individual subjective values and preferences. Here, we devised a behavioural paradigm and a computational framework that allowed us to formally tease apart the sources of confidence in value-based decisions. In line with canonical decision theories, we found that trial-to-trial fluctuations in the precision of value encoding impact economic choice consistency. Surprisingly, however, and contrary to canonical theories of confidence, this uncertainty has no influence on confidence reports. Instead, we find that confidence reflects the degree of balance and cognitive effort with which the choice alternatives have been compared. Specifically, we show that confidence emerges from endogenous attentional effort towards choice alternatives and down-stream noise in the comparison process. These findings caution a direct translation of canonical frameworks of confidence based on perceptual decision behavior into the value-based choice domain. In addition our computational framework provides an explanation for confidence miss-attributions in economic behaviour and reveals the mechanistic interplay of endogenous attentional states and subjective value for guiding decisions and metacognitive awareness.


2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (20) ◽  
pp. 3934-3947 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Westbrook ◽  
Bidhan Lamichhane ◽  
Todd Braver

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory John Depow ◽  
Hause Lin ◽  
Michael Inzlicht

Effort is aversive and often avoided—even when earning benefits for oneself— yet people sometimes work hard for others. How do people decide who is worth their effort? Prior work has found avoidance of physical effort for strangers. Here, we find people avoid cognitive effort for others relative to themselves, even when the cause is personally meaningful. We suggest that perceived overlap between self and other may underlie prosocial decisions involving effort. In two studies, participants repeatedly decided whether to invest cognitive effort to gain financial rewards for themselves and others. In Study 1, participants were less willing to invest cognitive effort for a charity they elected to support than themselves. In Study 2, participants were more willing to work cognitively for a charity than an intragroup stranger, but again preferred to think to earn rewards for themselves. Computational modeling suggests that, unlike physical effort, cognitive effort discounts the subjective value of rewards linearly. Participants varied in their willingness to invest prosocial effort. Follow-up machine learning analyses indicate that people who represented others more similarly to themselves were more willing to invest effort on their behalf. Our findings suggest that highlighting people’s similarities may be one way to promote prosocial effort.


2020 ◽  
Vol 123 (6) ◽  
pp. 2161-2172
Author(s):  
Tehrim Yoon ◽  
Afareen Jaleel ◽  
Alaa A. Ahmed ◽  
Reza Shadmehr

Behavioral economics relies on subjective evaluation, an abstract quantity that cannot be measured directly but must be inferred by fitting decision models to the choice patterns. Here, we present a new approach to estimate subjective value: with nothing to fit, we show that it is possible to estimate subjective value based on movement kinematics, providing a modest ability to predict a participant’s preferences without prior measurement of their choice patterns.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda M Ferguson ◽  
Daryl Cameron ◽  
Michael Inzlicht

Empathy often feels automatic, but variations in empathic responding suggest that, at least some of the time, empathy is affected by one’s motivation to empathize in any particular circumstance. Here, we show that people can be motivated to engage in (or avoid) empathy-eliciting situations with strangers, and that these decisions are driven by subjective value-based estimations of the costs (e.g., cognitive effort) and benefits (e.g., social reward) inherent to empathizing. Across seven experiments (overall N = 1,348), and replicating previous work (Cameron et al., 2019), we found a robust empathy avoidance effect. We also find support for the hypothesis that individuals can be motivated to opt-in to situations requiring empathy that they would otherwise avoid. Participants were more likely to opt into empathy-eliciting situations if 1) they were incentivized monetarily for doing so (Experiments 1a and 1b), and 2) if a more familiar and liked empathy target was available (Experiments 2a and 2b). Framing empathy as explicitly related to one’s moral character and reputation did not motivate participants to engage in empathy (Experiment 3a and 3c), though these null results may be due to a weak manipulation. These findings suggest that empathy can be motivated in multiple ways, and is a process driven by context-specific value-based decision making.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Westbrook ◽  
Bidhan Lamichhane ◽  
Todd Braver

SummaryCognitive control is necessary for goal-directed behavior, yet people treat control as costly, discounting goal value by cognitive demands in a similar manner as they would for delayed or risky outcomes. It is unclear, however, whether a putatively domain-general valuation network implicated in other cost domains also encodes the subjective value (SV) of cognitive effort. Here, we demonstrate that a valuation network, centered on the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum, also encodes SV during cognitive effort-based decision-making. We doubly dissociate this network from a primarily frontoparietal network recruited as a function of decision difficulty. We also find evidence that SV signals predict choice and are influenced by state and trait motivation, including sensitivity to reward and anticipated task performance. These findings unify cognitive effort with other cost domains, and inform physiological mechanisms of SV representations underlying the willingness to expend cognitive effort.


eLife ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd A Vogel ◽  
Zachary M Savelson ◽  
A Ross Otto ◽  
Mathieu Roy

Cognitive effort is described as aversive, and people will generally avoid it when possible. This aversion to effort is believed to arise from a cost–benefit analysis of the actions available. The comparison of cognitive effort against other primary aversive experiences, however, remains relatively unexplored. Here, we offered participants choices between performing a cognitively demanding task or experiencing thermal pain. We found that cognitive effort can be traded off for physical pain and that people generally avoid exerting high levels of cognitive effort. We also used computational modelling to examine the aversive subjective value of effort and its effects on response behaviours. Applying this model to decision times revealed asymmetric effects of effort and pain, suggesting that cognitive effort may not share the same basic influences on avoidance behaviour as more primary aversive stimuli such as physical pain.


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