Can social categories be manipulated? Exploring the in-group bias in facial recognition using a minimal group procedure

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maia T. Nguyen ◽  
Lucy J. Troup
2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya Machunsky ◽  
Thorsten Meiser

This research investigated whether relative ingroup prototypicality (i.e., the tendency to perceive one’s own ingroup as more prototypical of a superordinate category than the outgroup) can result from a prototype-based versus exemplar-based mental representation of social categories, rather than from ingroup membership per se as previously suggested by the ingroup projection model. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that a prototype-based group was perceived as more prototypical of a superordinate category than an exemplar-based group supporting the hypothesis that an intergroup context is not necessary for biased prototypicality judgments. Experiment 3 introduced an intergroup context in a minimal-group-like paradigm. The findings demonstrated that both the kind of cognitive representation and motivational processes contribute to biased prototypicality judgments in intergroup settings.


2021 ◽  
pp. 0261927X2110351
Author(s):  
Marie-France Champoux-Larsson ◽  
Frida Ramström ◽  
Albert Costa ◽  
Cristina Baus

Two experimental studies were conducted to replicate the effect found by Baus et al. where language as a marker of social categories affected recognition of faces in an old/new paradigm. In Study 1, we presented faces along with utterances in Swedish and in English to native Swedish speakers. Faces presented along with Swedish utterances were not recognized better than faces presented along with English utterances. In Study 2, we used another language pair and presented faces along with utterances in Swedish and in Spanish to native Swedish speakers. Faces presented along with Swedish utterances were recognized better than faces presented along with Spanish utterances. Our results suggest that language functions as a marker of social categories and that, similarly to other markers of social categories, it can be modulated by various factors and is not unconditional.


Author(s):  
Chrisanthi Nega

Abstract. Four experiments were conducted investigating the effect of size congruency on facial recognition memory, measured by remember, know and guess responses. Different study times were employed, that is extremely short (300 and 700 ms), short (1,000 ms), and long times (5,000 ms). With the short study time (1,000 ms) size congruency occurred in knowing. With the long study time the effect of size congruency occurred in remembering. These results support the distinctiveness/fluency account of remembering and knowing as well as the memory systems account, since the size congruency effect that occurred in knowing under conditions that facilitated perceptual fluency also occurred independently in remembering under conditions that facilitated elaborative encoding. They do not support the idea that remember and know responses reflect differences in trace strength.


2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 131-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catharina Casper ◽  
Klaus Rothermund ◽  
Dirk Wentura

Processes involving an automatic activation of stereotypes in different contexts were investigated using a priming paradigm with the lexical decision task. The names of social categories were combined with background pictures of specific situations to yield a compound prime comprising category and context information. Significant category priming effects for stereotypic attributes (e.g., Bavarians – beer) emerged for fitting contexts (e.g., in combination with a picture of a marquee) but not for nonfitting contexts (e.g., in combination with a picture of a shop). Findings indicate that social stereotypes are organized as specific mental schemas that are triggered by a combination of category and context information.


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