The Emergence of Lying for Reputational Concerns in 5-Year-Olds

Research suggests that even young children engage in strategic behaviors to manipulate the impressions others form of them and that they manage their reputation in order to cooperate with others. The current study investigated whether young children also lie in order to manage their, or their group’s, reputation in front of ingroup and outgroup members. Five-year old children (n=55) were randomly assigned to an individual reputation condition or a group reputation condition. Then, they played a mini dictator game in which they could share privately any number of their or their group’s stickers with an anonymous child. Participants then met ingroup and outgroup members, established through a minimal group design, via a pre-recorded, staged Skype call. Group members asked the participant how many stickers she, or her group, had donated. Results revealed that children stated to peers to have donated more than their actual donation, with no differences between conditions and no difference toward ingroup and outgroup members. Findings suggest that by 5years of age, children use lying as a strategy to manage their reputation.

Susceptibility to Ingroup Influence in Adolescents With Intellectual Disability: A Minimal Group Experiment on Social Judgment Making

Adolescents with intellectual disability (ID) experience challenges and uncertainty when making judgments about other people’s intentions. In an attempt to achieve certainty, they might exhibit judgment tendencies that differ from those of typically developing adolescents. This study investigated social judgment making in adolescents with ID (n = 34, Mage = 14.89 years, SD = 1.41 years) compared with chronological age-matched adolescents without ID (n = 34, Mage = 14.68 years, SD = 1.15 years) and mental age (MA)-matched children (n = 34, Mage = 7.93 years, SD = 0.64 years). Participants used a computer-based task to judge the hostility of persons (fictitious characters). Adolescents with ID were found to make more polarizing judgments (i.e., either positive or negative, as opposed to moderate judgments) and were more likely to be guided by the opinions of a fictitious peer ingroup (minimal group) compared with adolescents without ID. No such differences were found between adolescents with ID and MA-matched children. The results are discussed in terms of scientific and practical implications.

Who Can Be in a Group? 3- to 5-Year-Old Children Construe Realistic Social Groups Through Mutual Intentionality

Recent research suggests that young children’s causal justification for minimal group membership can be induced via a cognitive framework of mutual intentionality. That is, an individual can become a group member when both the individual and group agree to membership. Here, we investigated if children ages 3-5 understand groups formed by mutual intentions and whether they apply mutual intentions to realistic groups with varying entitative and essentialized qualities. In two studies (N = 197), we asked 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children if a novel character could join an existing group based on intentionality (mutual, individual-, group-only) and group type (task, friends, family). We find that 4- and 5-year-olds robustly relied on mutual intentions to constitute group membership and 3-year-olds also demonstrated emerging usage of this cognitive framework. Moreover, children employed mutual intentionality across different group types, suggesting a general framework for children’s understanding of different social groups.

Reading About Us and Them: Moral but no Minimal Group Effects on Language-Induced Emotion

Many of our everyday emotional responses are triggered by language, and a full understanding of how people use language therefore also requires an analysis of how words elicit emotion as they are heard or read. We report a facial electromyography experiment in which we recorded corrugator supercilii, or “frowning muscle”, activity to assess how readers processed emotion-describing language in moral and minimal in/outgroup contexts. Participants read sentence-initial phrases like “Mark is angry” or “Mark is happy” after descriptions that defined the character at hand as a good person, a bad person, a member of a minimal ingroup, or a member of a minimal outgroup (realizing the latter two by classifying participants as personality “type P” and having them read about characters of “type P” or “type O”). As in our earlier work, moral group status of the character clearly modulated how readers responded to descriptions of character emotions, with more frowning to “Mark is angry” than to “Mark is happy” when the character had previously been described as morally good, but not when the character had been described as morally bad. Minimal group status, however, did not matter to how the critical phrases were processed, with more frowning to “Mark is angry” than to “Mark is happy” across the board. Our morality-based findings are compatible with a model in which readers use their emotion systems to simultaneously simulate a character’s emotion and evaluate that emotion against their own social standards. The minimal-group result does not contradict this model, but also does not provide new evidence for it.

Do demand characteristics contribute to minimal ingroup preferences?

“Minimal group” paradigms investigate social preferences arising from mere group membership. We asked whether demand characteristics contribute to children’s apparent minimal group bias in a preregistered experiment (N = 160). In a “group” condition, we attempted to replicate findings of bias following assignment to minimal groups. A second closely-matched “no-group” condition retained potential demand characteristics while removing group assignment. Parallel bias in the no-group condition would suggest that demand characteristics contribute to findings of apparent ingroup bias. Three main findings emerged. First, in the group condition, ingroup preference emerged in one of three bias measures only. Second, this preference emerged although participants evaluated ingroup/outgroup photos varying in race/ethnicity between trials. Third, the measure that yielded ingroup preferences in the group condition produced no parallel bias in the no-group condition, consistent with the view that mere membership in a group, not experimental demand, leads to minimal ingroup preferences.