scholarly journals She told me about a singing cactus: Counterintuitive concepts are more accurately attributed to their speakers than ordinary concepts.

Author(s):  
Spencer Mermelstein ◽  
Michael Barlev ◽  
Tamsin C. German
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe

Within the cognitive science of religion, some scholars hypothesize (1) that minimally counterintuitive (MCI) concepts enjoy a transmission advantage over both intuitive and highly counterintuitive concepts, (2) that religions concern counterintuitive agents, objects, or events, and (3) that the transmission advantage of MCI concepts makes them more likely to be found in the world’s religions than other kinds of concepts. We hypothesized that the memorability of many MCI supernatural concepts was due in large part to other characteristics they possess, such as their frequent and salient association with moral concerns and the alleviation of existential anxieties, and that without such characteristics they would fail to be memorable. We report the results of three experiments designed to test the relative contributions of minimal counterintuitiveness, moral valence, and existential anxiety to the memorability of supernatural ideas. We observed no main effects for minimal counterintuitiveness but did observe main effects for both moral valence and existential anxiety. We also found that these effects did not seem to stem from the greater visualizability of morally valenced concepts or concepts that concerned existential anxieties. These findings challenge important claims made by leading researchers regarding MCI concepts within the cognitive science of religion.


2004 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Lisdorf

AbstractPascal Boyer, Justin Barret and associates have recently developed precise and testable hypotheses about what makes a concept attention-demanding, easier to recall and therefore has increased probability of being transmitted. Two theses are tested: 1) that all else being equal counterintuitive concepts are better remembered than bizarre, and bizarre better than common; 2) that counterintuitive concepts containing certain templates, which involve the activation of theory of mind expectations should have greater success. The research so far has been in controlled experiments, but it should be possible to test the theses "in the wild". The evidence from the roman prodigy reports offers us such a possibility. It also enables us to check for variation across time, which hasn't been done before. Thesis 1) is confirmed, but not thesis 2). It is argued however that this is not a disconfirmation of Boyer's general thesis. By considering the context it is argued that it does not disconfirm the basic assumption of the theory. The evidence could suggest that when the "social inferential potential" of templates activating TOM expectations is not used it has no transmission advantage. It is also argued that the specific distribution shows that what is normally considered local cultural factors, have a real effect on what is transmitted.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 296-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannah R. Wilkinson ◽  
◽  
Claire Smid ◽  
Su Morris ◽  
Emily K. Farran ◽  
...  

AbstractEvidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that learning counterintuitive concepts in mathematics and science requires inhibitory control (IC). This prevents interference from misleading perceptual cues and naïve theories children have built from their experiences of the world. Here, we (1) investigate associations between IC, counterintuitive reasoning, and academic achievement and (2) evaluate a classroom-based computerised intervention, called Stop & Think, designed to embed IC training within the learning domain (i.e. mathematics and science content from the school curricula). Cross-sectional analyses of data from 627 children in Years 3 and 5 (7- to 10-year-olds) demonstrated that IC, measured on a Stroop-like task, was associated with counterintuitive reasoning and mathematics and science achievement. A subsample (n = 456) participated either in Stop & Think as a whole-class activity (teacher-led, STT) or using individual computers (pupil-led, STP), or had teaching as usual (TAU). For Year 3 children (but not Year 5), Stop & Think led to better counterintuitive reasoning (i.e. near transfer) in STT (p < .001, ηp2 = .067) and STP (p < .01, ηp2 = .041) compared to TAU. Achievement data was not available for Year 3 STP or Year 5 STT. For Year 3, STT led to better science achievement (i.e. far transfer) compared to TAU (p < .05, ηp2 = .077). There was no transfer to the Stroop-like measure of IC. Overall, these findings support the idea that IC may contribute to counterintuitive reasoning and mathematics and science achievement. Further, we provide preliminary evidence of a domain-specific IC intervention with transferable benefits to academic achievement for Year 3 children.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Harmon-Vukić ◽  
M. Afzal Upal ◽  
Kelly J. Sheehan

2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 308-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Barrett

AbstractBoyer's theory of counterintuitive cultural concept transmission claims that concepts that ideas that violate naturally occurring intuitive knowledge structures enough to be attention-demanding but not so much to undermine conceptual coherence have a transmission advantage over other concepts (Boyer et al. 2001: 535-64). Because of the prominence of these counterintuitive concepts in religious belief systems, Boyer's theory features prominently in many cognitive treatments of religion. Difficulties in identifying what are and are not counterintuitive concepts in this technical sense, however, has made empirical treatment of Boyer's theory irregular and difficult to evaluate. Further, inability to quantify just how counterintuitive a given concept is has made ambiguous specifying where the alleged cognitive optimum lies. The present project attempts to clarify Boyer's theory and presents a formal system for coding and quantifying the "counterintuitiveness" of a concept, and hence, facilitates empirical scrutiny of the theory.


2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 271-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Reed Burdett ◽  
Tenelle Porter ◽  
Justin Barrett

AbstractThe present study sought to (1) determine whether Barrett's counterintuitiveness coding and quantifying scheme (CI-Scheme) could be applied to cultural materials with sufficient intercoder reliability, (2) provide evidence concerning just how counterintuitive is too counterintuitive for a concept to be a recurrent cultural idea, and (3) test whether counterintuitive intentional agent concepts are more common in folktales than other classes of counterintuitive concepts. Seventy-three folktales from around the world were sampled from larger collections. Using Barrett's CI-Scheme, two independent coders identified 116 counterintuitive objects and scored them for degree of counterintuitiveness with very high inter-rater concordance. Of folktales, 79% had one or two counterintuitive objects. Of the counterintuitive objects 93% had a counterintuitiveness score of only one. Of counterintuitive objects, 98% were agents. Results suggest the CI-Scheme may have utility for analyzing cultural materials, that the cognitive optimum for cultural transmission falls around one counterintuitive feature, and that counterintuitive agents are more common than other types of counterintuitive objects in folktales.


2013 ◽  
Vol 37 (7) ◽  
pp. 1251-1289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konika Banerjee ◽  
Omar S. Haque ◽  
Elizabeth S. Spelke

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 57-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Jason Slone ◽  

AbstractResearch on the cognitive foundations of cultural transmission has recently demonstrated that concepts which minimally violate one domain-specific ontological category expectation, or "minimally counterintuitive" concepts (MCI), are better recalled, all else being equal, than "intuitive" concepts (INT), which do not violate domain-specific ontological expectations. In addition, memory for MCI concepts is better than memory for "maximally counterintuitive concepts" (MXCI), or concepts which violate more than one domain-specifi c ontological expectation. Thus, MCI items appear to enjoy a memory advantage, although these effects are heavily affected by context. The present experiment was designed to investigate the influence of integration on the MCI effect. Participants memorized a series of stories that were either intuitive (INT), minimally counterintuitive (MCI), or maximally counterintuitive (MXCI). In addition, the stories were either causally integrated or not. Cued recall results suggested that integration of a story is a significant factor influencing memory performance. We argue that these results are complimentary to the MCI hypothesis.


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